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Abstract
Cognitive development is widely believed to occur in a domain-specific fashion
(Chomsky, 1975; Fodor, 1983, Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994) and it has been
suggested that children have three core domains of thought: physics, psychology and
biology (e.g. Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). However, there is
disagreement among researchers surrounding when and how biological
understanding arises. This thesis reports three studies about children's understanding
of illness, an important area of biological knowledge. The first aim of this thesis is to
examine the development of children's understanding of illness within the context of
the debates on biological knowledge.
Further, it has been identified that children's conceptions of illness often differ from
the ones being taught (Au & Romo, 1999) and can act as barriers to learning (Driver,
Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985). Therefore, there is a challenge to develop effective
intervention methods to improve understanding in this area; this is the second aim of
this thesis.
Study 1 reports the findings from an investigation into children's understanding of a
range of illnesses. It was found that children's understanding of different illness
becomes more sophisticated and accurate with age. Specifically, children employed a
physical model (e.g., He caught a cold because it was cold) to conceptualise illness
and gradually moved to a biological model with age, in line with the suggestions of
Au and Romo (1999) and Kalish (1999). They also appeared to explain injuries
purely in a physical way, and these explanations became more detailed and accurate
with age. A further finding is that children seem to have different levels of
knowledge for different illnesses.
The results of Study 1 also provided a baseline measure for the subsequent 2 studies,
by identifying that children's understanding of contagious illness as a good candidate
for intervention. Study 2 compared three different intervention conditions for
improving knowledge of the common cold and chicken pox. These were a group
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condition plus factual information, a group condition, and an individual condition
plus factual information. Measures of two non-contagious illnesses were also taken
at pre- and post-test. Only one significant difference was found: the group plus facts
condition had higher pre- to post test change scores for cold than the group condition.
However, trends in the data indicated that the conditions in which factual information
was provided were more successful than those that did not. As well as differences
between the intervention conditions, the older age group showed greater pre- to post-
test improvement than the younger age group. Additionally, improvements in
knowledge did not generalise to non-contagious illnesses.
Study 3 built on the findings of Study 2 by further investigating factual information
as the chosen intervention method. In this study, factual information was teamed
with an individual activity and the comparisons were made between different types
of factual information. It was found that factual information that included detailed
explanations of biological functions lead to greater improvements in knowledge than
factual information that only gave basic facts. Certain age dependent trends first seen
in Study 2, were also seen in Study 3: notably, the 11 year old age group showed
greater improvement than the 7 year olds. Furthermore, the increased understanding
of contagion generalised to other contagious illnesses and not just the target illnesses
of cold and chicken pox.
The findings from the studies lead to the conclusion that children develop a
biological understanding of illness at around 7-9 years, before which they understand
illness in physical terms. This corresponds with the theoretical positions of Kalish
(1999) and Au and Romo (1999). Intervention methods that were best placed to
improve children's understanding of illness were those that were successful in
promoting engagement with the task. The provision of explanations of illness
processes was particularly successful. The findings of this thesis not only further the
knowledge on the structure and development of children's biological knowledge, but
they also contribute to debate on the best way to teach about biology and health.
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Chapter 1: Theories ofCognitive Development and Children 's Understanding ofBiology 1
1.1. Aims of this Thesis
Research has identified that children have intuitive scientific knowledge before being
taught it in school (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). These nai've conceptions often differ
from ones that teachers are trying to teach and can act as barriers to learning (Driver,
Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985). Intervention methods which engage children's intuitive
knowledge have been shown to improve understanding of physics (Howe, Rodgers &
Tolmie, 1990) and recent research has suggested that similar intervention methods may
be successful in improving understanding of biology, including concepts of illness and
health (Sigelman et ah, 1996; Solomon & Johnson, 2000). There is a lack of research in
this area, however, which this thesis will help to redress.
This thesis will focus on children's understanding of illness, an important area of
biological knowledge (Siegal & Peterson, 1999). The aims are twofold. Firstly, the
thesis aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the development of children's illness
concepts throughout childhood and identify gaps in their knowledge that may benefit
from intervention. The second aim is to develop intervention methods that may be
successful in improving children's understanding of illness by specifically targeting the
identified gaps in conceptual understanding. The results will add to knowledge on how
children conceptualise illness and the different instruction methods that are successful in
teaching about this concept. This is especially pertinent regarding recent theories of
domain-specific development as there is current debate regarding the presence of a
domain of biology, separate from other areas of understanding, the age at which this
domain emerges and the processes that influence development within this domain. In
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addition, this thesis will have strong practical implications regarding teaching health
and illness concepts in schools and communicating about illness in health care settings.
To fulfil these aims, three empirical studies will be conducted. These are reported in
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 reports a study that will meet the first aim by
interviewing children about a variety of illnesses and illness processes. The research to
be reported in Chapters 5 and 6 will compare different intervention types for improving
children's understanding of illness, thus satisfying the second aim of this thesis.
1.2. Introduction
This chapter will begin by describing theories of development. Traditionally,
educational practice has been influenced by theories within psychology, therefore this
chapter provides a basis for the rest of the thesis. Firstly, Piaget's theory of development
will be outlined. His account of development proposes that development proceeds
simultaneously across all domains of knowledge as a result of changes in cognition.
This chapter will show how discontentment with these ideas led to the recent school of
thought that proposes domain-specific development. Domain-specific theorists argue
that several foundational areas of understanding develop independently from one
another and children's abilities in one of these areas does not always reflect their
abilities in another. Within this school of thought, however, there are several contrasting
accounts in the way in which cognition is organised. This chapter will cover modular
accounts of development as well as intuitive theory perspectives.
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The second part of this chapter will discuss the literature covering children's biological
knowledge. Again, there are several conflicting ideas about how children understand
biological phenomena which will be covered in this chapter. The chapter will conclude
with implications for the rest of the thesis as these discussions provide the grounds for
the next two chapters that discuss children's concepts of illness and different
intervention methods. Accounts of children's conceptual development have been
heavily influenced by theories of development as will be shown in Chapter 2.
Furthermore, theories of development have implications for teaching and instruction
methods to be discussed in Chapter 3.
1.3. Piaget's Domain-general Theory of Development
The first, and most comprehensive, theory to date of development is that of Piaget
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). Piaget believed that knowledge is constructed. He did not see
it as innate as proposed by Chomsky (1986), nor as a sole product of the environment as
argued by Skinner (1957). Instead Piaget thought development was a result of the
interaction between the individual and the environment. This interaction was not just
described as the individual acting upon the environment but also the environment acting
upon the individual. Mental development was characterised by major qualitative
changes which occurred through a process of assimilation and accommodation.
Assimilation being the process of taking in new information and transforming it to fit in
with previous ways of thinking. Accommodation being when existing mental structures
are adapted to incorporate incoming information.
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Piaget and Inhelder (1969) proposed that development proceeds through a series of
stages, each qualitatively different from one another. At each stage the child makes use
of different internal mechanisms for organising information, and at each new stage,
capacities developed at an earlier stage are reworked into a more complex structure.
Children pass through the stages at different rates, but the stages are always passed
through in a fixed order. The four main stages of intellectual growth are: the sensori¬
motor period, the pre-operational period, the concrete operational period and the formal
operational period. From birth to approximately 18 months is classified as the sensori¬
motor period, where the infant explores and recognises objects with the senses. The pre¬
operational period is between 18 months and 7 years and children begin to represent
actions with symbols but their thinking is still linked to their own perceptions. During
the concrete operational period, 7 years to 12 years, children become capable of logical
thought and begin to grasp abstract notions such as conservation of liquids and
substance. However, children at this stage still have problems with abstract thought
which does not become possible until the formal operational period. At this stage,
children are able to understand highly abstract and formal relationships.
Domain-general theories of development were accepted for a long time as accurately
characterising children's mental development and as such have had strong implications
for educational practice. The idea that children's thinking is qualitatively different from
adults has made cognitive development more than a matter of merely giving children
more information to increase their level of knowledge. In particular, Piaget saw the
child as an active learner, who needs to construct knowledge. One example of this in
practice is in mathematics and science lessons, where children can be helped to make
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the transition from pre-operational thinking to concrete operations through encouraging
practical and experimental work. Piaget emphasised individualised learning approaches
but also acknowledged the importance of social interaction as a factor in cognitive
development. He proposed that by listening to other children's viewpoints and having
their own views challenged, cognition would advance through a process of cognitive
conflict. This idea will be explored in more depth in Chapter 3 when discussing
different methods of instruction for use in learning environments.
1.3.1. Criticisms and Alternatives to Piaget's Theory
Despite its huge influence, Piaget's theory has come under serious criticism. Vygotsky
(1978) argued that Piaget's theory neglected the effects of the social environment. In
contrast, sociocultural factors are the main emphasis of Vygotsky's theory. Like Piaget,
he acknowledged that biological and environmental factors interact to produce
development, but instead of focusing on internal, mental structures, he said that the
biological and environmental factors may have very different effects depending on the
people among who the child grows up in, i.e. the culture of the people. The most
important concept to come out of Vygotsky's theory is the zone of proximal
development (ZPD). Chapter 3 includes further discussion on Vygotsky's theory.
Other criticisms of Piaget are a result of subsequent research, which has demonstrated
that young children's abilities are greater than suggested. Firstly, Donaldson (1978) led
a research effort to show that failure on classic Piagetian tasks did not indicate lack of
cognition. Instead, it was argued that the demands of the task were too high or didn't
make "human sense". More recently, new methodological techniques for studying
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infancy have been developed and research on innate cognitive capabilities indicates that
children have greater abilities in infancy than domain-general theorists would suggest.
For example, using a preferential looking task, it has been shown that infants show
surprise (by looking longer) at a ball that stops in mid-air without support, indicating
they are sensitive to violations of certain laws of physics (Spelke, Breinlinger,
Macomber & Jacobson, 1992). As well as providing evidence for greater abilities in
infancy, findings such as this are consistent with theories of domain-specific
development. In this example, children are shown to have a knowledge of physics that
is specialised. If development were domain-general, then children would also be
expected to display a level of understanding of other concepts commensurate with their
physics understanding. However, this is not the case.
There is a large body of evidence that suggests many conceptual abilities are specialised
for particular types of content. To take one example, memory skills have been shown to
be affected by specific content. This was demonstrated empirically by Chi (1978) who
found that children who were chess experts massively outperformed adult chess novices
on memory for chessboard positions. However, the adults scored higher in standard
memory tasks indicating a developmental advantage. Results such as these imply that
memory does not develop in a domain-general fashion, but is tied to different contents.
Additionally, a strand of research on atypical populations also suggests domain-specific
development. For example, Baron-Cohen (1997) found that children with autism
performed worse than a normal population in tests of psychology but similar deficits
were not found in their understanding of physics.
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1.4. Domain-specific Theories of Development
In response to these strong criticisms of domain-general theories, the view that
cognition may differ in different areas or domains of knowledge has become more
established (Chomsky, 1975; Fodor, 1983; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). This view has
arisen both as a result of discontentment with the domain-general accounts and also
newer research which suggests that many conceptual abilities seem specialised for
particular types of content (e.g. Chi, 1978; Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983) However,
there is not agreement on a complete theory of domain-specific development. The
general claim is that the mind is "modularised" and conceptual understanding of one
sort is likely to be quite different in character, structure and development from
understanding of another sort (Fodor, 1983). However, different theorists disagree on
what such domains of knowledge constitute, whether or not understanding within these
domains is theoretical and whether they are innate or a product of development. First,
modular accounts of development include Fodor's (1983) account of innate modules
and Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) theory of the development of modularity. Secondly, there
is the idea that children construct intuitive theories about the world, as proposed by
Wellman and Gelman (1992), Carey (1985) and Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997).
1.4.1 Modular Accounts Of Development
Fodor's 1983 book "The Modularity ofMind" made a significant impact on theories of
cognitive development by suggesting that the human mind was made up of genetically
specified, independently functioning, special purpose "modules" or input systems. This
was in stark contrast to the previous domain-general theories. Fodor's model of the mind
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has three major components: transducers, input systems, and central systems.
Transducers process sensory information about the outer world and translate this
information into a format for the perceptual system. Input systems process the
information and deliver representations of the world to the central processor. These
input systems (or modules) are the key part of Fodor's theory of modularity of mind.
They are domain-specific and work independently of other modules. The essential
characteristic of these modules is their informational encapsulation. The central
processor is concerned with higher cognitive functions (e.g. planning, problem solving)
and is domain-general. It builds a belief system from outputs of modules and long term
memory.
Despite the major influence that Fodor's ideas have had, they have come under vigorous
criticism, most notably from Karmiloff-Smith (1992). She acknowledges the strengths
of modularity but questions whether such modules are innately pre-prescribed. This
leads her to take a more developmental perspective where she replaces the view of pre-
specified modules in favour of a process of 'modularization' that occurs via
development. By this view, innate domain-specific constraints are acted upon by
domain-general processes. This allows for a more creative and flexible cognitive
system. In providing research evidence for her theory, Karmiloff-Smith investigated the
domains of language, physics, mathematics, psychology and notation.
The domain-general process of development she proposes is called Representational
Redescription (RR). Within each domain, the process of RR is the same, but it is
affected by the form and the level of explicitness of the representations supporting
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particular domain-specific knowledge at a particular time. Karmiloff-Smith describes
the RR model as a phase model as opposed to a stage model. By this view,
representational redescription is not age-related and can occur recurrently within
domains throughout development. There are three phases involved in development.
During Phase 1 the child focuses on external data in any microdomain to create
"representational adjunctions" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p. 18) which are added domain-
specifically. In Phase 2 system-internal dynamics take over such that internal
representations become the focus of change. Finally, in Phase 3, internal representations
and external data are reconciled and a balance achieved between quests for internal and
external control. Additionally, the RR model has four levels at which knowledge is
represented and re-represented. These are: Implicit, Explicit-1, Explicit-2, and Explicit-
3. The general idea is that children's implicit non-verbalised knowledge (i.e. I level
representations) are gradually restructured into El level representations. These differ
from the I level representations as they are more flexible and manipulable. However,
they are not available to conscious access or report. Further redescription leads to E2
level representations that are open to conscious access and finally E3 level
representations that are both entirely open to conscious access and explicit verbalisation.
Karmiloff-Smith stresses the importance of verbal interaction with others here as she
believes it is possible that some knowledge learned directly in linguistic form is
immediately stored at level E3.
1.4.2 Theory-Based Accounts of Development
By contrast to modular approaches, many researchers assert that young children's
knowledge is 'theory-like' and suggest that conceptual development involves intuitive
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theory construction and reformulation. Wellman and Gelman (1992) suggest that
children begin to understand the world through framework theories (see also Inagaki &
Wellman, 1997; Wellman, 1990). They suggest that there are three core framework
theories that children appeal to before developing detailed understanding of a particular
topic: physics, psychology and biology. These areas of understanding encompass most
of the external world with which we interact and are frequently argued to possess an
evolutionary advantage (Pinker, 1997). This makes intuitive sense as an understanding
of physics allows you to survive in the physical world i.e. if we had no notion of
gravity, we would be less concerned about the consequences of walking over the edge
of a cliff. An understanding of psychology allows us to attend to other human beings,
distinguish between humans and other entities and as we get older, understand different
intentions and beliefs. Finally, an understanding of biology helps us understand which
animals are dangerous, which are food, how to look after our own bodies and keep
ourselves healthy.
Wellman and Gelman (1992) further distinguish between framework theories and
specific theories. Framework theories represent the most general explanatory notions
and basic causal devices about a set of phenomena that a person uses. Specific theories
focus on causal reasoning within a domain and are more detailed than framework
theories. Above all, framework theories are regarded as acting as an umbrella for
understanding specifics:
...framework theories outline the ontology and the basic causal devices for
their specific theories, thereby defining a coherent form of reasoning about
a particular set of phenomena. (Wellman & Gelman, 1992, p.341).
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Carey (1995) also argues that a set of framework theories (or 'intuitive' theories) guide
children's reasoning about the world. She specifically proposes that there are innate
domain-specific systems of knowledge for physics, number and psychology. As we
shall see later in this chapter, Carey differs from Wellman and Gelman in that she does
not consider biology to be an innate domain of knowledge. Carey defines a framework
theory as a cognitive structure that guides perception and reasoning within a particular
domain of knowledge and is organised around a body of core principles. These innate
framework theories form the basis for development and Carey suggests this
development occurs through a process of conceptual change. This provides an
alternative process of domain-specific development to Karmiloff-Smith's process of
RR. Instead of knowledge becoming more explicit, conceptual change is described as
the reorganisation and restructuring of knowledge. By this view of development, there
is a radical overhaul of initial conceptions within a domain which means that
understanding held by older children and adults is qualitatively different from young
children. Carey (1985) distinguishes between two different types of restructuring.
Firstly, there is the novice-expert shift as depicted by Chi, Glaser and Rees (1982).
Carey (1985) describes this as "weak" restructuring where the later conceptual system
represents different relations between concepts than the earlier one. Alternatively,
"strong" restructuring is likened to theory change in science. This includes changes in
the individual core concept and is described as conceptual change in its true sense.
Carey (1985) stresses that the analysis of conceptual change is extremely difficult and it
is not always obvious what sort of restructuring has taken place in the development of
concepts.
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In a similar vein, proponents of the 'theory theory' also argue that conceptual
development is characterised by theory formation and change (Gopnik & Wellman,
1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). However, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) place a
stronger emphasis than Carey (1985) on children's "starting-state" (p.51) and believe
that children have innate theories that are later modified and revised. Despite advocating
the presence of innate knowledge, they do not believe, like Fodor (1983), that
knowledge is modularised. The main difference between modularity and the 'theory
theory' is the process of development. While Fodor would say that modules are
genetically predispositioned to develop and therefore any experience and evidence
encountered by the child is not important, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) place great
importance on input (see also Gopnik, 2003).
The basic idea is that children have intuitive theories of the world, analogous to
scientific theories and that the way these theories develop is similar to scientific theory
change (Gopnik et al., 2004). Children's theories are abstract, coherent, systems of
entities and rules that enable children to make predictions about new evidence, to
interpret evidence, and to explain evidence. Conceptual development is characterised by
theory change that occurs when the child comes across evidence that cannot be properly
explained by the present theory. Children actively experiment with and explore the
world, testing the predictions of the theory and gathering relevant evidence. Some
counter-evidence to the theory is simply reinterpreted in terms of the theory but when
many predictions of the theory are falsified, the child begins to seek alternative theories.
If the alternative does a better job of predicting and explaining the evidence, it
eventually replaces the existing theory. In line with Wellman and Gelman's (1992)
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account, the core domains of knowledge that this theory believe are present are physics,
psychology and kinds (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997;Gopnik, 2003).
1.4.3. Criticisms of Domain-specific Theories
As previously mentioned in this chapter, the two main domain-general theories have
had a significant impact on educational practices throughout the past century. However,
the domain-specific account is yet to strongly influence practitioners and many practices
based on domain-general theories are still observed in classrooms today. This must be
partly due to the lack of consensus within the domain-specific school of thought on a
range of issues. This has lead to a variety of contrasting theories which have a lot in
common but disagree on key issues. Due to these controversies, no consistent
implications can be teased out from the research. For example, there remains confusion
as to what "domains" are. To some, a domain (or module) refers to highly localised area
of expertise such as knowledge of chess, while to others a domain is a more widely
encompassing structure such as those of physical, biological and psychological
knowledge. This is not just a matter of arguing over a definition, however, it has
implications for the number of domains that are said to exist. In the former case there
could be thousands and in the latter very few. There are also implications for the level
of generalisation of understanding that might be expected within a domain.
Furthermore, there is no clear agreement on the domain-specific processes of cognitive
development (e.g. RR, theory building, learning constraints). The potential usefulness of
domain-specific development theories for education is indicated by one avenue of
research that has identified that children have intuitive knowledge of some areas of
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science which has influenced teaching. This is something that will be explored further
by Chapter 3.
1.5. Children's Naive Understanding of Biology
The study of children's biological understanding was initiated by Piaget (1929) who
demonstrated how qualitatively different young children's thought is from adults. Since
then, a wealth of research has arisen on children's biological thought and it has been a
central tenet of major theories of development. For example, as already discussed,
Wellman and Gelman (1992) consider naive biology as a core domain of thought. In the
past, research has mainly focused on children's understanding of physics (e.g.
Baillargeon, 1993) and psychology (e.g. Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). It is now the case
that these domains of knowledge are relatively well-understood but controversy still
rages about the ways in which children understand biology (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002).
Therefore, it is likely that the study of children's biological thought can provide us with
a fresh perspective on our attempts to understand the world. However, as well as
contributing to major theories of cognitive development, the study of biological thought
is important in its own right. Theories of domain-specific development propose that
different types of knowledge may be learned about in different ways (Keil &
Silberstein, 1996). Therefore, it is of practical importance to determine the nature of
children's biological thought to inform science education. In particular, if children come
to school with some form of naive biology, then this will hold implications for the way
it is introduced into the school curriculum.
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1.5.1. What Is Biological Knowledge?
Biological knowledge generally refers to the cognitive processes by which people
understand, classify, reason about and explain the world of plants and animals. A naive
biology is often considered to be more than a collection of facts. Many theorists argue
for a theory of biology which can provide predictions about and explain biological
phenomena as growth, digestion, illness and death (Hatano & Inagaki, 1994). A naive
theory of biology encompasses a large body of knowledge. Keil (1994) set out a
comprehensive list of characteristics. Firstly, category systems that are used to divide up
the biological world. Not only does this encompass distinguishing between living and
non-living things, but also between different types of animals, plants etc. Secondly,
children's categories of living things may be structured differently from other concepts
as they appear to believe that living kinds have an essence. Thirdly, biological
knowledge encompasses processes such as illness, reproduction and growth. This
section will include examples of each of these areas of understanding and give brief
descriptions of the research and findings for each one.
To begin, a crucial component of any biological understanding is the ability to
differentiate living from non-living things (Coley, Solomon & Shafto, 2002). Research
with young children has previously reported that children believe that inanimate objects
are alive, known as animism. This is clearly qualitatively different from an adult view.
Piaget (1929) asked children if a range of inanimate objects were alive and found that
children frequently said that they were (see also Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962). However,
more recent evidence suggests that early studies may have overestimated children's
animistic reasoning. For example, Hatano, Siegler, Richards, Inagaki, Stavy & Wax
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(1993) looked at children's biological understanding in a range of different cultures. The
results indicated that children in all three countries knew that people, animals, plants
and inanimate objects were different types of things with different properties. As will be
discussed later, cross-cultural investigation of taxonomies has been used as evidence
that biological understanding is innate (Atran, 1999; Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin &
Coley, 2002). Not only do very young children show awareness of differences between,
say, the biological and physical world, but the way in which they categorise the
biological world is consistent across very different cultures.
Secondly, having established that children can distinguish between animate and
inanimate objects, it needs to be determined how they distinguish between different
plant and animal categories. Children's categories of living things may be structured
differently from other concepts as they appear to believe that living kinds have an
essence (Gelman, 2004). Essentialism asserts that people act as if there is an underlying
property that causes the observable characteristics of any item. It is this property, not
other observable characteristics that determines category membership. One consequence
of essentialist beliefs is that superficial transformation should not change the identity of
a living thing. For example, children believe that a racoon painted black with a white
stripe and a pouch of smelly stuff, remains a racoon despite its similarities with a skunk
(Keil, 1989). Gelman and Wellman (1991) show that that when animals were reported
to have their "insides" or "outsides" removed, 4 and 5 year olds treated removal of the
insides as disastrous to the animal's identity but removal of the outsides was not. As a
consequence of such findings, Gelman and Hirschfeld (1999) assert that "essentialism is
an essential part of biological understanding" (p.438).
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Thirdly, understanding of biological causal processes has been investigated. The
findings from this body of research have been of importance to debate on the onset of
biological knowledge. To have an understanding of a biological causal mechanism
provides different evidence than, for example, identifying whether children can
distinguish between living and non-living objects. It involves understanding and
causally relating different concepts and is therefore a more explanatory type of
knowledge. More importantly, it is possible to investigate further development of
understanding of processes beyond when this knowledge emerges, making research
evidence on such processes very valuable to debates on the development of biological
knowledge.
The first of these processes discussed in this section is growth. Inagaki and Hatano
(1996) report that four and five year olds believe that animals and plants, but not non¬
living objects grow over time. Furthermore, Backsheider, Shatz & Gelrnan (1993)
report that 4 year olds realised that both plants and animals can regrow but that artefacts
must be fixed by human intervention. Demonstrating that evidence from research on
biological processes can be used to show more than just the existence of a domain of
biology, Zhu and Fang (2000) found that 4 year olds had some understanding of growth,
5 year olds had a better understanding but this depended on the type of task used and
finally, 6 year olds' performance was not so much affected by task-type and they
showed a more sophisticated understanding of growth.
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There is a large body of research on children's understanding of inheritance (e.g.
Solomon, 2002; Springer, 1999; Weissman & Kalish, 1999; Williams & Smith, in
press). Research has shown that pre-school children have knowledge of facts relating to
inheritance (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Inagaki & Hatano, 1993). However, others have
argued that knowledge of these facts does not necessarily imply that these children have
a theoretical understanding of biological inheritance. Solomon, Johnson, Zaitchik and
Carey (1996) suggested that most pre-schoolers do not understand biological
inheritance and do not have an understanding of the causal mechanisms of inheritance.
In general, however, the research suggests that preschool children have a basis of
understanding of inheritance and that this develops with age. Contrasts between studies
emerge as a result of the different tasks used to estimate children's knowledge.
The final process to be discussed is illness which has been chosen as the topic of
investigation in this thesis. Early research on illness concepts argued that they
developed in line with Piaget's stages of development (Bibace & Walsh, 1981; Perrin &
Gerrity, 1981) and recently they have been used to provide key evidence regarding the
onset and development of children's biological knowledge (Kalish, 1997; Siegal &
Peterson, 1999; Springer & Ruckel, 1992). Therefore, studying children's illness
concepts can inform broader theories of development. Most important to this thesis is
how children's understanding of illness can benefit broader debates regarding biology.
A biological understanding of illness consists of a conceptualisation of the mechanism
of contagion and the ability to reason about germs as a causal agent. Therefore, there is
potential for the study of when this understanding emerges and how it develops through
later childhood. Additionally, there is scope to investigate different influences on
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children's understanding of illness (to be discussed in Chapter 3). This has shown the
theoretical benefit of researching illness concepts and Chapter 2 will further outline the
practical benefits of researching illness concepts.
In sum, a biological understanding covers a wide area of knowledge. As shown by this
discussion, there is debate concerning the age at which children possess a nai've theory
of biology and the origins of biological thought. In particular, different areas of
biological understanding and the different methodologies used exacerbate this debate.
These key debates will form an important part of this thesis.
1.6. Theories of Development of Biological Understanding
Discussion of theories of domain-specificity have shown that some authors consider
development to be characterised by modules or intuitive theories and this debate is
mirrored in theories of biological understanding. From the literature, several conflicting
viewpoints about the nature of children's biological understanding have been identified.
Firstly, biology is an innate core module and it is not theory-like (Atran, 1990; Sperber,
1994). Secondly, biology is an innate core module that is theory-like (Keil, 1992).
Finally, biology is an intuitive theory that is constructed during childhood and may arise
from an intuitive theory of psychology (Carey, 1985) or mechanics (Au & Romo,
1999).
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1.6.1. Biology as an Innate Core Domain that is not a Theory
Atran (1990) and Sperber (1994) argue that biology is a core domain of thought that is
innately determined, triggered by privileged input and emerges without the aid of theory
building. Within this core domain there are core modules, an example of which is a
universal taxonomy (Atran, 1998). Core modules share much with Fodor's input
modules but there are also differences. Input modules are closed cognitive structures
that have exclusive access to their own mental representations. Core modules, on the
other hand, make use of other module's inputs and outputs. This flexibility means that
humans can quickly acquire different sorts of knowledge.
The evidence that is offered to support biology as a core domain of thought is based,
firstly, on the evolutionary plausability argument for innate understanding of biology,
and secondly on research which suggests cross-cultural universality in taxonomic
organisation of categories of animals and plants. The evolutionary advantage of having
an innate bias to understand biology has already been mentioned in this chapter. Atran
(1998) has shown that different cultures divide the living world into two kingdoms
(animals and plants), and that each of these is sub-divided into major life forms (e.g.
fish, bird, mammal). Atran (1999) explains that ranking folkbiological taxonomies in
this way provides a general inferential framework for category-based inductions. This
allows people to readily predict and project the likely distribution of familiar or
unfamiliar biologically related properties across living kinds.
However, although Atran's arguments appear plausible, his theory lacks a consideration
of other aspects of biology. For example, he says nothing of whether children can
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reason about biology or provide explanations of biologically causal mechanisms. Not
only has this been argued to be an important aspect of biological knowledge (Coley et
ah, 2002) but there is also strong evidence to suggest that children's understanding of
biology is theoretical (discussed in the following two sections). Additionally, the main
evidence in support of his theory is that there is cross-cultural universality in
understanding biology. However, there are clear signs of cross-cultural variation in
explanations of biological phenomena, indicating that innate mechanisms are unlikely to
be operating at the level of causation (Raman & Gelman, 2004, discussed in the
following chapter). Furthermore, there is no mention of how children's knowledge
develops beyond their innate capabilities. This is a criticism that extends to modular
theory in general. As identified by Karmiloff-Smith (1992), it is most unlikely that the
experiences of children have no effect on their understanding of phenomena.
1.6.2. Biology as an Innate Core Domain that is an Intuitive Theory
Keil (1992; 1994) proposes that biology is an autonomous domain of knowledge that is
construed differently from the start. However, his theory differs from the Atran/Sperber
position in that children's biological understanding is theory-like. Children are
predisposed to think differently and endowed with "modes of construal" that are specific
for understanding the biological world. For evidence, Keil (1999) cites the study of
biological concepts such as growth, illness, inheritance and reproduction as showing
that pre-schoolers appear to have cores of explanatory beliefs for these biological
concepts and therefore display a certain bias to explain them in a biological way.
However, this cannot be called a fully conscious theory of biology at this age as they do
not give specific biological mechanisms (Keil, Levin, Gutheil & Richman, 1999).
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Therefore, Simons and Keil (1995) propose that children have a set of abstract
principles relating to biology and these are useful in building up an understanding of
specific biological mechanisms.
Keil (1989) provides evidence that children have a basic theory of biology. This study
found that pre-schoolers judged that a racoon might be turned into a skunk if something
internal to the skunk was changed. However, if only surface transformations took place
then the animal would stay the same. However, other researchers have argued that such
findings indicate that children do not have an innate theory of biology. One such
theorist is Carey (1985) who cites such findings as evidence for an emergence of
biology from psychology. This idea that biology is an intuitive theory that arises from
another intuitive theory is covered in the following section.
1.6.3. Biology as an Intuitive Theory that is Constructed During
Childhood
Both the Sperber/Atran position and the Keil position is that children's biological
understanding is innate. However, there is a third possibility that biology emerges as a
theory at some point during later childhood. Within this viewpoint, there are several
contrasting opinions about when and how biology arises.
Carey (1985; 1995) argues that biology emerges from a first-order cognitive module of
psychology. In her 1985 book, Conceptual change in childhood, Carey put forward an
argument that children have a tendency to explain biological phenomena such as life,
death and illness in terms of psychological, that is intentional, processes. For example,
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children might say that someone was getting fatter because they wanted to. In addition,
children begin to understand animals by using the "comparison to people" model and
project properties that they know humans possess onto other animals (Carey, 1985;
Inagaki and Sugiyama, 1988). Carey suggested that this reliance on intuitive psychology
develops into a distinct domain of biology at about the age 10 years through a process
of conceptual restructuring/change.
However, these claims have been the subject of much criticism (e.g. Atran, 1994;
Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; Keil, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1992) and there is evidence
against this view. In terms of intentional causality, Inagaki and Hatano (1993) have
produced a series of studies that show that children do not believe bodily processes,
such as weight gain and sleep, are under a person's intentional control. In addition, it has
been shown that children have some degree of knowledge of biological causation. For
example, when asked which of a pair of twins would get fat, one who wanted to become
fat but did not eat very much or one who wanted to stay thin but ate a lot, pre-schoolers
judged the twin who ate a lot would be more likely to become fat. Results such as these
have led to a revision of Carey's original (1985) position.
Carey (1995) later acknowledged that her claim that children explain all properties of
animals in terms of intentional causality may be wrong. However, she also asserted that
although the evidence against this claim is strong, it does not imply that there is a
specific explanatory system for biology. Inagaki and Hatano's (1993) findings show
that children know that there are bodily functions outside of the control of human
intentional causation but they do not show knowledge of biological causal mechanisms.
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Carey (1995) suggests that this only shows knowledge of input-output relations which is
also the case for children's understanding of inheritance and illness. Additionally, Carey
(1995) sticks by her second strand of evidence which states that children understand
animals by comparing them to humans. Therefore, Carey's (1995) new proposal of the
emergence of biological thought lowered the age at which she saw an autonomous
biology emerging at 6 - 7 years but she still argued that it emerged from an intuitive
psychology.
This view was more in line with other theorists such as Inagaki and Hatano (2002) who
also argue that age 7 years is when biology emerges. However, later work by Johnson
and Carey (1998) forced a further revision and the latest theory is back at Carey's
(1985) position. A thorough investigation of a large number of biological concepts
showed that children of age 10 years did not have satisfactory understanding of
folkbiological concepts, such as life and death:
To our surprise, the older controls had not completed the construction of
T2, despite an average chronological age of nearly 10 and a mental age of
nearly 11. This result is consistent with the claim of Carey (1985) that the
construction of the framework theory of living kinds is a long and slow
process and is not completed until the end of the first decade of life. It is
inconsistent with much of the recent work pushing the age of acquisition
of the living kind ontology younger, even into the preschool years, (p. 194)
One of the most damning criticisms of Carey's assertions is that studies frequently find
that children make no reference to psychological influences when trying to explain
biological phenomena (Keil, 1992). However, it cannot be claimed that the research
evidence against the emergence of biology from psychology is conclusive about the
presence of an autonomous theory of biology in young children. Most of the research
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that argues for an autonomous theory of biology has been on input-output relations, e.g.
will the character get ill or not get ill (Kalish, 1996a; Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999). Of
the studies that have considered causal mechanisms for biological phenomena, some
show that mechanical causality is the mechanism of choice for children (Inagaki &
Hatano, 1993; Springer & Keil, 1991). Au and Romo (1999) argue that an
understanding of biological causal mechanisms is not something that children can pick
up in everyday life and it may require formal instruction for children to move from a
mechanical understanding of biological phenomena to a biological understanding. Most
of the research evidence that points to a progression of mechanical understanding to a
biological understanding is from research on children's understanding of illness
concepts, therefore it will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 2.
From the above discussion, different viewpoints on the emergence of an intuitive
biology have become apparent. However, these three positions do not map very clearly
onto the three theoretical approaches to domain-specificity previously outlined in this
chapter. One possible reason for these conflicting accounts may be due to different
authors tending to develop their own theories. This is not helpful and almost detracts
from the credibility of the theories and research in this area.
Another criticism of these accounts of the development of nai've biology is that the
different accounts have different criteria set out in defining biological understanding.
For instance, Au and Romo (1999) want evidence that children have specific knowledge
of biological causal mechanisms such as viral reproduction in illness. Carey (1985)
would also like to see evidence of such causal mechanisms. However, for Keil (1992), it
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is enough that children can reason about biology, even if they do not know the specifics.
These, he argue, come later. Furthermore, Atran (1990) cites evidence that all cultures
divide the living world in similar ways as evidence of biology's innate bias. In contrast,
Carey (1995) argues that this is insufficient as this ability to create folkbiological
taxonomies is not domain-specific. Therefore, on the available evidence, it is impossible
to claim that one theory is correct or better than another. Consensus on what construes a
nai've biology, folk biology or intuitive biology would be helpful in reconciling these
approaches.
1.7. Factors Influencing the Development of Biological Thought
It is promising that there has been so much research attention directed to determining
where a domain of biology emerges from. However, there has not been so much interest
directed towards the further development of biological thought. Carey (1985) suggests
that the development of biological thought is characterised by major conceptual change
or changes. Keil (1992) prefers the idea of an abstract construal of biology that becomes
more concrete. However, it is not clear what external and internal factors influence this
development of biological thought. From an educational point of view, if trying to
create learning environments to directly manipulate children's knowledge, it is
necessary to know what influences children's understanding of biology.
There are two suggestions from the literature. Springer (1999) argues that the
acquisition of factual knowledge leads to the possession of a theory of biology. Inagaki
and Hatano (2002) propose a more complete model of the development of biology and
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discuss the influence of four factors: direct experience, personification, innate
constraints and sociocultural constraints.
1.7.1. A Theory of Biology through the Acquisition of Facts
Springer (1999) suggests that a theory of biology is autonomous, at least at age 4 or 5
and does not emerge from other framework theories, although it may be informed by
them. He suggests that an interaction takes place between initial knowledge and the
acquisition of factual knowledge. This leads to inferences being made and the
acquisition of theories relating to biology. Springer focuses on a nai've theory of kinship,
as he believes that children's knowledge of the family moves from social understanding
to biological understanding based on genetics. This move in knowledge is believed to
occur when children learn the crucial fact that babies grow inside their mothers which
occurs around the age of 4 years. If Springer's theory is correct, this suggests that the
provision of facts should be enough for children to derive inferences in order to
construct a nai've theory of biology. Springer shows that as a result of holding certain
factual knowledge, children are able to generate inductive inferences and acquire a
specific theory of inheritance. (There are methodological drawbacks to this research and
therefore to this theoretical position that will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.)
1.7.2. Experience, Personification, Innate and Sociocultural
Constraints
Inagaki and Hatano (2002) give a detailed account of how children may acquire a naive
biology and the major influences in the acquisition of this. In their view, pre-school
children are able to think consistently and causally about biological phenomena.
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Evidence that children as young as 5 years of age possess a naive theory of biology
comes from research that found pre-schoolers can distinguish between living and non¬
living entities (e.g. Inagaki & Hatano, 1987). Therefore, unlike Carey, they think that
young children have a distinctive biological knowledge system as opposed to a
psychological one. Young children's understanding of biology is seen as qualitatively
different from adults due to the paucity of young children's biology-relevant experience
and specific knowledge. Inagaki and Hatano (2002) propose various influences on the
development of children's thinking about biology. In their view, children construct
biological knowledge using a powerful learning mechanism of selective analogy with
knowledge about humans as the source, helped by innate constraints, building on their
experiences and helped by sociocultural constraints.
The use of personification as analogy means children can grasp commonalities between
animals and plants. Previously personification has been seen as evidence of
psychological thinking about biological phenomena (Carey, 1985). However, Inagaki
and Hatano (2002) believe personification is an attempt to interpret biological
phenomena biologically. Personification is the extension and application of human
properties and behaviours to animals and plants. This is practical as children have
extensive knowledge about humans compared to scant knowledge of animals and
plants. Therefore, humans function as a reference point. Research evidence shows that
children do not make many errors when using personification as analogy and this may
be due to the help of two constraints. The similarity constraint requires the target object
to be similar to humans to allow personification to apply to it. The feasibility constraint,
or factual check, checks whether personification is feasible on the basis of factual
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knowledge about the target object. Through these means children can generate
predictions and reason about unknown target objects through reference to their
knowledge of humans. Further to this, personification as analogy allows children to
incorporate facts about animals by connecting them to the core of their biological
knowledge, knowledge of human biology processes, thus developing a fuller knowledge
of biology.
Inagaki and Hatano also propose that the acquisition and development of a nai've
biology is influenced by innate constraints. Evidence for the innate predisposition to
acquire a theory of biology comes from three sources. Firstly, research on infants has
shown that children under the age of 3 years olds show evidence of precursors to naive
biology, by distinguishing between animate and inanimate objects. Secondly, innate
constraints are strongly suggested by the universality of folkbiology. As discussed
above, Atran (1998) compared Itzaj Mayas with Americans and found that they
categorised plants and animals in similar ways. Finally, it is possible that there are
dedicated neural mechanisms for reasoning and thinking about biology. For example,
patients have been shown to have selective impairment for naming and recognising
living or non-living things (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983). However, Kawashima et
al. (2001) have found that although different areas of the brain are activated in the
naming of plants, animals and artefacts compared to naming digits, no differences
between the three categories were found. This indicates that they are not necessarily
located in different areas of the brain.
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A further influence on the development of biological knowledge is through direct
experience. Inagaki and Hatano (2002) describe how basing biological understanding on
experiences is an important part of children being considered "theory builders" (Carey,
1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992) as they are active learners. However, today's
industrialised society means that children do not often have the opportunity to gain first
hand experience of the biological world. Three kinds of practice are indicated as being
of particular importance to children: raising animals and growing plants (Inagaki, 1990)
visiting a zoo or botanical garden (Altman, 1998); and joint reading of picture books
(Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman & Pappas, 1998). Inagaki and Hatano argue that
experiences such as these give children a form of contact with the natural world that
helps them to construct biological understanding.
The final influence on the acquisition of naive biology is sociocultural constraints. This
account asserts that interaction with other people plays an important role in learning and
cognitive development (Hatano & Wertsch, 2001). Through children's interaction with
more mature members in the community or culture and activity-based experiences, they
are helped to acquire naive biology. Sociocultural contexts greatly influence what are
accessible for each child in the course of development by restricting access to resources.
However, not only does the cultural setting determine what experiences children have
access to, it arguably shapes the interpretation placed upon these experiences. As a
result, there may be some cultural variation in naive biology (e.g. to a sociocultural
theorist, even the natural kinds/artefact distinction is best regarded as a cultural
construction of a central functional difference - hence its universality - which children
are inducted into from a very early age in many different ways.). An example of
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sociocultural constraints is demonstrated by Inagaki and Hatano (1997) where they
allowed children to discuss evolution with each other and found this enhanced their
knowledge. The findings of this study are elaborated on in Chapter 3.
The impact of these influences on the development of children's biological thought will
be considered in detail in the discussions of Chapter 3. They suggest the types of
factors, i.e. experience, sociocultural influences, that have an influence on the
development of biological thought. This will be used to determine possible intervention
approaches that may be beneficial in improving biological understanding by showing
how experimental situations can be created to provide these factors under controlled
conditions.
1.8. Summary
This chapter has described children's thinking about the biological world. There are
various existing theories about how and when a nai've biology emerges. Atran (1998)
and Sperber propose that biology is an innate domain of knowledge that is there from
birth. Likewise, Keil (1992) also believes that biology is innate but considers this
understanding to be theory-like. Alternative accounts see biology as emerging from
other intuitive theories at a point later in development, either psychology (Carey, 1985)
or physics (Au & Romo, 1999). Various proposals about the factors that influence the
development of biological thought are identified, such as the provision of factual
information and socio-cultural constraints, and it is possible that they have implications
for teaching about biology.
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1.9. Implications for this Thesis
From the foregoing literature review, it is obvious that there are many unresolved issues
regarding the nature of children's naive biological understanding. As already stated, it is
not the purpose of this thesis to attempt to resolve these debates. Despite this, the thesis
will still have implications for the theories discussed in this chapter. Namely, whether
children have a naive biology, at what age this arises, whether it is theoretical and what
can be used to improve their knowledge i.e. what influences and drives their
understanding. In providing input on these debates, this thesis will also touch upon the
bigger debate of whether cognitive development proceeds in a domain-general or
domain-specific way.
There are two main points that have arisen which hold implications for the research to
be reported in this thesis. Firstly, research on different areas of biological understanding
frequently paints a different picture regarding the nature of children's biological
knowledge. For example, investigations on the essentialist nature of children's na'ive
biology would suggest that children hold a framework theory of biology (Gelman,
2004). Whereas, research on children's inheritance concepts implies that children hold a
series of facts about biology that are not yet integrated into a coherent theory (Solomon
et ah, 1996). One possibility for these discrepancies is that children's understanding of
biology may be fragmented or organised into micro-theories of specific systems of
knowledge. Indeed, it has been shown that this is the case with children's physics
knowledge (Howe, Tolmie, Greer & Mackenzie, 1995). Therefore, when looking to
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improve understanding of biology, one of the aims of this thesis, it may be appropriate
to look at one area of biological understanding in isolation. This is one reason why the
rest of this thesis will focus specifically on children's understanding of illness. It has
already been discussed that illness concepts can inform theory on cognitive
development and this will be returned to in Chapter 2 where the practical benefits of
research on illness will also be taken account of.
The second point to arise from the preceding discussion is the various theories of how
biological knowledge arises and develops. By looking at theories of domain-specific
development, there is no clear agreement on domain-specific processes of development
with some theorists favouring theory building (Carey, 1985; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997)
or RR (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). However, discussion of theories of na'ive biology
reveals various influences on the development of children's biological thought e.g.
through the acquisition of factual information (Springer, 1995; 1999), or sociocultural
constraints (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). These ideas will be discussed further in the
context of developing intervention methods for teaching about illness in Chapter 3.
This thesis has two further literature reviews to recount before going on to report
empirical work. First of all, the following chapter will examine previous research on
children's illness concepts. One of the key functions of Chapter 2 will be to build on the
ideas introduced in this chapter. Mainly, a contrast between the domain-general
approach to illness concepts and the domain-specific approach will be highlighted and
how research on children's understanding of illness can inform theories on naive
understanding of biology will also be discussed. Chapter 3 is concerned with
Chapter 1: Theories ofCognitive Development and Children's Understanding ofBiology 34
intervention methods that have been used in previous research to improve children's
understanding of biology and illness.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 describe three empirical studies investigating what children
understand about illness and whether intervention methods can improve this
understanding. The final chapter is a general discussion where the findings of this work
will be considered in terms of the previous work and theories discussed in the present
chapter and the following two chapters.
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2.1. Introduction
The previous chapter outlined contrasting theories of cognitive development and
emphasised the key debate of whether development proceeds in a domain-general or a
domain-specific fashion. As discussed, research on children's understanding of illness is
an area of conceptual understanding that has been influenced by these different
theoretical perspectives and has thus informed debate on cognitive development
(Kalish, 1997). However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, children's understanding of illness
is also important practically in terms of health care, education and practice (e.g. Au,
Romo & Dewitt, 1999; Rushforth, 1999; Siegal & Peterson, 1999). The aim of this
chapter is to review the literature on children's understanding of illness for the purpose
of identifying what children know about illness and what directions future research
could take.
There is a wealth of literature on children's understanding of illness. Many researchers
from disciplines as varied as developmental psychology, health psychology, paediatrics,
nursing and sociology have investigated what children understand about illness.
However, such a variety of disciplines has led to a disparate literature. As a result, the
various attempts to review this literature have also come from different disciplines and
therefore have different orientations specific to their research agenda. Thus, it is
important to take a novel approach to reviewing the literature on children's
understanding of illness to provide the necessary background for the empirical work of
this thesis.
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For this purpose, this chapter will cover three different areas of research on children's
understanding of illness. Frameworks adopted by previous reviews in developmental
psychology have been adapted here to fit with contemporary theories of domain-specific
development and more recent research on illness understanding. First, the domain-
general approach to children's understanding of illness will be covered. This approach
has been covered extensively in previous reviews (e.g. Bibace, Schmidt & Walsh, 1994;
Eiser, 1985; Jordan & O'Grady, 1982) and is included here: firstly because it gives an
outline of the development of illness concepts and secondly as it shows how research on
illness concepts can be influential in informing education and health practice.
The second approach included in this chapter is the domain-specific approach. This is
similar to the "cognitive science" category of research studies identified by Bibace et al.
(1994) but also considers the recent wave of research on children's intuitive biological
understanding as described by Kalish (1999) and Siegal and Peterson (1999) in their
reviews. This is the approach that is particularly crucial in this thesis as it is aiming to
adopt a domain-specific approach in designing intervention methods to improve
understanding of illness. Therefore, the way in which children's cognitions of illness
develop and how they are influenced is particularly important to the intervention studies
reported in Chapters 5 and 6.
The final approach comes from health psychology. Within health psychology there have
been some strands of research that are identified as important to this thesis. In
particular, understanding of specific illnesses and how experience impacts on children's
knowledge of their illness. Further, research on adults' illness cognitions will be briefly
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considered. This approach adds to the previous two orientations as it provides
information on specific illnesses and cognitive consequences of the experience of illness
that the developmental approaches lack to a certain extent.
Criticisms of the extant research on illness concepts will be discussed. The most
important of which is that these individual approaches do not provide the complete story
of what children understand and even when they are considered together, there are still
gaps in knowledge. As a result, a rationale for the first empirical study of this thesis is
created.
2.2. Why Study Illness Concepts?
Children's understanding of illness is important from both a theoretical and practical
perspective. It has already been discussed in Chapter 1 how understanding of illness can
be used to inform more general theories of cognitive development. For example, early
research attempted to place children's concepts of illness within Piaget's theory of
development and therefore concluded that development proceeds in stages. More recent
research, considers illness as an important part of understanding in the domain of
biology and investigations on illness concepts have been used to supplement key
arguments in this area. For example, as discussed in Chapter 1, when children acquire a
nai've theory of biology; and whether an understanding of biology arises from an
understanding of psychology, physics or is present at a pre-school age. These debates
and the contribution of research on illness concepts will be discussed fully in this
chapter.
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From a practical perspective, research on children's understanding of illness can be used
to generate age-appropriate explanations for children affected by illness. This is
especially pertinent in health care settings as children have frequently been shown to
display unnecessary fear, guilt and anxiety before receiving treatment for illness (Whitt,
Dykstra & Taylor, 1979). Perrin and Perrin (1983) suggested that child health care
providers might communicate more effectively with child patients if they become more
familiar with how much children are capable of understanding about illness. They found
that information being given to children by health practitioners was pitched at mid-
school age irrespective of age, cognitive ability or existing knowledge. Even in the
present day, evidence suggests that practitioners may be offering children inadequate
explanations of their illness and underestimating how much children understand
(Alderson, 1993; Rushforth, 1999). The benefits of knowing what children are capable
of understanding and providing age-appropriate explanations are two-fold: this will not
only reduce fear but also open up the possibility for them to become active participants
in decisions surrounding their care. This is relevant to the idea that children have a right
to be informed about their illness and treatment procedures.
As well as benefiting health care providers, a full analysis of children's understanding of
illness could benefit health education programmes used in schools (Bibace & Walsh,
1980). Health education is important as children need to develop positive attitudes to
self-care and health behaviour, not only for their immediate health status, but also
because these attitudes are associated with positive health beliefs in adults (Mechanic,
1979; Lau, 1982). It has been shown that health education can improve knowledge of
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cancer prevention (Schonfield et al., 2001), nutrition (Cullen et al., 2004), asthma
(Bartholomew et al., 2000; McGhan, Wells & Betus, 1998) and AIDS (Au et al., 1999;
Sigelman et al., 1996) indicating that age-appropriate education programmes can be
successful. Chapter 3 will discuss this in depth by considering the different intervention
methods that have been used with illness concepts and other biological concepts. It is
clear that the practical need to inform children about health and illness is well-
recognised. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 3 the issues of when, how and
what to teach are more open. Research on illness concepts is of value here as it can
highlight what children understand at different stages of development and help pitch
educational materials at the right level.
2.3. The Domain-General Approach to Children's Understanding
of Illness
The earliest work on illness concepts adopted a domain-general approach and was based
on the work of Piaget. Piaget (1932) claimed that children rely on immanent justice as
an explanation of unfortunate events i.e. they are likely to judge such events as a
consequence of misbehaviour. Immanent justice has also been found to be given as an
explanation for illness by young children in several empirical studies (e.g. Beverly,
1936). For example, Brodie (1974) found that anxious children were likely to see their
illness as punishment and Perrin and Gerrity (1981) reported that bad behaviour was
used as an explanation for subsequent illness. Langford (1948) suggested that this
tendency to see illness as punishment may be due to the language parents use in talking
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to their children about illness e.g. parents frequently scold children for eating certain
foods and tell them that this will cause an upset stomach.
However, children were also shown to hold other beliefs about the causality of illnesses,
such as germs being a potential cause of illness (Perrin & Gerrity, 1981). Kister and
Patterson (1980) compared children's use of contagion and immanent justice as
explanations of illness. Children aged between 4 and 10 years were asked questions
about a contagious illness (cold), a non-contagious illness (toothache) and an injury
(scraped knee). They found that the older children used contagion as an explanation of
illness but the younger children were likely to use immanent justice as an explanation
for all illnesses. Furthermore, the younger children frequently over-extended contagion
as an explanation for both toothache and scraped knee.
Piaget's stage model of cognitive development also had a strong influence on research
on illness understanding. Early research on children's illness concepts attempted to plot
the development of concepts of illness in line with these stages (e.g. Bibace and Walsh,
1981; Perrin and Gerrity, 1981). Hence, it was argued that children's understanding of
illness was limited. Bibace and Walsh (1981) conducted a series of interviews based on
children's understanding of several common illnesses such as the cold, heart attack and
measles. They asked a comprehensive set of open-ended questions including questions
on definitions of illness and causes of illness. The use of this Piagetian "clinical
method" was believed to tap cognitive processes and result in meaningful responses.
Responses were coded into three major types of explanation consistent with Piaget's
stages of development, prelogical, concrete logical and formal logical. Within each of
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these stages, two subtypes of explanation were distinguished. The explanation types
generated by Bibace and Walsh's research are explored in depth below:
Prelogical Explanations: Children in the pre-operational stage, between 2 and 7 years
of age, were argued to be egocentric and unable to distance themselves from their
environment. As a result, their causal explanations of illness were said to be heavily
influenced by the immediacy of their perceptual experiences. "Phenomenism" described
the most developmentally immature category of explanations as these types of response
show no ability to differentiate between cause and effect. A more mature type of
explanation from children in this stage was "contagion" where the cause of the illness is
identified as being from other people but only proximity links the cause and the illness.
Concrete-logical Explanations: Piaget (1926) described the main development shift in
the concrete operational stage as the accentuation of the differentiation between self and
other. This allowed children aged 7 to 10 years to distinguish between internal and
external influences on the self. This lead to more sophisticated explanations being
offered for illness based on "contamination". Here, the child can distinguish between the
cause and the effect of the illness. The cause is viewed as something external to the
child, e.g. person, object or action that has a bad or harmful quality for the body. If this
person or object comes in contact with the child, they become contaminated. More
mature children in this stage offered "internalisation" explanations where the illness is
located inside the body and the cause is external. The external cause, either a person or
object, leads to illness by process of internalisation e.g. swallowing. However, illness is
still described in vague terms with confusions about internal processes and organs.
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Formal-logical Explanations: The highest level of explanation was at the formal logical
stage. Piaget described children aged 11 years to be capable of advanced reasoning.
Children in this stage were described as able to give "physiological" explanations of
illness which correspond to formal theories of infection, health maintenance and
treatment. An even more mature understanding of illness was characterised by
"psychophysiological" explanations where the child is further aware of the possible
psychological causes of illness.
Perrin and Gerrity (1981) also plotted the development of illness concepts in a similar
fashion. They investigated the understanding of illness causality along with more
general tests of cognitive development and found that the development of illness
concepts followed a developmental sequence in line with other areas of cognitive
development between the ages of 5 and 13. They argue that their data support the idea
that development proceeds in parallel for different areas of cognition and understanding.
For example, younger children between the ages of 5 and 7 years define illness in terms
of external signs of the illness such as being told to go to bed. At the concrete
operational stage, where children are able to understand things from multiple points of
view, they start defining illness in terms of its symptoms. They see prevention of illness
as a matter of simply staying away from people who are ill and therefore have germs.
By age 13, children are expected to have reached the formal operational stage of
thinking and should be able to reason about illness in abstract terms. Perrin and Gerrity
found that very few children were able to do this for illness and the most difficult aspect
for them to understand was prevention.
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These accounts have provided very detailed descriptions of the developmental
progression of illness concepts. Both these studies show that children's understanding
of illness becomes more sophisticated with age in line with the development of other
areas of cognition. This supports predictions made by Piaget regarding cognitive
development being domain-general. However, despite recognising development in
children's understanding of illness, it was also assumed that any misconceptions or
partial understanding of illness were a consequence of cognitive immaturity which
could only be overcome by advancement in chronological age. This implied that
children could not be taught about illness or told details of their condition that was
beyond their cognitive capabilities at a certain stage which had implications for health
practice and health education (Eiser, 1989).
Stage theories of illness have shown their importance as they have been used as the
background for a lot of further studies on illness understanding (e.g. Banks, 1990; Crisp,
Ungerer and Goodnow, 1996; Koopman, Baars, Chaplin & Zwinderman, 2004) and
their importance in first recognising that illness concepts could be studied from a
developmental perspective is still acknowledged today.
2.4. The Domain-specific Approach to Children's
Understanding of Illness
As mentioned in Chapter 1, recent theorists have argued that children's development is
likely to proceed in a domain-specific fashion (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Wellman &
Gelman, 1992; Wellman & Inagaki, 1997). As well as providing an alternative account
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to the domain-general theories of children's development, this has also led to a different
approach of researching children's illness concepts. Additionally, a case was made in
Chapter 1 for the relevance of illness concepts to broader theories of cognitive
development. This section covers the domain-specific approach to illness concepts.
Firstly, it will consider how this new approach to children's illness concepts arose. Then
it will discuss research which suggests children's illness understanding is a part of their
intuitive biological knowledge approach. Finally, the structure of illness concepts will
be considered.
Eiser (1989) was one of the first to suggest a new theoretical approach to children's
understanding of illness, despite her earlier pro-Piagetian standpoint (Eiser, 1985). She
was disillusioned with the previous theoretical framework, which was being challenged
so fiercely within developmental psychology as a whole that she felt it was
inappropriate to still apply the model to work on illness. She proposed links between
Carey's theory of conceptual change that was described in Chapter 1 and the
development of illness concepts. Carey (1985) saw a change in reasoning from
psychological to biological not only as a result of cognitive development but due to an
acquisition of knowledge and structural change. Although Carey did not consider illness
concepts in her theory, Eiser suggested that the implications were important.
Around the same time, Siegal (1988) conducted a study that challenged the findings of
earlier research methodologically. He posited that children may not lack understanding
as suggested by researchers such as Bibace and Walsh (1981) and Kister and Patterson
(1980), rather they may have misinterpreted the experimental situation as a result of
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inappropriate methodologies. Therefore, he created more child-friendly methodology to
investigate children's understanding of contagion. Pre-schoolers were asked to judge
whether a puppet was accurate in their explanation of why they got ill. The children
were not likely to advocate immanent justice as a reasonable explanation of illness and
in contrast to Kister and Patterson (1980), it was also found that they were not likely to
overextend contagion to toothache and scraped knee.
These two papers helped change the face of research into children's illness concepts.
The constraints imposed by stage theories were lifted giving way to more generous
theoretical frameworks to work from. The development of new methodologies meant
that research could turn to looking at what they did understand rather than what they did
not. Most importantly, however, children were credited with more capability of
understanding than previously thought.
It was outlined in Chapter 1 that illness is an important area of children's understanding
of biology (Siegal & Peterson, 1999). However, there is a lack of consensus on what a
biological understanding of illness would entail. It can broadly be characterised as
having four components: acquisition, symptoms, treatment and subsequent contagion,
with germs as the causal agent that links these components into a coherent
understanding (Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999). Therefore, conceptions of illness provide
an excellent opportunity to study children's reasoning about causal mechanisms in
biology, whether their ideas are organised into a coherent model of illness transmission
and the age at which this understanding becomes "biological". However, what counts as
biological understanding will depend in part on the criterion set out by the different
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researchers, e.g. possessing domain-specific facts (Springer & Ruckel, 1992; Kalish,
1996a) or specific understanding of the mechanisms involved in the causal processes
(Au & Romo, 1999), which holds implications for these debates.
One study which demonstrates nicely that illness is an area of biological understanding
is that of Raman and Gelman (2004). They interviewed Indian and American
preschoolers and asked them to choose between biological, moral, psychological and
irrelevant explanations for different illnesses. Results indicated that the biological
model was the most prominent across both cultures. However, cultural differences were
found as Indian participants acknowledged significantly more moral and psychological
causes than Americans and Americans made explicit reference to germs whereas
Indians referred to contamination. This is an important study as it not only demonstrates
that illness is universally a biological phenomenon for children but it also shows how
vital it is to take a cultural perspective.
However, it may be slightly restrictive to confine a biological understanding of illness
to contagion as this excludes understanding of infectious illness and organic disease. In
fact, most studies looking at children's understanding of illness considers diseases that
are transmissible by contagion, e.g. runny noses and sore throats. This leads to the
variation involved in the nature of transmission of illnesses, for example, through air,
water, bodily contact, being somewhat neglected by this type of research. It would be
relevant to look at the various vectors involved in transmission but this would involved
a level of complexity beyond the basic notion of transmission via biological organisms
on which this thesis, and most of the previous research, is focused.
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2.4.1. Illness Concepts as Part of an Autonomous Theory of Biology
As illness is considered to be a biological concept, research on illness concepts can
contribute to the discussions raised in Chapter 1 regarding the origin and onset of a
naive understanding of biology. Most research that looks to determine whether biology
is an autonomous theory is conducted with pre-schoolers and investigates their ability to
distinguish between the living and non-living worlds (see Chapter 1). However, there is
also a limited body of research on understanding of illness. For example, Kalish (1996a)
asked children and adults to make judgements about characters suffering from various
symptoms of illnesses. Participants were asked to indicate whether or not the character
would have a fever, need medicine from a doctor, be better soon, and, most crucially, be
contagious. The findings showed that preschoolers were likely to predict illness when
germs were present and it is therefore likely that they see germs as the mechanism of
illness causation. A follow-up study found that children as young as three years
recognised the causes of illness were invisible although they did not know what germs
were. Kalish argued these results demonstrated that preschool children could reason
about a specific hidden mechanism and that they have some theory-based knowledge in
the domain of biology.
Likewise, Raman and Gelman (2005) reported that preschoolers have an understanding
of contagion and genetic transmission of disease. They used a classic "adoption" style
task where children were described scenarios in which a baby was born to a couple and
immediately after birth went to live with another couple. The vignette then described
either a genetic disorder or a contagious illness that either the biological parents or the
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adoptive parents had and the participants were then asked whether the child would have
the disorder or illness or would be okay. Through a series of studies they demonstrated
that pre-schoolers were able to attribute distinct modes of transmission for the genetic
disorders and contagious illnesses. These findings are argued to be consistent with the
suggestion that a theory of biology is an early, autonomous competence rather than an
offshoot of some other theory. It is important to note, however, that in both these
studies, children did not spontaneously suggest germs and genetic transmission as
mechanisms for illness as the methods used were forced-choice.
2.4.2. Illness Concepts as an Offshoot of Psychology
An alternative origin of an intuitive understanding of biology is that it arises from a
nai've psychology (Carey, 1985). This is supported by research findings that show that
children tend to explain biological phenomena such as life, death and hunger in terms of
social/psychological explanations (see Chapter 1). Carey (1985) does not use any
specific illness examples but the immanent justice explanations given by children in the
earliest illness research are essentially a social/behavioural explanation for illness
(Kister & Patterson, 1980). However, more recent work has shown that children do not
favour immanent justice as an explanation of illness causality. As already mentioned,
Siegal (1988) showed that pre-schoolers preferred biological explanations and rejected
immanent justice explanations for colds, toothache and scraped knee.
Springer and Ruckel (1992) report further empirical findings in support of this. They
changed the questioning method used in the original Kister and Patterson (1980) study
from a "retrospective" technique to a prospective questioning method, i.e., instead of
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telling a story about a child who had misbehaved and later got ill, they told stories about
children who had misbehaved and then asked if they would get ill. Four different items
were used to see whether children preferred immanent justice (a social construct) or
contact with germs (a biological explanation) as a more plausible explanation of illness.
Their results suggested that the preschoolers do not adhere to immanent justice
explanations and they frequently mentioned germs in their explanations of illness.
Therefore, the authors concluded that children think about disease in biological rather
than social terms.
However, the disparity between Piagetian research and this more recent work may be
partly due to the sample population. Springer and Ruckel (1992) used a sample
comprising of healthy children compared to early research which has mainly included
children with a chronic illness (e.g. Beverley, 1936). For this reason, Springer (1994)
conducted a further study that investigated immanent justice beliefs in children with
cancer and healthy children. Given the high rate of rejection of immanent justice in
Springer and Ruckel's study, immanent justice explanations were made more tempting
by describing prolonged instances of misbehaviour rather than specific incidents.
Results showed that pre-schoolers with cancer were at least as likely as healthy children
to reject immanent justice as an explanation of illness. This extends the conclusions of
Springer's previous work by showing that the children were not swayed by long periods
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Therefore, research that looks at the causality of illness concludes that children do not
prefer social explanations to biological explanations. However, there are other ways of
distinguishing between the social and biological factors of illness. Kalish (1997) told
children stories in which a character did or did not know if food was contaminated, and
did or did not eat the food. Responses showed that children said that the character was
more likely to get sick than depressed if they did eat the food but did not know it was
contaminated, and also that the character would be more likely to get depressed than
sick if they knew the food was contaminated but did not eat it. This indicates an
understanding that emotional effects are more likely to occur from knowing the food is
contaminated and the physical effects are more likely to arise as a result of eating the
food. Kalish (1997) concluded that children are capable of distinguishing between the
domains of biology and psychology when thinking about illness.
Further evidence regarding whether psychological and biological understanding is
entwined or separate is provided by Keil et al. (1999). They asked children to predict
the likely route of transmission for novel mental and physical illnesses. Correct answers
were judged to be ones where the child matched the mental affliction with the social
interaction, or the physical affliction with the physical interaction. The results were
interesting as data from the youngest age group (3-4 years) suggested that children were
able to match each kind of illness with the most likely method of transmission.
However, in the older age groups, children appeared to have thought that physical
contact was necessary to catch both biological and mental afflictions. Children's
responses suggested that the change was caused by a move from an abstract
understanding of biological disorders to a more concrete model involving detailed
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understanding of the mechanisms involved in illness transmission. However, as the
method of transmission in all cases is seen as the transmission of germs through
physical contact, this finding agrees with the conclusion that understanding of biology is
separate from psychology.
Overall, the results from these studies strongly support the suggestion that children are
capable of distinguishing between psychological and biological factors of illness. The
authors of these studies conclude that as children do not appear to reason about illness
in psychological terms, they must possess an autonomous theory of biology. This would
suggest that biological understanding is innate or at least present in pre-schoolers.
However, an alternative explanation is that children do not have a coherent
understanding of biology and rely on mechanical reasoning to explain biological
phenomena (Au & Romo, 1999; Baron-Cohen, 1997). Indeed, alternative explanations
based on mechanical or physical reasoning for the above findings of these studies can
be provided and are just as convincing. Springer and Ruckel (1992) have shown that
social explanations of the causality of illness are rejected and therefore assume that
biological reasoning is dominant. However, they have described the preferred
explanations of illness as such:
...the illness is induced through contact with material agents such as
germs or poison, or through some other physical means, and not through
intentional states or other social influences...Overall, these data support
the idea that young children prefer biological and reject social construals
of biological phenomena. (Springer & Ruckel, 1992, p.439).
The conclusion drawn from these results is felt to be very optimistic. Although a clear
rejection of psychological explanation of illness is present, it is not obvious that
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children are capable of understanding illness in biological terms. Instead, attention is
drawn to the idea that illness is caused by physical means, suggesting an understanding
based on na'ive physics rather than biology. Similarly, Keil et al.'s (1999) findings can
be explained in this way. Although the pre-schoolers in this study acknowledge the role
of germs in illness, it is not clear whether they see germs as biological entities which are
alive and whether they fully understand the role they play in contagion and
contamination. In contrast, children have been shown to have a detailed understanding
of physics and the mechanics of objects and movements (Baillargeon, Kotovsky &
Needham, 1995) so it is not unreasonable that this understanding and knowledge may
be used to reason about biological mechanisms.
2.4.3. Illness Concepts as an Offshoot of Physics
In order to provide evidence that children invoke mechanical causality in explaining
illness, Au and Romo (1999) interviewed children aged 5-10 years using an open-
ended questioning method. Questions were asked about why there is an incubation
period between contracting the illness and showing symptoms (the understanding of
reproduction of germs is often considered evidence of a biological model of
understanding (Kalish, 1999)) and also why a child would feel ill over his whole body.
The responses were coded according to whether they were biological or mechanical.
This led to a very small proportion of children (6%) being credited with a biological
understanding of illness. Most of the children explained things in terms of mechanical
causality such as it took a few days for him to get ill because "it takes a while for the
germs to get in" (p.375). Therefore, Au and Romo conclude that children do not possess
the ability to reason biologically about phenomena and cannot talk about biological
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causal mechanisms. However, it can be noted that the coding scheme they use classifies
many things as mechanical that other studies would say are biological and even the
authors admit they may be being "too harsh" (Au and Romo, 1999, p. 396). An
additional point is that this study uses open ended questioning methods which have been
traditionally criticised for not allowing children to show the full extent of their
understanding (Siegal, Waters & Dinwiddy, 1988).
However, research that uses forced choice methods has also suggested that children may
think about illness according to a physical model. Solomon and Cassimatis (1999) asked
pre-schoolers to judge whether someone would be contagious to others due to contact
with a biological agent, e.g. germs, or a non biological agent, e.g. pepper. They found
that pre-schoolers did not distinguish between the types of agent in determining whether
someone was contagious to others. Further studies indicated that pre-schoolers did not
consider germs as living things and biological causal agents. These results may indicate
a possible lack of discrimination between physical and biological modes of explanation.
2.4.4. Development of a Biological Understanding of Illness among
Older Children
These studies have mainly focused on preschoolers and when an understanding of
biology comes to the fore. More information on the development of illness concepts
throughout later childhood is obtained from research that has based investigation upon
Carey's theory of conceptual change. One of the first studies to adopt this approach was
Hergenrather and Raboniwitz's (1991) research into the organisation of children's
knowledge of illness. They compared the structure of children's knowledge of illness
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across three age groups, 6/7 years, 9/10 years and 13/14 years. Younger children appear
to organise their understanding of illness in terms of associated behaviours, for
example, being in bed or having a temperature taken were seen as signals of being ill.
By contrast, 13 year old children reorganised their conceptions of illness in terms of
more internal processes such as causes, symptoms and treatments. The description of
the development of children's knowledge of illness is not dissimilar to that described by
Perrin and Gerrity (1981). However, rather than the development of illness concepts
involving cognitive maturity and passing through a series of developmental stages,
Hergenrather and Raboniwitz (1991) describe development as involving a conceptual
change and reorganisation of concepts to reach the highest level.
Similarly, studies that have looked at the development of specific illnesses rather than
illness in general have found their results do not fit a Piagetian model of development.
Sigelman, Maddock, Epstein and Carpenter (1993) were interested in plotting the
development of children's understanding of AIDS, an area of research where previous
studies did not base their hypotheses or methodologies on any theory of development.
To take a Piagetian stage-like approach was not found useful as what was of especial
interest to the researchers was not simply cognitive maturation but the developmental
changes in the content and organisation of knowledge. Understanding of AIDS was
compared to understanding of cold, another contagious disease and understanding of
cancer, a non-contagious disease. The findings show that specific knowledge of each
disease became more differentiated with age supporting the idea of specific areas of
understanding for different diseases. Moreover, the tendency to infer properties from
colds and AIDS to cancer was argued to be evidence that children are guided by an
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intuitive theory of contagion as it indicates that if children lack knowledge of a disease
they are likely to assume it is contagious.
Charman and Chandiramani (1995) also considered specific illnesses and looked at
children's understanding of chicken pox and of depression, thereby comparing a
physical illness to a psychological state. They found that there were developmental
changes between the ages of 5 and 9 years with older children having a more coherent
understanding of illness. It is argued that the findings of this study do not fit in with a
neo-Piagetian framework of illness understanding. For example, the children in this
study did not seem to make the egocentric error of overextending contagion to
depression. In addition even the younger children were able to describe the illnesses
using non-observable symptoms. Instead, Charman and Chandiramani appeal to Carey's
(1985) theory of conceptual change to support their findings. The 5 year old children
were shown to have some basic knowledge and this knowledge appears to have been
built upon to become more sophisticated. In addition, as the children were shown to
have differing levels of knowledge of chicken pox and depression, this indicates that it
is not a domain-general phenomenon and that reasoning is not characterised and fixed at
one particular point in development.
These studies show the value of taking a domain-specific approach to understanding of
illness for a range of illness(es) and illness processes. It builds on research on biological
concepts performed with preschoolers and shows how understanding of illness develops
in later childhood. Like research from a domain-general perspective, there is clear
development of illness concepts. However, it is not seen as just cognitive maturation
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and the children are able to give better explanations of illness than those that mention
magic or immanent justice. These results support Sigelman et al.'s (1993) proposition
that children construct coherent theories of disease and acquisition of knowledge shapes
the evolution of these theories. In particular, it seems as though there is some sort of
conceptual change in understanding of illness at some point during childhood. However,
there is little consensus at the age at which this may occur indicating the need for future
research in this area. A clearer picture of the ages at which children understand different
things about illness would have obvious benefit for any attempts to improve
understanding. This would help ensure that intervention methods were designed for
appropriate age groups.
2.4.5. Structure of Illness Concepts
One final unresolved issue in this area is the structure of children's illness concepts. It is
possible that children have a theoretical understanding of illness (Kalish, 1996a). As
outlined in Chapter 1, a theory of illness would enable children to predict future events,
interpret evidence, and provide explanations both of illness and novel situations
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). This has implications for domain-specific theories of
cognitive development described in Chapter 1 advocated by Wellman and Gelman
(1992), Carey (1985), Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997).
However, this is also important in terms of education as the nature of children's illness
concepts may influence what different teaching approaches are successful in leading to
improvements in knowledge. If children's knowledge is theoretical, then it is unlikely to
progress through a process of knowledge enrichment. Alternatively some process of
domain-specific development would be necessary, such as conceptual change (Carey,
Chapter 2: Children's Understanding ofIllness 58
1985), theory building (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997) or representational redescription
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). In this case, specialised intervention approaches that
encourage such learning would be more successful than those that merely promote
enrichment. It will be the objective of Chapter 3 to discuss this further, in terms of
intervention. In this present section, discussion will be devoted to the structure of illness
concepts.
There are two alternative viewpoints about the development of a theoretical
understanding of illness. Keil et al. (1999) have argued that children's understanding of
illness proceeds from an abstract understanding to a more specific understanding.
Alternatively, Kalish (1999) proposes that children move through a series of models of
infection that become more biological with development.
As alluded to in Chapter 1, it is possible that children have abstract knowledge within
the domain of biology with little or no understanding of specific biological mechanisms
(Keil et al., 1999; Simons & Keil, 1995). By this account, it appears as though abstract
principles are among the first to be learned. Then, throughout development, specific
information is learned and incorporated into this existing framework. Therefore, before
learning about a particular mechanism of contagion, children might have some strong
sense about more general causal properties of a domain of biology. Evidence in support
of this view is provided by Keil et al.'s (1999) finding that children limit contagion to
physical/biological attributes, as discussed in the previous section. Children were asked
if a novel mental illness was likely to be transmitted through germs and a U shaped
developmental curve in responses was observed with younger and older children giving
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more correct answers than the middle age group. This is argued to be evidence of an
abstract to concrete shift as the youngest children perform well as they rely on an
abstract notion that physical and social afflictions are fundamentally different and
therefore likely to be caused in different ways. However, the drop in performance
observed in the middle children is explained by them having an understanding of
contagion but overgeneralising this to explain the transmission of social diseases as well
as physical illnesses. The older children, however, have developed a more accurate
notion of a mechanism of contagion so can distinguish between social and physical
illnesses and perform better.
An alternative viewpoint is provided by Kalish (1999) who suggests that children's
understanding of specific details is more important than their abstract understanding
within a domain. He has dedicated a number of studies into determining how children
understand contagion and whether this understanding is theoretical (Kalish, 1996a,
1996b, 1997, 1999). The earliest findings identified what type of concept; nominal,
property cluster or natural kind, children's conception of illness could be characterised
as. Kalish (1996a) studied the types of inferences children were able to make from the
properties of illness and concluded that children's concepts of illness correspond to a
property cluster where both symptoms and causes contribute to their identifications of
illness. However, there was also evidence that children linked these concepts together
into a theory, making their conception of illness more like a natural kind and suggesting
that children's knowledge of contagion was indeed organised by a theory-like structure.
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However, there has been direct disagreement with this viewpoint. Solomon and
Cassimatis (1999) argue that children's knowledge of illness is incomplete and not
organised in a coherent, theory-like manner. Their research and previous research
clearly demonstrates that children have some knowledge of contagion, symptoms and
germs but in order to achieve a biological germ theory of illness, children's
understanding of illness needs to undergo a conceptual reorganisation, similar to that
described by Carey (1985). Before this biological understanding is realised though, it is
likely that children hold a coherent model of physical infection. Kalish (1999) has
reassessed his initial viewpoint that preschoolers have a theoretical biological
understanding and has identified different infection models that children may hold at
different stages of development.
The most basic model is an associational model of infection, which the domain-general
theorists would suggest characterises children's illness understanding (e.g. Bibace &
Walsh, 1981). An example of evidence that children have an associational
understanding of infection is that they view all illnesses as contagious (Kister &
Patterson, 1980). However, more recent research suggests that preschoolers have a
physical view of infection as their predictions of illness are not based on simple
associations and frequently involve a concept of a mechanism of illness transmission.
Although children often see germs as a mechanism of infection, they also see other
physical entities as causing illness. Solomon and Cassimatis (1999) finding that poisons,
as well as germs, were viewed as mechanisms of contagion indicates that it is more
likely that these children hold a model of physical infection than a biological model.
Chapter 2: Children's Understanding ofIllness 61
A more formal scientific biological model of infection would require some additional
knowledge above and beyond a physical model. Specifically, Kalish's third model of
infection is a biological model where there needs to be knowledge of the living nature
of germs, and the way germs interact with the body to produce symptoms and
eventually recover. The fourth model is a differentiated biological model and agents of
infection are understood to come in distinct types, species with unique attributes. These
models are believed to be theoretical as children's knowledge has become more
consistent and coherent, which are key aspects of theoretical understanding (Gopnik &
Meltzoff, 1997).
It is possible to describe a developmental sequence of these infection models
progressing from simple associational to biological. Similar to Piagetian stage models,
this seems to progress in a fixed invariant sequence. However, the cognitive changes
involved in the transition between stages are not thought to be domain-general changes
in the organisation of thought but more domain-specific changes in specific knowledge
relating to germs, the body and illness. A higher stage is not seen as reflecting superior
logic or more sophisticated thinking, instead, it is considered to consist of more
knowledge about the biological mechanisms and processes. However, it is not clear at
what age or developmental stage children could be expected to progress between the
models. Kalish (1999) suggests that preschoolers hold a physical model of infection and
predicts that they will be developing biological models of infection in middle childhood.
However, more research is needed to ascertain this. In addition, it is likely that there are
ways of assisting this transition to biological thinking through educational programmes
or personal experience that have yet to be considered.
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These theories of the structure of illness concepts are important but they only consider
children's understanding of contagion and contagious illnesses, thereby neglecting non¬
contagious illnesses and injuries. Williams and Binnie (2002) attempted to provide a
more unified picture of children's conceptual understanding of illness by including non¬
contagious illnesses and injuries in their study. They interviewed four and seven year
olds about a range of illnesses and illness processes and concluded that there might be
three separate reasoning systems associated with illness. One is a theoretical framework
that covers contagious illnesses and germ theory. The second is separate areas of
understanding linked to experience of illnesses such as asthma which may not be
incorporated within a broader framework of understanding. The third is a behavioural
understanding of injuries where the biological mechanisms involved are less of a focus
than the behaviours which lead to injury (see also Coppens, 1986). This leads to the
conclusion that children's understanding of illness may be fragmented with different
types of illness being understood in different ways. If children understand different
illnesses according to separate systems of understanding, it is therefore likely the
processes involved in learning about these illnesses may be different. This has
implications for teaching children about illness.
2.5. The Health Psychology Approach to Children's
Understanding of Illness
In this section the contribution of health psychology to understanding what children
know about illness will be considered. This research is mainly concerned with children
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with a chronic illness and the understanding of their condition (Eiser, 2003). Therefore,
it differs from the cognitive developmental literature in its sample population,
methodology, aims and focus. However, despite being difficult to reconcile with other
research, relevant work will be considered in this chapter as it may be especially useful
in highlighting how children define health and illness and what they understand about
specific illnesses, areas somewhat neglected by the cognitive developmental literature.
Health psychology also looks at what adults understand about illness and the relevance
of this research for children's illness concepts will be considered.
One important aspect of health psychology research is investigating how children define
health and illness. Early studies found that health was generally defined as in a variety
of ways relating to behaviours such as eating and exercise (Byler & Lewis, 1969; Eiser,
Patterson & Eiser, 1983; Natapoff, 1978) and definitions of illness were mainly based
on symptoms (Millstein, Adler & Irwin, 1981). However, there has been little attempt to
integrate or compare children's definitions of health and illness. An exception is
Millstein and Irwin (1987) who compared concepts of health and illness and found they
become more polarised during adolescence. Additionally, Schmidt and Frohling (2000)
investigated definitions of health and illness in German children aged 5 to 16 years.
They argued that adequate definitions of health encompassed more than just an absence
of illness. They found that describing negative aspects (e.g. absence of illness)
decreased with age and describing positive aspects (e.g. positive mood) increased. In
Schmidt and Frohling's study, illness was frequently described in terms relating to
symptoms and a general feeling of being unwell; developmental changes were reflected
in the number of aspects that were mentioned. The importance of the finding that health
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and illness are not understood to be opposites of each other indicates that health and
illness should be considered as separate concepts by health educators and practitioners.
However, for this to become practical, future work needs to extend the age ranges used
as Millstein and Irwin (1987) did not look at early childhood and children's concepts of
health and illness.
A further issue in the health psychology research is how children understand specific
illnesses. There is a large amount of literature on how children with chronic illnesses
understand their condition and how this understanding influences their behaviour,
preventative strategies and compares to a control group. The types of illnesses
investigated includes juvenile rheumatoid arthritis (Berry, Hayford, Ross, Pachman &
Lavigne, 1993), diabetes (Rubovits & Siegel, 1994), cancer (Chin et ah, 1998) and
asthma (Ireland, 1998). McQuaid, Howard, Kopel, Rosenblum and Bibace (2002)
provide a good example of how the development of illness concepts is related to health
issues such as preventative measures and behaviour. They interviewed children with
asthma and found that factual knowledge and conceptual sophistication of reasoning
about asthma are related to age in children. Children with asthma and their parents have
higher conceptual reasoning regarding asthma than headache, and the severity of asthma
may be associated with higher conceptual sophistication. Importantly, more
sophisticated concepts of asthma were associated with more frequent use of
preventative strategies indicating the necessity of educating children about their
condition. This supports the hypothesis that repeated experience and education may lead
to more advanced reasoning, this is an important notion that will be revisited in more
depth in Chapter 3.
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Research on adult's understanding of illness is relevant to this review as it introduces
further important dimensions of illness. Unlike most research with children, it is not
concerned with plotting the development of what adults understand about different
conditions. Instead, research determines how adult's illness cognitions are related to
symptom perception and coping behaviour. Adult's understanding of illness has been
investigated through interviews (Leventhal, Meyer & Nerenz, 1980; Leventhal &
Nerenz, 1985) and experimental techniques (Bishop & Converse, 1986; Lau, Bernard &
Hartman, 1989). Both methods have provided support for the presence of five cognitive
dimensions of illness: identity (definition and symptoms) of illness, the causes of
illness, the timeline, the consequences, and whether it is controllable and curable. These
illness cognitions function to help adults cope with their illness, understand their illness
and help them to identify illness onset (Ogden, 1996). This framework of illness
dimensions broadens out the research possibilities for those working with children from
a focus purely on causes and contagion to a consideration of a range of possible illness
concepts.
2.6. Criticisms of the Research on Children's Understanding of
Illness
2.6.1. The Domain-General Approach
The domain-general approach has been criticised for both methodological and
theoretical reasons. Burbach and Peterson (1986) conducted a review of the cognitive
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developmental literature on illness concepts and concluded that although the literature
had added to knowledge on children's understanding of illness, better methodologies
were needed before the research could be utilised in health care settings. Their
methodological criticisms focused on issues such as reliability of coding scales, validity
of the interviews and inadequate descriptions of methodologies. For example, Bibace
and Walsh (1980; 1981) offer no statistical analysis in support of their framework
(Eiser, 1989) which is unsatisfactory as this framework was, for a long time, accepted as
describing the development of illness concepts.
Further criticism focuses on how "child-friendly" the methodologies were. Bibace and
Walsh (1981) used a clinical-style interview technique which involved prolonged, direct
questioning. This type of procedure does not usually allow children to display their full
understanding (Siegal, Waters and Dinwiddy, 1988) as it places too many demands on
the child. Alternatively, Kister and Patterson (1980) used a forced choice methodology
which pre-schoolers would find easier to respond to but the questions were very
leading. For example, "Once a boy your age disobeyed his mother. Well, that afternoon
he got a cold. Do you think he got a cold because he disobeyed his mother?" It is hardly
surprising that children as old as 7 years answered "yes" to this question. Not only is the
question highly leading but no other option is offered so the explanation based on
immanent justice is salient to the child. It is also possible that children could believe
there to be a moral to be had in the story and answer accordingly.
There are also limitations in the type of questions asked. As this review has shown,
children are mostly asked about the causality of illnesses such as colds. This neglects
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other features of illness such as time course and recovery (see also Williams & Binnie,
2002). Also, the focus on causality and contagion means that most research looks at
contagious illnesses rather than non-contagious illnesses and injuries. Indeed, the few
studies which have included non-contagious illnesses or injuries have done so only to
determine if contagious explanations are overextended (e.g. Kister & Patterson, 1980),
not to discover what children understand about these ailments. Further, despite arguing
for the necessity of health education, research has failed to consider everyday aspects of
health such as definitions of health and how children believe they can keep themselves
healthy, key factors in any health education programme.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Piagetian theory has been criticised for underestimating
children's abilities such as reasoning about physical phenomenon (Baillargeon, 1993).
In line with these criticisms, taking this approach towards children's understanding of
illness has also been criticised for underestimating how much children can understand.
This research was mainly criticised for focusing on children's misconceptions and what
they fail to understand rather than what they do understand. Furthermore, Hergenrather
and Raboniwitz (1991) propose that it is incorrect to use Piaget's stages to plot the
development of illness concepts in the first place. As Piaget's stages refer to children's
logic and capability for certain types of thought, they argue that they cannot be used to
plot their conceptual understanding. Carey (1985) also argues that specific concepts
cannot be conceptualised as part of a domain-general Piagetian framework as children's
reasoning skills are very different across domains. By this account, domain-general
theories may not be appropriate for explaining theoretical development within a specific
domain.
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2.6.2. The Domain-specific Approach
With few exceptions, research in this area still fails to address many of the concerns
raised regarding domain-general theories. In determining whether children have a naive
biology or not, research has mainly focused on contagion. Although this is useful to
theoretical debates, it is not of practical importance when trying to determine what
children know about illness. It fails to consider specific illnesses and does not add to
knowledge on other types of ailment such as non-contagious illnesses and injuries (see
also Williams & Binnie, 2002). Some studies do consider specific illnesses e.g.
Sigelman et al. (1993) and Charman and Chandiramani (1995) but these studies are few
and do not make a substantial contribution with the types of illness they investigate.
This focus on contagion also means other important illness processes are neglected such
as time course, recovery and prevention. Additionally, most studies have been
concerned with preschoolers and have not considered further development of illness
concepts throughout childhood. The few studies that have looked at further
development suggest that conceptual changes occur but there is little agreement
regarding the ages of these changes.
A further criticism is a lack of consensus among the researchers over what constitutes
biological understanding. For example, Springer and Ruckel (1992) suggest that
children have biological understanding based on their rejection of social explanations of
illness. In contrast, Au and Romo (1999) look for a complete detailed explanation of
germ action. Finally, there has not been a lot of work looking to translate these theories
into educational practice and as a result there is a lack of practical application of this
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research. Despite the focus of the research being illness concepts, the findings have not
yet been used to inform health care or practice. This is particularly important as the
Piagetian stage model rejected by many active researchers still influences health
practice. Domain-specific research has demonstrated practical value as educational
programmes based upon this approach have been more effective than traditional
approaches (Au, Romo & Dewitt, 1999; Sigelman et ah, 1996). This will be discussed
further in Chapter 3 and it will be a focus of this thesis to help rectify this criticism by
looking to further the implications of domain-specific theories for education by
examining the effectiveness of intervention approaches that are designed from this
theoretical perspective.
2.6.3 The Health Psychology Approach
The main criticism of this approach is that it is based on experience and neglects factors
internal to the child such as cognition. This approach stresses societal and other
environmental factors but there is also a need to consider possible interactions between
the environment and the individual child. Furthermore, this research is rarely based
upon theory. Therefore, the questionnaires and interview schedules created to
investigate illness concepts are driven by the researchers' own agendas. This also leads
to studies being disjointed from each other rather than contributing to a body of
research. Therefore, the impact of this research is frequently limited to specific single
studies.
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2.6.4. The Overall Picture
This chapter began by highlighting the disparate nature of the existing literature on
children's understanding of illness. Here we return to this complaint. It is clear that a lot
of effort has been placed on finding out what children understand about illness in order
to fulfil the agendas of the different disciplines. Each approach has contributed
something unique towards our knowledge of what children understand about illness.
Firstly, the domain-general perspective was crucial in identifying that knowing about
children's understanding of illness is important for health practice and education. The
attempts that were made to plot the development of children's illness concepts may have
underestimated children's understanding but were useful in identifying that these
concepts became more sophisticated with age. Likewise, the domain-specific approach
has discussed illness concepts from an intuitive biological perspective. This research
helped to identify that children had more understanding than first thought and the use of
child-friendly methodologies help to reveal this. Research from health psychology
includes some interesting dimensions of children's health and illness not considered by
cognitive developmental literature, such as the effect of experience, understanding of
specific illness and beliefs about health and illness.
However, there is an incomplete picture of exactly what children understand about
illness highlighting the need for further research. In particular there needs to be research
that does the following: First, plots the development of illness concepts as the domain-
general research has done. Second, acknowledges that development is more likely to be
domain-specific and realises that illness is a biological concept. Finally, looks at a range
of specific illnesses and illness processes in the way that health psychology has done.
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Thus, this creates the rationale for the first empirical study of this thesis to be reported
in Chapter 4.
2.7. Conclusions
The preceding review has discussed a large body of research on children's illness
concepts from different theoretical approaches. The first conclusion reached from this
review is that these approaches used in combination may provide a fuller picture of
children's understanding of illness and they should not be seen as distinct approaches
that contradict each other. The complementarity between research on what children
believe, how they understand illness and the types of thinking that underlie their beliefs
and knowledge should be evident. As described above, future work needs to utilise
aspects of each these approaches in order to fully address the question of what children
understand about illness.
The second conclusion drawn is that combining the findings from these approaches
gives some idea of what children understand about health and illness and how this
understanding develops. The three perspectives all agree on one thing: that children's
illness concepts become more sophisticated with age. However, there are conflicting
findings regarding how much children understand at different ages. For example, some
research suggests that preschoolers know that germs are living things and that they
cause illness (Kalish, 1996b) but other research suggests that they do not (Solomon &
Cassimatis, 1999). Most theorists agree on some sort of conceptual change in
understanding of illness at some point during childhood leading to a reorganisation of
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illness knowledge. However, there is little consensus on the age at which this change
occurs or the state of children's understanding before and after. The most convincing
findings report that children understand illness according to a physical model (Au &
Romo, 1999; Kalish, 1999) and this progresses to a biological understanding in middle
childhood. However, this attention on contagion means that not much is known of what
children understand about non-contagious illnesses or injuries, or indeed illness
processes other than contagion Therefore, future research is needed to plot the
development of illness concepts, identify whether children have a physical or biological
model of contagion and determine how they understand non-contagious illnesses and
injuries. Before any interventions can be developed, it is necessary to conduct a separate
investigation of children's illness concepts. The study to be reported in Chapter 4 will
attempt to address these issues.
As well as cognitive development, Au and Romo (1999) argue that children may need
educational instruction for their understanding of illness to correspond to formal
scientific knowledge. Given the lack of studies which show that older age groups have
formal understanding, it is likely that this is the case. It is beneficial for children to hold
more formal theories of illness, health and health care as research has shown that these
children have decreased anxiety and better health care (Vessey, 1996). However, as
identified by this chapter, there is lack of up-to-date research that can inform
educational practice in teaching children about illness. The domain-general approach
still has a lot of influence but it has been argued in the previous chapter and this chapter
that development proceeds in a domain-specific fashion. Therefore, it is likely that
learning about illness involves more than just a domain-general enrichment of
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knowledge and the challenge for research is to identify intervention methods that can
enhance children's understanding of illness through domain-specific processes of
development. In an attempt to explore this issue, the proceeding chapter will discuss
research that has looked at intervention methods to improve understanding of biology
and will consider how domain-specific theories of development can help in developing
successful methods of instruction.





Chapter 3: Intervention Approaches to Improve Understanding ofBiology 75
3.1. Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, studies which look at the development of illness concepts
have found that older children have more sophisticated and coherent understanding of
disease (Charman & Chandiramani, 1995; Hergenrather & Raboniwitz, 1991; Sigelman,
Epstein & Carpenter, 1993). It has been suggested that educational intervention may be
needed to achieve an understanding of illness that corresponds to formal knowledge
(Kalish, 1999). Therefore, the challenge for research is to identify intervention methods
that can help children reach this level of understanding. In general, methods which
challenge or build upon children's intuitive knowledge of science are the more
successful and Au, Romo and Dewitt (1999) have suggested that such approaches may
help provide a coherent base for improving reasoning about health and illness. The aim
of this chapter is to discuss possible intervention methods that could be effective in
enhancing children's understanding of illness.
Frequently, the main barrier for children learning about science concepts is not a lack of
knowledge but the knowledge that the student already holds (Driver et al., 1985). Often
these "alternative conceptual frameworks" work well for children, as they explain
phenomena and have a certain amount of predictive power, thus making children
reluctant to replace them. As mentioned in Chapter 2, some studies have shown that
preschool children hold naive knowledge about illness (Kalish, 1996b; Raman &
Gelman, 2004). This creates a problem for educators when trying to change these
intuitive theories and concepts to match more formal understandings of science.
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Educational researchers have traditionally described the replacement of older 'intuitive'
theories with newer ones as conceptual change (Posner, Strike, Hewson & Gertzog,
1982; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). However, similar processes from the domain-
specific literature also offer accounts of how children's understanding of scientific
concepts develop. Chapter 1 includes discussion of the processes of RR (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1992), conceptual change (Carey, 1985) and theory building (Gopnik &
Meltzoff, 1997) and this chapter will include consideration of how these ideas can
inform interventions.
As this thesis is concerned with looking at domain-specific approach to learning, this
chapter will begin by discussing the potential direction of this research for practice,
using health education as an example. It will then move on to discuss health education
programmes that have demonstrated the successful enhancement of illness-related
knowledge by basing interventions upon children's intuitive knowledge of biology.
However, as these have mainly been full educational programmes, further consideration
of specific types of instruction used to improve other aspects of biological knowledge
will be discussed in this review. There are three main intervention types that have been
explored for use with biology: direct experience, provision of factual information and
collaborative learning. Studies from intuitive biological literature and education
literature that have used these intervention methods will be included.
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3.2. A New Approach to Teaching About Illness
As this thesis is primarily concerned with children's illness concepts, it is relevant to
consider health education. Therefore, health education will be used in this section to
show how the traditional health education approach could be improved through
applying principles of domain-specific theories of cognitive development.
In general, it is presumed that health education as a whole has a positive influence on
children as evidenced by major changes in health related behaviours over the last two
decades (Tones & Tilford, 1994). However, two criticisms about health education in
schools have been identified. Firstly, there is a widespread tendency to organise health
education around major health topics making it unwieldy and sometimes unmanageable
for children. An alternative would be to break down educational programmes into
different more manageable components. Basing an intervention programme solely on
illness concepts, for example, may not only lead to better understanding of the specific
topic but it is also possible that learning about illness would generalise to other areas of
health understanding.
Secondly, Au et al. (1999) argue that a new approach is needed towards health
education. They state that current educators tend to focus on a long list of dos and
don'ts and fail to explain the reasoning behind such instructions. In general, basing
health education interventions upon theoretical models generally leads to greater
understanding of the mechanisms and factors the intervention is trying to change.
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Interventions with adults have been based upon thoroughly tested and validated models
such as the Health Belief Model (Becker, Maiman, Kirscht, Haefner, Drachman &
Taylor, 1979; Revere & Dunbar, 2001) and the Transtheoretical Stages of Change
Model (Prochaska, Redding, Harlow, Rossi & Velicer, 1994) but there are no such
proven models for use with children. Child health education interventions must take into
account that children develop and so a model from Developmental psychology may be
useful. Theunissen and Tates (2004) suggest Piagetian and Vygotskian influenced
Cognitive Developmental models as a possibility. However, basing an educational
intervention upon Piagetian or Vygotskian theory may not be the best way forward (see
Chapters 1 and 2 for a critique of these theories). An alternative would be to base
interventions on the suggestion that children's knowledge of the world develops in a
domain-specific fashion and children construct theories about the world. To build on
these intuitive theories may be the most valid approach to take towards improving
illness concepts (Au et al., 1999).
3.3. Using Children's Intuitive Knowledge in Teaching About
Illness
There are a series of studies that have designed health education programmes around the
idea that children have intuitive knowledge or nai've theories of illness that can be built
upon. These studies have mainly considered understanding of AIDS and HIV
transmission (Au et ah, 1999; Sigelman et ah, 1996). Traditionally, it was argued that it
would not be beneficial to provide young children with detailed information about
AIDS as they were believed to be too cognitively immature to comprehend this
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information (Walsh & Bibace, 1990). However, Sigelman et al. (1996) argued that early
education is important as it can help prepare children to avoid high risk behaviours,
enable them to make better sense of the information, increase their compassion for
people with AIDS and reassure them that they are not at high risk. Furthermore, extant
research suggested that even brief HIV/AIDS education in schools can successfully
increase knowledge of the disease (e.g. Ashworth, DuRant, Newman & Gaillard, 1992;
Brown, Barone, Fritz, Cebollero & Nassau, 1991). From this viewpoint, age-appropriate
intervention methods have the potential to be more successful than Walsh and Bibace
(1990) suggest.
To investigate this fully, Sigelman et al. (1996) adopted a nai've theories approach in
order to improve understanding of AIDS in 8 - 13 year olds. Children in this age group
have been shown to hold misconceptions about HIV transmission, i.e. they commonly
believe that FIIV can be transmitted through the same behaviours that cause colds and
that it can be caused by any form of drug use. The goal of AIDS education in this study
was to achieve advances in both knowledge and understanding by exposing these flaws
in children's nai've theories and offering them a more accurate alternative theory.
Therefore, the curriculum was designed specifically to help children differentiate
between AIDS and other diseases and reject their common misconceptions about HIV
transmission. Various teaching methods were employed by this study including
lecturing, class discussion and video clips. The findings showed that the programme led
to improvements both in knowledge of key facts and causal reasoning of AIDS. This
suggests that even relatively young children can grasp scientific theories of disease with
the help of age-appropriate instruction, contrary to Piagetian suggestion.
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Sigelman and her colleagues have explored the potential of this na'ive theories approach
through a series of studies examining the effect of similar educational programmes on
teaching about drugs and their effect on the body. Firstly, their research determined that
children with greater background knowledge of biology learned more about drugs and
their effect on the body from instruction (Sigelman et ah, 2003a). A further study
compared different curricula for improving understanding of drugs (Sigelman et al.,
2003b). Three versions of the experimental curriculum, a basic version, one with extra
biological background information, and one challenging tobacco related
misconceptions, were evaluated and compared to a control curriculum. Children in the
experimental conditions showed increased awareness of the biological processes and
scientific understanding that they were taught. The effects of the three experimental
curricula did not differ significantly. This implies that the approaches of challenging
misconceptions or providing a causally coherent theory of drug action work as well as
each other.
Au et al. (1999) adopt a similar approach by suggesting building on children's intuitive
theories of biology to help them develop an understanding of health and illness. Their
target area of understanding was also, like Sigelman et al. (1996), AIDS and HIV
transmission. Their approach to improving this understanding was systematic in that
they first set about determining what children know in this area and how this
understanding is linked. As outlined in Chapter 2, even young children may have
sophisticated understanding of germs. To recap, pre-schoolers believe that germs are the
causal agents of illness (Kalish, 1996b; Springer & Ruckel, 1992) and by age 6 children
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know that germs have biological attributes. However, although children understand that
germs cause illness, they demonstrate very little understanding of how germs make
people sick (Au & Romo, 1999). This leads Au et al. (1999) to believe that children
know learned facts about illness without understanding any biological causal
mechanism for how germs affect the body. This is important for the teaching about
AIDS as one way to reason coherently and sensibly about AIDS is to rely on an
understanding of a biological causal mechanism for HIV transmission.
Taking this into account, Au et al. (1999) designed a "Think Biology" curriculum that
was designed to help 9-14 year old children fill this conceptual gap by explicitly
teaching about a biological mechanism for HIV transmission. This curriculum
comprised three lessons that focused on the biology of HIV. The children were taught
that the AIDS virus is a living thing; it can reproduce, stay alive and die in various
environments. Children already know some of these facts but this curriculum aimed to
ensure that children were taught the crucial facts that the virus can stay alive and
reproduce in a person's blood but it will die instantly in air and water. Knowledge of
these facts allowed the children to reason about HIV transmission, for example, they
would be able to figure out that you cannot get AIDS by sharing a swimming pool with
someone who has AIDS. The "Think Biology" curriculum was compared to an existing
AIDS education programme and it was found to be more successful at improving
knowledge of AIDS. Children in the experimental condition appeared to think more
coherently about HIV transmission and were better at reasoning about AIDS in novel
situations. This "Think Biology" approach has been used in subsequent studies and has
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been found to improve understanding of STD transmission (Zamora, Romo, Bishop &
Ulpindo, 2003), and colds (Au, Chan, Wan & Chan, 2005)
These studies highlight that an intuitive knowledge approach to health education can be
effective at improving understanding of different aspects of health and illness. By
building on what children already know or challenging misconceptions, appropriate
intervention can improve knowledge and make understanding of illness more coherent
and theory-like. However, these studies examine the efficacy of full educational
curricula and programmes. These programmes comprise many different methods of
instruction such as group discussion, guided lessons, watching videotapes etc. There is
no way of indicating what parts of the curriculum used were most effective in
improving understanding. Not only would it be beneficial to identify the most
successful instruction methods but also it is important to identify the underlying
learning mechanisms that are leading to the conceptual change. This could lead to the
development of more efficient and effective intervention programmes.
3.4. Methods of Instruction
In order to determine what intervention methods would be effective at improving
understanding of illness, the level and nature of children's intuitive knowledge of this
area must be considered. Teaching children in areas where they already hold intuitive
knowledge has been described as involving a process whereby they must incorporate or
reconcile the formal knowledge with their intuitive/spontaneous knowledge. A
framework to determine the best teaching methods is provided by Pines and West
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(1986). They identify four possible interactions between formal and nai've knowledge:
zero-spontaneous situation, spontaneous situation, congruent situation and conflict
situation. The type of interaction that may occur when teaching children about biology
depends on the nature of children's intuitive biological knowledge. The zero-
spontaneous situation can be discounted as Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 have described a
large body of evidence stating that children have intuitive knowledge of biology before
being taught in school. However, it is not obvious which of the other three categories is
most appropriate for biological knowledge and this has implications for the most
appropriate teaching method to be used.
In the spontaneous situation, there is no formal school knowledge presented yet the
child's spontaneous knowledge is extensive. Therefore, experience of biology gained
through individual investigation should be enough to promote understanding that
corresponds to formal knowledge. Would it be possible to design an intervention
method that gives children experience with a biological phenomenon and leads to
increases in knowledge? The first sub-section will attempt to answer this question but it
will become clear that illness is difficult to manipulate so this will not be considered in
the rest of this thesis.
Alternatively, the formal and nai've knowledge may be congruent with each other. Pines
and West (1986) argue that biological knowledge often falls into this category of
knowledge interactions and some of the research covered in Chapter 2 would suggest
that children have intuitive knowledge of illness that may form a basis for more formal
knowledge. A process of cognitive change is required to incorporate the new knowledge
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and adapt existing na'ive knowledge. One possible method of instruction would be to
provide children with the age-appropriate facts that they lack from their intuitive
knowledge. The second sub-section will consider the effectiveness of factual
information as an intervention method.
At the other extreme, there are cases where naive and formal knowledge directly
contradict each other. In these circumstances encouraging the learning of the formal
concepts can be difficult because the child's naive knowledge can act as a barrier to
learning (Driver et al., 1985). Pines and West (1986) argue that many areas of physics
concepts fall into this category and learning through a process of cognitive conflict
whereby children become aware of their misconceptions, question them and later
reformulate their concepts, is often successful. However, children find certain areas of
biology conceptually difficult to grasp, indicating that naive concepts of biology may
not be congruent with formal knowledge. These include genetics (Thomas, 2000;
Williams and Affleck, 1999; Williams & Tolmie, 2000), photosynthesis (Anderson,
Sheldon & Dubay, 1990) and some illness processes (Au & Romo, 1999). In these
instances an intervention that is designed to engender cognitive conflict is often
required to facilitate learning. The most successful method for this has been found to be
collaborative learning (Howe, Rodgers & Tolmie, 1990) and this is covered in the third
sub-section.
By this account, there are three main intervention approaches that can be investigated
for use with biological knowledge. These are direct experience, factual information and
collaborative learning. The following sections will cover each of these in turn and
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discuss, where appropriate, the theoretical background, empirical findings and the
possible mechanisms underlying learning. These sections will not just scrutinize
research on illness and health but also biology as a whole. This is because there is not a
substantial literature on illness so other dimensions of biological understanding need to
be considered to provide a fuller picture. For the same reason, research on improving
understanding of physics is also included.
3.4.1. Direct Experience
If children hold spontaneous knowledge of biology without receiving formal teaching,
then providing children with direct experience of biological phenomena should be
enough to enhance knowledge (Pines & West, 1986). Kellert (2002) distinguishes
between types of experience children have with nature and how this can influence
development. Specifically, he identifies direct experience, e.g. play in natural settings
giving direct experience of plants and animals; indirect experience, e.g. physical contact
with nature in more managed contexts such as zoos or pet ownership; and symbolic
experience, e.g. television, films and books. Evidence has shown that these types of
experience can have a positive impact on cognitive development (Kahn, 1999; Kellert
1996; Kellert & Vollbracht, 2000).
There is also research, although it is limited, looking specifically at the development of
biology concepts. Chapter 1 mentioned that direct experience was one of the key factors
in Inagaki and Hatano's (2002) ideas about influences on the development of children's
biological thought. Inagaki (1990) provides empirical evidence for this by
demonstrating the positive influence of pet ownership. She investigated the effects that
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raising a goldfish had on children's biological knowledge of animals by matching 5 year
old children who had previously raised a goldfish for 3 months or more with children
who had never raised any animal. Through individual interviews it was found that the
goldfish raisers not only displayed a greater amount of factual knowledge but also more
conceptual knowledge. Conceptual knowledge was measured by children's responses to
questions that asked how goldfish would respond in novel situations and their
explanations about the meaning of goldfish raising. In addition the goldfish raisers
could relate their knowledge of goldfish to similar aquatic animals, such as a frog, to
make reasonable predictions about a frog's life.
Likewise, Williams and Smith (in press) have found that children who own a pet show
slight advantages in knowledge of inheritance than those who do not. They also report
that children in rural areas have greater understanding than those in urban areas. This is
accounted for in terms of rural children's increased direct experience with animals and
fauna. Additionally, research has noted the educational benefits associated with
increased experience of animals through visiting zoos (Altman, 1998; Chouinard, 2003;
Tunnicliffe, Lucas & Osbourne, 1997).
Despite these positive findings regarding the effect of experience, it would be
impossible to manipulate experience of illness. At any rate, findings from studies that
compare children with experience of an illness to children with no experience have been
mixed. For example, Rubovits and Siegal (1994) found that children with diabetes have
more sophisticated concepts of disease management than a group with no experience of
diabetes. In contrast, Perrin, Sayer and Willett (1991) report that children with an
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orthopaedic condition showed less sophisticated concepts of illness than a control.
Results such as this are argued to be due to the chronic condition interfering with
general cognitive development that in turn affects illness concepts. Research on more
common childhood illnesses, namely chicken pox and asthma, which are not likely to
affect cognition development has found that knowledge is higher in children who have
first hand experiences of these illnesses (Myant & Howe, 2003). Taking this into
consideration, direct experience may improve understanding of some aspects of biology
but it is not clear that it improves understanding of illness and it is certainly not a
practical intervention method for use with this concept.
3.4.2. Factual Information
The second type of intervention method involves the provision of factual information. If
illness is an area of knowledge where formal and na'ive knowledge are congruent,
interventions that provide illness facts in child-appropriate language should enhance
understanding through a process of cognitive change (Pines & West, 1986).
There are further theoretical grounds why factual information may be effective in
enhancing children's learning of biology. Two propositions about the importance of
factual information were introduced in Chapter 1. Springer (1999) argues that "the
critical factor driving the acquisition of naive biology may be the acquisition of factual
knowledge, combined with certain key inferences generated from this knowledge"
(p.46). He suggests that by the age of 4 to 5 a nai've theory of biology is autonomous but
that growth in this domain is heavily influenced by children learning facts about the
biological world. A second influential theory about the development of biology
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knowledge has been proposed by Inagaki and Hatano (2002). They argue that children
learn about the biological world by employing "constrained personification" whereby
they use their knowledge of humans to make inferences about biological processes in
other animals and plants. Two constraints are believed to influence this process of
personification, one is the "similarity constraint" where the more similar a target is to
humans the more likely personification will be employed. Another constraint is the
factual check or "feasibility constraint". From this viewpoint, even young children have
extensive knowledge about living things and their factual knowledge database is
extremely important in checking the plausibility of personification. Thus, great
importance is placed by Inagaki and Hatano on the role of factual information in
children's learning of biology.
Springer (1995) was interested in the origin and acquisition of a nai've theory of kinship
and argued that teaching facts of intrauterine development and birth to young children
should help lead to the acquisition of a naive theory of kinship. As mentioned in
Chapter 1, this naive theory of kinship consists of three beliefs: firstly, that children
presume babies share more physical properties with their mothers than with unrelated
animals (Springer, 1992), secondly, that children consider good and bad functional
properties to be equally heritable and thirdly, that children believe inheritance occurs by
material transfer from mother to child. These beliefs, he argued, are deduced from
children's knowledge of certain simple facts about inheritance and kinship. He reported
these as being that babies grow inside their mothers, that foetal growth is not normally
affected from influences outside the womb and that physical proximity facilitates the
transmission of physical properties. Springer's (1995) findings showed that if children
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held knowledge of these basic facts they can begin to draw appropriate inferences about
inheritance processes. He further reported the results of a training study where children
who did not have knowledge of these facts about prenatal development were taught the
basic facts without being taught about detailed biological inheritance processes.
Children in the training condition showed significantly improved knowledge and
understanding at post-test, implying that teaching children simple biological facts can
improve theoretical knowledge of inheritance.
However, Williams and Affleck (1999) attempted to replicate Springer's findings and
found that factual information did not improve understanding of inheritance in their
sample of 4 and 7 year olds. They suggest that one possible reason for this discrepancy
may be due to the materials used. Williams and Affleck's (1999) materials contained
reference to animals rather than humans, in an attempt to prevent children relying on
their concrete knowledge of humans and provoke intuitive thinking. However, a more
likely reason, they argue, is that the lack of effect of the intervention was due to the high
levels of baseline knowledge observed at pre-test in their sample. As a result, the factual
information provided did not build on their intuitive knowledge, as they already knew
most of the facts. This indicates the importance of determining children's baseline
knowledge before designing an intervention.
One further possibility for the failure of this study is the probable lack of engagement
that children would have had with the task materials. Both Springer and Williams and
Affleck read stories out to the children with no real effort to promote engagement with
the materials. Promoting engagement is important for making the learning tasks seem
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'real' and relevant to the children (Newmann, 1991) which in turn leads to interest
among the children and high motivation to learn about the topic. More of an effort to
involve the children in some way with the facts may lead to more convincing effects. A
related issue that needs flagged up is that children's understanding of biology may not,
as suggested by Pines and West, be congruent with formal knowledge. If this is indeed
the case (this will be investigated by the study reported in Chapter 4 and discussion will
therefore be devoted to this in Chapter 5) then this makes the case for promoting
engagement with factual information even more crucial as efforts to overcome
conflicting ideas of biology will need to be made.
Throughout the literature recounted here, factual information is normally used to refer
to basic facts of biology. An alternative to providing children with these basic facts
would be to provide them with explanations, slightly different from basic facts as they
give an account of processes above and beyond basic detail. Distinguishing between
basic facts and explanations would allow a closer examination of how providing
children with factual information leads to increases in knowledge.
Added to this, it would be beneficial to have some idea of how providing facts or
explanations might lead to conceptual change. It is possible to speculate on some
candidates here. The most basic model would suppose that children's knowledge is
enriched through the provision of basic facts. This would also suggest that children's
knowledge is further improved if explanations are provided. Another account would
favour theory building (Carey, 1985; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Wellman & Gelman,
1992) where basic facts or explanations would serve to contradict and reaffirm aspects
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of children's theories engaging a process of theory revision and conceptual change.
Alternatively, it could be through RR (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), where children's
representations are restructured from an implicit non-verbalised understanding (i.e. I
level representations) to a more theoretical understanding open to explicit verbalisation
(i.e. E3 Level representations). This explanation has been used to explain the findings of
other intervention studies (Pine & Messer, 1998) that provide children with detailed
explanations.
In sum, most studies have shown that the provision of factual information is successful
in enhancing understanding of biology. Unfortunately, there is a lack of studies in
developmental psychology that have investigated the efficacy of factual information to
improve knowledge of illness. Springer (1995) has shown that basic facts can increase
theoretical understanding of inheritance but Williams and Affleck (1999) attempted to
replicate this study and found factual information to be an ineffective intervention
method. However, further research is needed to determine the level of factual
information that is more appropriate; in particular there is a lack of research that
considers the effect of providing children with explanations. One fruitful avenue of
research would be to investigate the best ways in which to promote engagement with
factual information materials. Furthermore, if factual information does lead to increases
in knowledge, what are the processes that underlie this? It may be some form of
conceptual change or it could be rote learning leading to enrichment of knowledge. This
is another question which future research could aim to answer.
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3.4.3. Collaborative Learning
As discussed, children's intuitive knowledge of science can sometimes be in direct
conflict with formal knowledge. Pines and West (1986) suggested physics
understanding as such an area of knowledge but some areas of biology are also difficult
for children to grasp. In general, intervention methods that promote cognitive conflict
are needed to lead to conceptual change in such instances. The most successful method
investigated to date is collaborative learning.
Much research has found collaborative learning to be beneficial for individual cognitive
gain (Doise & Mugny, 1984; Rogoff, 1990). This research has been informed by the
theories of Piaget (1932) and Vygotsky (1978). Although Piaget's theory mainly
focused on the individual aspects in cognitive development, he recognised the potential
productivity of peer interaction in relation to cognitive development (Piaget, 1926,
1932). Piaget described the process that drives subsequent individual performance
through collaborating with other children as "socio-cognitive conflict", i.e. arguing or
debating with peers with conflicting viewpoints lead to cognitive disequilibration, and
the process of re-equilibration resolves the conflicting elements and leads to conceptual
growth. He further observed that children are most challenged in their thinking when
they are with peers rather than adults, because they all are on an equal footing and are
more free to confront ideas. There is also no appeal to status to determine which is right.
However, when children are too similar in their thinking, there may be little to debate
about, resulting in fewer developmental gains. This indicates the importance of the
social dimension of the situation, it is not as simple as placing children together who are
at different cognitive levels - they must enter the situation with different cognitive
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perspectives. Subsequently, investigation of how social interaction affects individual
cognitive development has been undertaken and it is generally accepted that peer
interaction shows superior performances at individual post-test than individual training
(for a review see Doise & Mugny, 1984).
Vygotsky's (1962, 1978) socio-cultural approach has also influenced research on
collaborative learning (Wertsch, 1979, 1991; Rogoff, 1990). This differs from the
Piagetian approach as instead of championing socio-cognitive conflict as the
mechanism facilitating cognitive development, Vygotsky argues that the
communication between individuals is more important. These communications, or
"inter-psychological processes" are the internalised by the individuals involved and
become "intra-psychological", in other words, inner speech. By this account, each
learner stores the conversations conducted during the collaborative problem solving and
later reflects on elements of the dialogue.
Vygotsky differs from Piaget by asserting that collaboration with more skilled partners,
as opposed to those at a similar developmental stage, is important. Vygotsky explains
that the more experienced partner provides help in the way of an intellectual scaffold,
which allows the less experienced learner to accomplish more complex tasks than may
be possible alone. This is defined as the "zone of proximal development", more
specifically, "...the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by
independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined
through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable
peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p.86).
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From these theoretical contentions, a wide body of research on collaborative learning
has arisen. Considerable research effort has been directed towards this and many issues
have been investigated. These include the types of knowledge or skills that collaborative
learning can influence positively, the most productive make-up of the groups, and the
underlying processes that are responsible for such dramatic increases in knowledge.
However, a major direction for research on collaborative learning has been to consider
how children working together can enhance conceptual change.
Group discussions have been used as a mechanism for promoting conceptual change in
the domain of physics by Howe and colleagues. A series of studies on naive physics
showed that letting groups of primary school children discuss phenomena such as
sinking and floating (Howe et al., 1990; Tolmie, Howe, Mackenzie and Greer, 1993),
motion down an incline (Howe, Tolmie & Rodgers, 1992) and heat transfer (Howe,
Tolmie, Greer and Mackenzie, 1995) led to increases in knowledge and understanding.
To give one illustration of this work, the study by Howe et al. (1995) put together
groups consisting of four children aged 8 to 12 years and let them discuss characteristics
of heating and cooling. In this study, pre- to post-test change was greater when there
was a larger degree of collective understanding displayed during the group task.
However, that collective insights induce learning was not a consistent finding from
other studies. For example, Howe et al., (1990, 1992) found that the greatest
advancements occurred when members of the group held different conceptions as
predicted by theories which state that cognitive conflict can promote conceptual change
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through forcing a reassessment of conceptualisations (Piaget, 1932; Doise, 1990). When
a child's views are challenged by another child who holds an alternative perspective,
they are forced to compare their differing viewpoints and rethink their own original
beliefs (Doise & Mugny, 1984). This is backed up by the finding that the amount of
conceptual change observed in these studies was related to the amount of disagreement
and conflict within the group rather than the agreements within the group (Howe et al.,
1992; Tolmie et al., 1993). As cognitive conflict experienced by a child working
individually was not found to lead to such conceptual advancement, it is implied that
group discussions promote conceptual change through a successful process of socially
generated cognitive conflict (Tolmie et al., 1993).
The conceptual increases observed in these studies were often not apparent
immediately. Greater conceptual advancements were observed when a delayed post test
was administered compared to an immediate post-test. For example, Howe et al. (1992)
administered immediate post-tests and post-tests at 6 weeks. It was found that there was
a greater increase in knowledge and understanding at the delayed post-test. This
increase in knowledge has also been observed between post-tests at 4 and 11 weeks
(Tolmie et al., 1993). One explanation is that the group discussions act to create
conflicts that are later resolved rather than creating solutions to be remembered.
However, recent research by Howe, McWilliam and Cross (2004) suggests that this
"delayed post-test effect" is due to external input experienced after the group tasks. The
discussions are believed to prime the children to pay more attention to references to
appropriate material. Therefore, the greater the delay, the more time the children have to
pick-up relevant information.
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Various researchers have now investigated whether similar discursive interactions
induce conceptual change in biology. There are a few instances in the science education
literature. For example, Lumpe and Stave (1995) showed that high school students
working in groups developed more scientifically correct conceptions of photosynthesis
than students working alone. Additionally, Ponce and Schneeberger (2002) found that
interactions among children promoted the acquisition of knowledge in biology,
particularly if there was conflict of ideas within the groups.
Chapter 1 described Inagaki and Hatano's (2002) proposition that "sociocultural
constraints" are influential in the development of children's biological thought. They
assert that a child's social context is crucial for building upon na'ive biological
knowledge to acquire an advanced knowledge system. They base these claims upon
empirical findings. Hatano and Inagaki (1997) attempted to show that if children engage
in collaborative activities, they are likely to acquire an advanced biological knowledge
system more readily. They compared a control group who received basic facts about
evolution with an experimental group who received the same facts and participated in a
whole class discussion. Results revealed that the children in the experimental group
gave significantly more elaborate explanations than the children in the control subjects.
From this they conclude that it was the joint attempt at comprehension by the group that
led to the acquisition of more sophisticated knowledge than the individuals working
alone.
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A more systematic evaluation of the impact of collaborative learning on biology
concepts was undertaken by Williams and Tolmie (2000). They examined
understanding of inheritance in 8 - 12 year olds and evaluated the impact of a variety of
intervention approaches. Three different experimental intervention conditions were
compared: individual condition aimed to generate cognitive conflict; group condition
with children who had similar naive concepts; and a group condition with children who
had differing na'ive concepts of inheritance. Group discussions involving children with
differing conceptions of inheritance were found to be the most successful. Dialogue
analysis of the group sessions revealed that learning proceeded through a process of co¬
ordination of ideas rather than thorough explicit conflict as has been found in relation to
physics (Howe at al, 1990). Williams and Tolmie (2000) argue that this difference
observed in the group processes may be due to the nature of children's inheritance
concepts. Howe et al. (1995) identified that there are clear signs of differences between
topic areas in physics in the degree of underlying structure of children's concepts, and
that this has considerable impact on the nature of children's discussions. As it has been
suggested that children's biological ideas are more congruent with formal science than
physics ideas (Hatano, 1990; Pines & West, 1986), then they may be able to co-ordinate
ideas more easily without the same degree of conflict/task support.
Collaborative learning has also been used in research to improve children's concepts of
illness. For instance, Williams and Binnie (2002) showed group discussion leading to
slight improvements in understanding of illness. Children aged 4 and 7 years were
placed into groups of five and discussed issues relating to three common ailments,
chicken pox (contagious), asthma (non-contagious) and a scraped knee (injury). When
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compared to a control group which received no intervention, the mean pre-test to post-
test change was greater for the intervention group. This is a promising finding showing
that collaborative learning may be a possible way of learning about illness. However,
the groups of children in the experimental condition were given basic factual
information in the form of short stories before the discussions. Therefore, it is not clear
whether the improved knowledge is due to this factual information or the discussions.
This needs to be unpacked to determine if the factual information alone or the group
discussions alone would have a similar effect.
One further project investigated the efficacy of different intervention methods based on
the provision of factual information and collaborative learning for improving
understanding of illness (Myant & Howe, 2003). The target areas of understanding
included in this study were chicken pox and asthma. A control group was compared
with three experimental conditions: factual information, factual information followed by
group discussion, group discussion followed by factual information. Findings indicate
there was no difference between intervention conditions and the control group in
understanding of asthma. However, the factual information condition and the group
discussion followed by factual information condition both showed significantly greater
pre- to post-test change than the control for understanding of chicken pox. The finding
that providing factual information is an effective way of improving biological
knowledge is in line with Springer (1995). The most surprising finding was that factual
information followed by group discussion was not successful in improving knowledge.
This implies that when the factual information is given to the child is a crucial point.
Giving the children the facts after they have discussed the topic is more successful. This
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relates back to Howe et al.'s (2004) proposal that children are more primed to pay
attention to relevant material after they have discussed it. However, a caveat in this
study is that the pre- and post-test in this study did not include a measure of reasoning
about novel situations or generalisability. It only measured increases in knowledge
measured by the number of correct symptoms, processes and treatments mentioned.
Therefore, more research is needed to consider collaborative learning on its own and to
measure theoretical understanding.
In sum, collaborative learning is a well recognised instruction method for use in the
teaching of science (Kutnick & Blatchford, 1999). It has been shown to promote marked
increases in understanding of physics (Howe et al., 1992) and this is argued to be due to
the conflict experienced in the groups. Similar increases in knowledge have been
observed in children's understanding of biology but the processes involved may be
slightly different due to the nature of intuitive biological understanding. Initial research
investigating group discussions as interventions for illness concepts is promising.
However, existing studies have combined group discussion with factual information so
it is not clear which has the most benefit or if combining factual information with group
discussion is the best approach.
3.5. Conclusions
This review has covered a breadth of literature from different disciplines in an attempt
to identify possible instruction methods for improving understanding of illness. Several
conclusions can be reached as a result of this review. A possible new approach towards
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health education has been identified by researchers. Educational programmes to teach
about health have been based on the idea that development proceeds in a domain-
specific way and that children possess intuitive knowledge of the world. Specifically,
two ideas for developing educational intervention methods have emerged: educators can
build on what children already know or produce materials that challenge their
misconceptions and replace them with formal knowledge. So far though, there are only
a few studies in this area.
Secondly, discussion has focused on the types of intervention methods that have been
used to improve children's biological understanding. In particular, it seems as though
collaborative learning and the provision of factual information may be productive
methods of instruction with the further option of combining these. However, there is a
distinct lack of research on improving children's understanding of illness which needs
to be addressed.
Finally, there are two main types of research that investigate methods of instruction for
promoting conceptual change. The first of these administers educational interventions
and looks for a measure of how successful they are (e.g. Au et ah, 1999; Sigelman et al.,
1996). For the second type of research, it does not matter so much whether the
intervention has been successful or not, what matters is the underlying processes ofwhy
the approach succeeded or failed (e.g. Howe et ah, 1995). What appears to have
happened is that there is a split between theory and practice-based researchers. Co¬
operation between these two camps or at least a consideration of both theory and
practice is needed in future research to develop the most effective intervention methods.
Chapter 3: Intervention Approaches to Improve Understanding ofBiology 101
The foregoing chapter shows clearly that there is scope for further research into
methods of instruction to enhance conceptual change in this area. The issues raised by
the present chapter will be taken into account in designing intervention methods based
on collaborative learning and factual information. In particular, it is acknowledged that
an approach which recognises children's intuitive knowledge about illness is needed.
Chapter 2 showed that there are many gaps in our knowledge concerning what children
understand about illness. Therefore, the first empirical study of this thesis will aim to
fill these gaps and will show the areas of knowledge that would benefit most from
intervention. This is reported in the following chapter. Thereafter, the following two
empirical studies will systematically investigate the ideas raised in this chapter by
conducting studies looking at the efficacy of factual information and collaborative
learning as intervention methods to teach about illness.








A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Health Psychology. The
published article can be found in Appendix VI.
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illnesses and Injuries
4.1. Introduction
The study reported in this chapter investigates the development of children's
understanding of illness and health. This study is an important part of this thesis for two
reasons. First, this study aims to provide a more complete picture of children's
understanding of illness. As identified in Chapter 2, there are several gaps in the
literature on children's understanding of illness and a more comprehensive approach is
needed. It is expected that the findings of this study will add to debate concerning
intuitive biology as well as adding to health psychology literature on understanding of
specific illnesses.
Secondly, the results will provide the basis for the intervention studies to be reported in
Chapters 5 and 6 by providing a reliable baseline measure of children's understanding
of illness and identifying possible age groups and areas of illness understanding that
would benefit from intervention. As identified by Au, et al. (1999), it is important to
determine exactly what children know about illness and what the gaps in their
knowledge are before designing an intervention programme. Otherwise, there is a risk
of teaching children what they already know as demonstrated by Williams and Affleck
(1999) (see Chapter 3) or assuming they understand more than they do.
In order to fully address previous criticisms as set out in Chapter 2 and provide a
reliable baseline for the intervention studies, there are four major issues that must be
first considered. First, there is the question of what illnesses to include. One criticism of
the developmental approach to children's understanding of illness is that it frequently
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does not consider specific illnesses and neglects non-contagious illnesses and injuries.
In contrast the health psychology approach is focused on understanding of specific
illnesses, but these are usually chronic conditions. To strike a balance between these
approaches, this study will include common childhood illnesses that children are likely
to have some experience of. In line with Williams and Binnie (2002), contagious
illnesses, non-contagious illnesses and injuries will be included. This will allow an
examination to see if different types of illness are understood in different ways.
Additionally, children will be asked for their definitions of illness and health.
Secondly, previous research has been criticised for focusing too strongly on causality of
illness (e.g. Siegal, 1988; Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999). In terms of biology, this is the
most important process as it shows whether children understanding the biological
mechanism of contagion (Au & Romo, 1999; Kalish, 1999). However, little research
has been conducted on children's understanding of the prevention, time course or
recovery of illness. This study will include a range of illness processes which will show
how an understanding of illness extends beyond causality. Furthermore, an analysis of
the full range of illness processes will be useful in determining if children's
understanding of illness is causally linked and therefore theoretical.
A third issue concerns the age range of children that needs to be investigated. As
discussed in Chapter 2, there is some agreement between Piaget's stage model and the
development of children's illness concepts (Bibace & Walsh, 1981). Although the
domain-general approach to children's understanding of illness underestimated what
children are capable of understanding of illness, it was useful in showing that the
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development of illness concepts continues throughout childhood. The domain-specific
approach has not followed this trend and usually only looks at preschoolers. This means
that development of illness concepts throughout childhood has not been investigated by
these researchers. Therefore, this study will include children up to the age of 11 years in
an attempt to plot the development of children's understanding of illness and determine
at what age it becomes "biological".
Finally, different research studies have used many varied methodologies and it is clear
that the methodology used can have significant impact on the results. Traditionally, it is
argued that open-ended questioning methods in illness research do not allow children to
display their full understanding whereas forced choice methodologies have been shown
to credit children with more understanding. However, a drawback with forced choice
methods is that they do not reveal anything about the detail or accuracy of children's
explanations of illness. For these reasons, an open-ended questioning method was
chosen for this study as it allows children to express their spontaneous thoughts and
may indeed be the only appropriate method for probing some issues (Howe, 1998).
Although it was noted that the full extent of understanding among the youngest children
may not be tapped by this type of method (Smith & Williams, 2004), it was hoped a
more compete picture of understanding of illness will be obtained than by using forced
choice methods.
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4.2. The Present Study
The present study aimed to consider general definitions of the concepts of health and
illness as well as understanding of specific illnesses. The age range in this study was
extended to include children from 4 years up to 12 years allowing an examination of the
development of illness concepts throughout primary school. It was predicted that
concepts become more sophisticated and accurate with age. The specific illnesses were
common childhood ailments that the children have some knowledge of as shown by
previous research. In addition, more than just understanding of causality was
investigated with questions on definitions, prevention, time course and recovery also
being asked. It was thought likely that the children will have different levels of
understanding of the different illnesses. It was expected that the results will hold strong




A total of 83 children participated in this study from state-run primary schools and both
state-run and private nurseries in Glasgow. The sample comprised four age groups: four
year olds (N = 20, 9 boys, 11 girls: Mean age = 4,7; range = 4,0 to 5,3); seven year olds
(N = 20, 10 boys, 10 girls: M = 7,9; range = 7,4 to 8,2), nine year olds (N = 21, 13 boys,
8 girls: M = 9,9; range = 9,4 to 10,3) and eleven year olds (N = 22, 12 boys, 10 girls: M
= 11,9; range = 11,4 to 12,4).
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The sample was recruited through a process of Education Authority approval and school
willingness to participate. Parents in the relevant age groups were then invited to give
their permission for their children to participate in the study and were informed of the
purpose of the study and the importance of the findings for health education and
cognitive development research. They were also advised that all data would remain
confidential and anonymous. Therefore, written parental permission was received for all
participants. Some participants (N=5) did not have English as their first language and
although they were interviewed in line with inclusive practice they were not included in
this final analysis.
Social background
Free school meal entitlement figures were used to classify each school as belonging to
either a low, mid or high socio-economic status group (SES). These figures are
frequently used as an indicator of social deprivation (Scottish Executive, 2003). The
children were split fairly evenly across three schools. One of these was classed as mid-
SES, the other two as low SES. This data are not available at nursery level although it is
predicted that two of the nurseries would have been classed as mid SES and two as low
SES.
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4.3.2. Pilot Study
Initial items were extensively piloted on a sample of 45 children. Nine common
ailments were asked about but this was reduced to six as the interview was felt to be too
long. The nine ailments consisted of contagious illnesses (cold, chicken pox, tonsillitis),
non-contagious illnesses (asthma, toothache, eczema), and injuries (broken leg, sprained
wrist, bruised knee). One ailment in each category was taken out. These were tonsillitis,
eczema, and sprained wrist. In addition, prompting for each question was introduced as
a result of the pilot study's findings. Children would be asked for explanations of their
responses (e.g. why would that make someone ill?) as this would yield more insights
into the children's knowledge (Springer & Ruckel, 1992). The final materials and
procedure used are described below.
4.3.3. Materials
Introductory questions
Two questions asking for general definitions of health and illness were drawn up (Can
you tell me what it means to be ill/healthy?). These questions served a dual function:
firstly, they eased the participants into the interview situation and secondly, they
allowed an examination of understanding of the concepts of health and illness in
general.
Vignettes
Six short vignettes were written describing child characters with different illnesses. The
ailments described were: contagious illnesses (cold and chicken pox), non-contagious
Chapter 4: Study 1: Children's Understanding ofContagious Illnesses, Non-contagious \ 09
illnesses and Injuries
illnesses (asthma and toothache), and injuries (bruise and broken leg). Each vignette
described the symptoms experienced by the character and gave the name of the illness.
The vignettes were of the same form and complexity for each illness and described the
same number of symptoms. In addition, to maintain the participant's interest, a cartoon
drawing of each of the characters accompanied the vignettes. This method of employing
vignettes facilitate children's ability to answer questions concerning their
representations has been used widely in research on illness (e.g. Kalish, 1996a, 1996b,
1997; Siegal, 1988; Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999; Williams & Binnie, 2002) and
children's understanding of biology more generally (e.g. Smith & Williams, 2004;
Williams & Tolmie, 2000). In this study, questions about each illness which followed
the vignettes explored different dimensions of the illnesses. The questioning began by
asking for a definition of the illness, a simple question designed to be easy for the child
to answer. This helped establish a focus on each ailment and build up a rapport between
researcher and child.
For example:
"This is Johnny. Johnny has a runny nose and a sore throat. He also coughs and sneezes
a lot. This is because Johnny has a cold."
Definition: What is a cold like?
Causality: How do you think Johnny got a cold?/ Why would that make Johnny get a
cold?
Prevention: What could Johnny do to stop himself from getting a cold?/Why would that
stop Johnny from getting a cold?
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Time course incubation: How long would it take for Johnny to feel bad?/Why would it
take that long for Johnny to feel bad?
Recovery: What could Johnny do to make himself feel better?/Why would that make
Johnny feel better?
Time course recovery: How long would it take for Johnny to feel better?/Why would it
take that long for Johnny to feel bad?
The full interview schedules along with the cartoon drawings are included in Appendix
I.
4.3.4. Procedure
The participants were individually interviewed in a quiet room separate from their
classroom. They were told they were going to be asked some questions about different
illnesses, that there were no right or wrong answers and that they were free to leave the
interview situation at any point. The introductory questions were asked first followed by
the vignettes and questions for the specific illnesses. First the vignette was read out to
the participant and they were shown the cartoon drawing. The questions about each
illness were then asked. These always followed the same order. However, the order in
which each of the illnesses was presented was randomised for each participant. Probing
was used to elicit full answers from the participants. Children were asked to fully
explain their answers until it appeared that they had revealed the full extent of their
understanding. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed before analysis.
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4.3.5. Coding
The data was coded using content analysis (see Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1995), a
method frequently employed for analysing children's explanations of illness (Perrin,
Sayer & Willett, 1991; Raman & Winer, 2002; Sigelman, Maddock, Epstein &
Carpenter; 1993). Two coders used 15% of the response scripts to devise appropriate
categories. After discussion the final categories were decided and used to analyse the
remaining response scripts by the two coders. The final categories were fairly broad in
order to encompass responses to each of the illnesses/injuries. Although this may lead to
missing some detail of the data which would remain with narrow categories it does have
the advantage of allowing analysis of cross-illness comparisons. Since one of the
purposes of this study was to look at cross-illness variations in representations it was
crucial to devise a coding scheme that would allow statistical comparisons across the
illnesses. Full details of the coding system are given in Appendix II. For the definitions
of illness and health and the strategies for recovery, it can be seen that the data were
coded into separate categories independent of each other. For definitions, causality and
prevention a higher score indicated a higher level of response. An attempt was made to
maintain a high level of detail with the coding of the causality questions by including an
accuracy measure. This enabled responses to be coded in two ways: firstly, whether
they were biological or physical and secondly, how accurately they described the
mechanism. The time course items were also coded according to how accurate they
were.
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4.4. Results
The data for each question were analysed using either chi-square or two-way ANOVAs
with follow-up tests. Where data were judged to be categorical and therefore non-
parametric as in the case of definition of illness/health and strategies for recovery from
illness, chi-square analyses were employed to explore age trends (in line with Charman
and Chandiramani, 1995). However, for some of the questions each response type
superseded the other in level of sophistication and therefore a higher score indicated a
greater level of understanding. This means the data were ordinal. However, it was
decided to use parametric testing for these items as this form of testing offers more
power and allows analysis of important age by illness type interactions. Such analysis
on data like this has been frequently utilised in previous research (e.g. Springer & Keil,
1991; Williams & Binnie, 2002; Williams & Tolmie, 2000). Thus, for questions on
definition, causality, prevention and time course the data were analysed parametrically
using age group (4 years, 7 years, 9 years, 11 years) x illness type (cold, chicken pox,
asthma, toothache, bruise, broken leg) two-way ANOVAs. Any main effects were then
examined by use of post hoc t-tests with corrections for the significance values or post
hoc Tukey's HSD procedure. Interaction effects were explored with the use of one-way
ANOVAs and post hoc Tukey's HSD. Effect sizes reported are Cohen's d for t-tests and
Cohen's f for ANOVAs (Cohen, 1988).
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In relation to definitions of illness, Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of children giving
each response type. "Don't know" answers decrease across the age groups and
"symptom" answers increase with age. Behavioural and psychological definitions are
generally unpopular with all age groups. A chi-square test (x2 — 21.65, p < .01)
indicated the response pattern is associated with age.
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of children giving each type of definition for health
90 -i
4/5 years 7/8 years 9/10 years 11/12 years
Figure 4.2 shows the percentages of participants invoking each response type for
definitions of health. A different pattern to definitions of illness is seen. The most
favoured category here is behavioural for the 7 year olds and the 11 year olds. The 4
years olds prefer "don't know" and the 9 year olds mainly use definitions based on
absence of symptoms. Chi-square test showed responses to be significantly associated
with age (x2 = 45.37, p < .001).
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Table 4.1: Mean scores for definitions of each illness type by age group (standard
deviation)
Cold C pox Asthma Tooth Bruise Br leg
4y 1.00 (0.56) 0.95 (0.39) 0.50(0.61) 0.75 (0.55) 0.90 (0.55) 0.95 (0.51)
7 y 1.10(0.64) 0.90 (0.31) 0.70 (0.47) 1.05 (0.51) 1.25 (0.55) 1.25 (0.64)
9y 1.33 (0.48) 1.00 (0.32) 0.95 (0.59) 1.33 (0.48) 1.62 (0.50) 1.19(0.68)
ii y 1.09 (0.43) 1.05 (0.21) 1.00 (0) 1.23 (0.53) 1.41 (0.50) 1.45 (0.60)
Table 4.1 shows that older children have higher scores and are therefore more likely to
specify the cause of an illness than the younger children. Asthma has the lowest scores
so is most commonly defined in terms of symptoms or, for the younger age groups,
"don't know". The two injuries have higher scores which indicates more mention of
causality than for the other illnesses.
A two-way ANOVA on the definition scores found a main effect of age group (F (3, 79)
= 7.70, p < .001, f = 0.54), post hoc Tukey HSDs found that the 4 year olds had lower
mean scores than the 9 year olds and the 11 year olds (ps < .001). There was also a main
effect of illness type (F (5, 395) = 13.47, p < .001, f = 0.41). Repeated measures t-tests
comparing the different illness types across all ages showed that scores for asthma were
lower than scores for cold (t (82) = 4.88, p < .001, d = 0.63), chicken pox (t (82) = 3.31,
p < .001, d = 0.43), toothache (t (82) = 4.17, p < .001, d = 0.57) and bruise (t (82) =
6.71, p < .001, d = 0.92). Further, chicken pox scores were significantly lower than the
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injuries' scores: bruise (t (82) = 5.05, p < .001, d = 0.68) and broken leg (t (82) = 3.68, p
< .001, d = 0.48). No interaction effect was found.
Table 4.2: Mean scores for causality of each illness type by age group (standard
deviation)
Cold C pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Br leg
4y 0.65 (0.59) 0.40 (0.60) 0.55 (0.69) 0.90 (0.31) 0.95 (0.22) 0.85 (0.37)
7 y 1.00 (0.56) 0.80 (0.95) 0.60 (0.88) 0.95 (0.73) 1.00 (0) 1.00 (0)
9 y 1.19 (0.40) 1.33 (0.91) 0.85 (0.91) 1.00 (0.68) 1.00 (0) 1.00 (0)
11 y 1.00 (0.31) 1.55 (0.86) 1.18 (0.85) 1.50 (0.43) 1.00 (0) 0.95 (0.21)
Table 4.2 shows that understanding of causality mainly falls at a physical level, i.e. not
above a mean score of 1. However, for the injuries it was not possible to code causality
as "biological" as the causes of injuries are always physical. Therefore, a mean score of
1 for these ailments indicates that every child gave a reasonable "physical" explanation.
In general, higher scores are observed in the older age groups and like the scores for
"definition" it appears as though the lowest scores are obtained for asthma.
For understanding of the causality of illness, a two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect
of age group (F (3, 79) = 14.26, p < .001, f = 0.74). Subsequent post-hoc tests found that
4 year olds have lower mean scores than the 9 and 11 year olds and the 7 year olds have
a lower mean scores than the 11 year olds (all ps < .001). A main effect of illness type
(F (5, 395) = 2.55, p < .001, f = 0.17) was found, but post hoc t-tests did not show any
significant differences between pairs of illnesses.
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The significant interaction effect (F (15, 395) = 3.11, p < .001, f = 0.34) was initially
explored using one-way ANOVAs with Tukey HSD post hoc analysis (only significant
differences are reported). There were significant developmental improvements between
age groups for cold (F (3, 79) = 4.59, p < .005; 4 year olds have a lower mean than 9
year olds, p < .01 ), chicken pox (F (3, 79) = 7.87, p < .001; 4 year olds have a lower
mean than 9 year olds and 11 year olds, p < .01 and 7 year olds have a lower mean than
11 year olds, p < .05) and toothache (F (3, 79) = 8.07, p < .001; 11 year olds have a
higher mean than all other age groups, p < .01). There were no age differences for
bruise, broken leg and asthma.
Table 4.3: Mean scores for accuracy measure of each illness type by age group
(standard deviations).
Cold C pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Br leg
4y 0.10(0.45) 0.10(0.45) 0(0) 1.50 (0.69) 1.90 (0.45) 1.80 (0.83)
7y 0.45 (1.14) 0.95 (1.31) 0.40 (0.82) 1.65 (0.93) 2.35 (0.59) 2.60 (0.75)
9y 0.47 (1.08) 1.52 (1.33) 0.91 (1.09) 1.95 (0.86) 2.09 (0.54) 2.24 (0.44)
ii y 0.09 (0.43) 1.68 (1.13) 1.18 (1.22) 2.64 (0.95) 2.27 (0.55) 2.27 (0.83)
Table 4.3 shows the accuracy of explanations for causality of illness. The illness with
the least accurate knowledge of causes is a cold. In particular, the 11 year olds have a
low mean score for cold of 0.09, in fact, this is even lower than the score achieved by
the 4 year olds. Possible reasons for this will be flagged in the discussion. The greatest
accuracy of knowledge is for the injuries and there does not appear to be much
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improvement due to age for these two ailments indicating that children already hold a
fairly sophisticated view of injury that does not developmentally change over
childhood.
A two-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of age group (F (3, 79) = 16.91,
p < .001, f = 0.80) with differences in accuracy detected between the 4 year olds and all
other age groups (all ps < .001). A significant main effect of illness type (F (5, 395) =
82.28, p < .001, f = 1.02) was also found. For the cross-illness post hoc comparisons,
scores for toothache, bruise and broken leg were found to be significantly higher than
scores for cold, chicken pox and asthma (cold - toothache: t (82) = -10.92, p < .001, d =
1.85; cold - bruise t (82) = -16.27, p < .001, d = 2.64; cold - broken leg: t (82) = -15.23,
p < .001, d = 2.42; chicken pox - toothache: t (82) = -5.53, p < .001, d = 0.78; chicken
pox - bruise: t (82) = -7.89, p < .001, d = 1.11; chicken pox - broken leg: t (82) = -7.60,
p < .001, d = 1.10; asthma - toothache: t (82) = -10.07, p < .001, d = 1.32; asthma -
bruise: t (82) = -13.00, p < .001, d = 1.85; asthma - broken leg: t (82) = -12.62, p < .001,
d = 1.76) and chicken pox scores were higher than scores for cold (t (82) = -4.87, p <
.001, d = 0.75).
The interaction effect (F (15, 395) = 3.174, p < .001, f = 0.35) was examined by using
one-way ANOVAs and post hoc Tukey HSDs comparing means for different age
groups for each illness type separately. There were significant age differences in
accuracy for chicken pox (F (3, 79) = 7.87, p < .001, f = 0.55; 4 year olds have a lower
mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .005) asthma (F (3, 79) = 6.70, p < .001, f = 0.50; 4
year olds have a lower mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .05), toothache F (3, 79) =
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7.17, p < .001, f = 0.52; 11 year olds have a higher mean than 4 and 7 year olds, p <
.01), bruise (F (3, 79) = 2.85, p < .05, f = 0.33; no pairwise differences detected) and
broken leg (F (3, 79) = 4.04, p < .01, f = 0.39; 4 year olds have a lower mean than 7
year olds, p < .05). No age differences were detected for cold.
Table 4.4: Mean scores for prevention of each illness type by age group
Cold C pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Br leg
4y 0.50(0.51) 0.30 (0.47) 0.25 (0.44) 0.35 (0.49 0.55 (0.51) 0.40 (0.50)
7 y 1.00 (0.56) 0.85 (0.88) 0.40 (0.50) 0.90 (0.64) 0.80 (0.41) 0.90 (0.31)
9y 0.90 (0.44) 1.43 (0.68) 0.57(0.51) 1.10(0.62) 1.00 (0) 1.00 (0)
ii y 1.00 (0.44) 1.27 (0.94) 0.91 (0.75) 1.32 (0.48) 1.00 (0) 0.91 (0.29)
Table 4.4 shows clear developmental trends with prevention strategy scores increasing
across the age groups for each illness. A two-way ANOVA found a main effect of age
group (F (3, 79) = 24.32, p < .001, f = 0.96), with differences between the 4 year olds
and all other age groups (all ps < .001) and the 7 year olds and 11 year olds (p < .001).
The main effect of illness type (F (5, 395) = 7.84, p < .001, f = 0.31) was further
investigated using post-hoc t-tests, which showed that asthma scores were significantly
lower than for all other illnesses (cold: t (82) = 3.99, p < .001, d = 0.56; chicken pox: t
(82) = 4.39, p < .001, d = 0.58; toothache: t (82) = 4.71, p < .001, d = 0.61; bruise: t (82)
= 4.29, p < .001, d = 0.60; broken leg: t (82) = 3.85, p < .001, d = 0.52).
The interaction effect (F (15, 395) = 2.21, p < .01, f = 0.28) was examined by
comparing age differences within each illness using one-way ANOVAs with post hoc
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Tukey HSD tests. There were significant age effects for all illness types: Cold (F (3, 79)
= 4.84, p < .005, f = 0.43; 4 year olds have a lower mean than 7 and 11 year olds, p <
.05); chicken pox (F (3, 79) = 8.94, p < .001, f = 0.58; 4 year olds have a lower mean
than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .001); asthma (F (3, 79) = 5.26, p < .005, f = 0.44; 11 year
olds have a higher mean than 4 and 7 year olds, p < .05); toothache (F (3, 79) = 11.23, p
< .001, f = 0.65; 4 year olds have a lower mean than all other age groups, p < .05);
bruise (F (3, 79) = 9.09, p < .001, f = 0.59; 4 year olds have a lower mean than 9 and 11
year olds, p < .001) and broken leg (F (3, 79) = 14.07, p < .001, f = 0.73; 4 year olds
have a lower mean than all other age groups, p < .001).
Table 4.5: Mean scores for incubation time course of each illness type by age group
(standard deviation)
Cold C pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Br leg
4y 0.05 (0.22) 0.20 (0.62) 0.20 (0.62) 0.05 (0.22) 0.01 (0.45) 0.20 (0.62)
7y 0.45 (0.76) 0.30 (0.73) 0.10(0.45) 0.75 (0.91) 1.30 (0.98) 0.70 (0.98)
9y 0.76 (0.94) 1.15 (1.01) 0.48 (0.87) 0.86 (0.85) 1.33 (0.96) 1.24 (0.99)
ii y 0.77 (0.97) 0.73 (0.93) 0.64 (0.95) 1.00 (0.69) 1.09(1.01) 1.64 (0.79)
Table 4.5 shows how accurate the participants in each age group were in their
estimations of incubation time, i.e. the time between contracting the illness and "feeling
ill". Again, scores generally increase with age. The most difficulty is observed in
understanding the time course of asthma and cold. Scores appear a bit higher for
toothache and the injuries.
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There was a main effect of age group (F (3, 79) = 17.86, p < .001, f = 0.82). Post hoc
tests detected improvements in accuracy scores between the 4 year olds and all other
age groups (all ps < .001) and between the 7 year olds and 9 and 11 year olds (ps < .05).
For the cross-illness main effect (F (5, 395) = 8.35, p < .001, f = 0.32) , post hoc t-tests
indicated that asthma has a lower mean score than bruise (t (82) = 4.74, p < .001, d =
0.68) and broken leg (t (82) = 4.92, p < .001, d = 0.68); and cold has a lower mean score
than bruise (t (82) = 4.38, p < .001, d = 0.48) and broken leg (t (82) = 3.38, p < .001, d =
0.48).
One-way ANOVAs with post hoc Tukey HSDs examining age trends within illness
types were employed to investigate the interaction (F (15, 395) = 2.29, p < .005, f =
0.29). Age differences were found for cold (F (3, 79) = 3.80, p < .05, f = 0.38; 4 year
olds have a lower mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .05); chicken pox (F (3, 79) = 5.40,
p < .005, f = 0.45; 4 year olds have a lower mean than 9 year olds, p < .01 and 7 year
olds have a lower mean than 9 year olds, p < .05); toothache (F (3, 79) = 6.98, p < .001,
f = 0.51; 4 year olds have a lower mean than all other age groups, p < .05); bruise (F (3,
79) = 8.60, p < .001, f = 0.57; 4 year olds have a lower mean than all other age groups,
p < .01) and broken leg (F (3, 79) = 11.11, p < .001, f = 0.65; 4 year olds have a lower
mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .005 and 7 year olds have a lower mean than 11 year
olds, p < .01). There were no age trends for asthma.
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Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of children giving each recovery strategy for the six
illnesses. In general the most favoured strategy is symptom relief. For toothache, most
children referred to seeking medical help. As for all other illness features, asthma shows
the highest number of don't know responses.
To explore this overall trend in more detail, associations between recovery strategies
and age were examined for each illness type using chi-square. The results were
significant in relation to cold (x2 = 29.85, p < .005), bruise (x2 = 24.64, p < .05) and
broken leg (x = 27.83, p < .01).
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Table 4.6: Mean scores for recovery time course of each illness type by age group
(standard deviation)
Cold C pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Br leg
4y 0.20 (0.41) 0.30 (0.66) 0.30 (0.73) 0.20 (0.41) 0.20 (0.41) 0.55 (0.83)
7 y 0.55 (0.76) 0.95 (0.83) 0.40 (0.82) 0.45 (0.51) 0.95 (0.83) 1.00 (0.86)
9y 1.38 (0.74) 1.62 (0.74) 0.48 (0.87) 0.71 (0.46) 1.05 (0.67) 1.62 (0.67)
ii y 1.27 (0.70) 1.41 (0.73) 0.73 (0.98) 0.77 (0.43) 1.09 (0.61) 1.41 (0.73)
Table 4.6 shows the accuracy of answers regarding time to recovery. Overall, the scores
are higher than the incubation time scores indicating a better understanding of this part
of the time course of illness.
A two-way ANOVA found a main effect of age group (F (3, 79) = 26.66, p < .001, f =
1.00) and post-hoc Tukey HSD tests showed significant increases in accuracy between
the 4 year olds and all other age groups (all ps < .005) and the 7 year olds showed lower
means than the 9 and 11 year olds (ps < .005). For the main effect of illness type (F (5,
395) = 13.76, p < .001, f = 0.42), toothache has a lower mean than cold (t (82) = 3.79, p
< .001, d = 0.47), chicken pox (t (82) = 5.95, p < .001, d = 0.75), bruise (t (82) = -3.34,
p < .001, 0.46) and broken leg (t (82) = -6.45, p < .001, d = 0.88). Asthma has a lower
mean than chicken pox (t (82) = 4.88, p < .001, d = 0.68) and broken leg (t (82) = -5.30,
p <.001, d = 0.79).
In relation to the interaction (F (15, 395) = 1.91, p < .05, f = 0.27), there were
significant age differences for all illness apart from asthma: cold (F (3, 79) = 14.91 ,P<
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.001, f = 0.75; 4 year olds have a lower mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .001 and 7
year olds have a lower mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .005) chicken pox (F (3, 79) =
12.73, p < .001, f = 0.69; 4 year olds have a lower mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p <
.001 and 7 year olds have a lower mean than 9 year olds, p < .05) toothache (F (3, 79) =
6.95, p < .001, f = 0.51; 4 year olds have a lower mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .01)
bruise (F (3, 79) = 8.57, p < .001, f = 0.57; 4 year olds have a lower mean than all other
age groups, p < .01) and broken leg (F (3, 79) = 7.66, p < .001, f = 0.54; 4 year olds
have a lower mean than 9 and 11 year olds, p < .01).
Correspondences between children's understanding of different features and different
illnesses
Looking at the data in the above tables, it is clear that children have better
understanding of some of the features of illness than others. For instance, mean scores
for the incubation time course are particularly low when compared to the understanding
of other features. How much children understand about the different illness processes
depends on the illness being asked about.
It was previously discussed that children may have three micro-theories of illness,
relating to contagious illnesses, non-contagious illnesses and injuries. The results of this
study can be used to investigate this hypothesis. From the data reported above, it
appears as though there is some correspondence between the two injuries. The mean
scores for bruise and broken leg are often similar indicating that understanding may be
at a similar level. However, mean scores for the cold are often lower than for chicken
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pox so it cannot be concluded that children understand these two contagious illnesses
according to the same biological theory. Further, there is little correspondence between
toothache and asthma, supporting the idea that children develop different levels of
understanding for different non-contagious illness.
These findings are based on merely eye-balling the data and correlational analyses
would shed further light on this issue. Therefore, a single score for each illness was
calculated by summing together the scores for definition, causality, accuracy,
prevention and time course. These scores were then correlated with each other and it
was found that each illness was positively and significantly correlated with every other
illness. Taking these results as given would indicate that understanding of illness is not
constructed around three micro-theories, instead it would imply that understanding of
all illnesses and injuries is interlinked. However, an important caveat is that the scale
for each illness is quite constraining (i.e. 0 - 14) so no clear conclusions can be drawn
from this.
4.6. Discussion
This study has shown the development of children's understanding of health and illness
between the ages of 4 years and 11 years. As predicted, children's knowledge of illness
becomes more sophisticated and accurate with age. This was found both for general
definitions of health and illness and also for knowledge of specific illnesses.
Furthermore, it was expected that children would hold differing levels of knowledge for
the specific illnesses investigated and this was supported with knowledge of injuries
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being much greater than the illnesses, with a particularly low understanding of asthma.
This section will discuss each of these findings in turn and then consider understanding
of each specific illness separately.
In this study, the most frequent definition of illness was based upon the presence of
symptoms and feeling poorly. Even some of the 4 year olds were able to define illness
in this way, although the majority answered "don't know". In contrast, definitions of
health were more commonly based on behavioural factors, such as healthy eating and
exercise, therefore indicating health is not necessarily defined as the opposite of illness.
Chapter 2 discussed how various researchers have suggested that health and illness are
different but overlapping constructs (Millstein & Irwin, 1987; Schmidt & Frohling,
2000). Millstein and Irwin (1987) looked at these concepts among adolescents and
found that the degree of overlap varied with age with older adolescents seeing health as
more than just absence of illness. The results of the present study extend this by looking
earlier into childhood and they show polarisation of the concepts occurring in this age
range with the 9 year olds giving definitions that appear to associate health with absence
of illness but the 11 year olds moving away from illness-related definition and giving
more definitions based on health-related behaviours.
It is well documented that children's understanding of illness becomes more
sophisticated with age (e.g. Bibace & Walsh, 1981; Charman & Chandiramani, 1995)
and this study supports this further by including a wider range of illnesses and processes
than previous studies. The most commonly found effect of age in this study was that 4
year olds display less understanding that the older age groups (9 year olds and 11 year
Chapter 4: Study I: Children's Understanding ofContagious Illnesses, Non-contagious 127
illnesses and Injuries
olds). In addition, the 7 year olds also frequently showed differences from the 4 year
olds, for example, accuracy of judgements of time course. This will now be discussed
with more detail of the types of response given by each age group.
At 4 years, children mainly respond 'don't know'. They give some responses for
definition questions which can be correct but are only based on symptoms or generally
feeling unwell, they give very little detail. With regards to causality, irrelevant or
incorrect responses are common e.g. colds are from bubbles. Where responses are
correct they are very basic and involve little detail. They are not easily coded as
biological and are more likely to reflect a physical model of explanation. There is clear
development between this age group and the 7 year olds. The analyses found little
difference between the 7 year olds and the 9 year olds so this age group will be
considered as one. The explanations given by the 7-9 year olds include a much
reduced number of irrelevant or wrong responses. This is especially true for definitions
and causality but they are still very basic and lack accuracy or biological detail where
relevant. At 11 years, children have more accurate understanding and can give detailed
explanations of biological mechanisms.
Comparing across illnesses for each process has shown that children can have
understanding of one ailment without understanding another to the same degree. For
example, although accuracy of explanations of causality of toothache was quite high
across all age groups, accuracy of explanations for asthma, another non-contagious
illness, was significantly lower. This indicates the importance of considering the
variation in understanding of specific illnesses when researching children's concepts.
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Looking at differences across illnesses is also relevant to Williams and Binnie's (2002)
suggestion of the possibility of three separate reasoning systems for understanding
illness as outlined in Chapter 2. The correlational analyses in this study would appear to
suggest that there are not separate reasoning systems for understanding contagious
illnesses, non-contagious illnesses and injuries but this will be further investigated in the
subsequent studies of this thesis. Consequently, full consideration to this possibility will
be given in the general discussion of Chapter 7, when the results of the intervention
studies to be reported in Chapter 5 and 6 can also be discussed.
In order to provide a complete overview of the findings and interpret them in respect to
previous literatures in both developmental and health psychology (see Chapter 2), each
illness will now be considered separately. The following paragraphs discuss
understanding of causality as this has been the focal point of previous literature and it is
therefore easy to draw comparisons. However, as this study aims to give a more
comprehensive picture of what children understand about illness, the findings of what
children understand about other illness processes are also considered.
Despite the cold being a common contagious ailment of which children are likely to
have extensive direct experience, children held misconceptions of the causality of the
cold. Specifically, children at all ages were more likely to refer to cold weather than
contagion to explain the causality of colds. Sigelman and Alfeld-Liro (1995) suggest
this misconception may be prevalent due to the nature of colds. The symptoms of a cold
can be described as cold-like e.g. runny noses and chills and children tend to get more
colds in the winter than in the summer. This misconception may also have a linguistic
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basis as the same word is used to describe the weather and the illness. More
importantly, however, children may be frequently told that they will catch a cold if they
go out in the cold weather without proper protection. This indicates how powerful
parental influence is in giving children advice related to health. Despite a naive
conception of causality of colds, the children in this study did show fairly sophisticated
reasoning of the other aspects of colds such as definitions, prevention, and recovery.
Knowledge of the causality of chicken pox was greater than for cold which further
suggests it is not a lack of understanding of contagion that underlies misconceptions of
cold. This study shows that children are capable of conceptualising the causality of
chicken pox in biological terms even at age 4 years. However, explanations of the
biological mechanisms involved in contagion do not become accurate until age 9 years.
Knowledge relating to chicken pox specifically has only been investigated by a handful
of studies (e.g. Charman & Chandiramani, 1995; Peltzer & Promtussananon, 2003) but
knowledge of contagion has been extensively studied (e.g. Kalish, 1996a, 1996b;
Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999). The finding of this study that children are capable of
referring to a biological framework of understanding at age 4 years without having
knowledge of the specific mechanisms at work would appear to bridge the gap between
contradictory findings by these studies. It is possible that children have an idea that
some illnesses are caught off other people (Kalish, 1996a, 1996b) without knowing the
details (Au & Romo, 1999; Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999). In addition, the older age
groups of children have the beginnings of an understanding of the incubation period
involved in this contagious illness and the time to recovery. However, the younger
children frequently answer that someone would get chicken pox immediately showing
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little understanding of the biological processes involved in the reproduction of viruses
and this effect on the body.
Of all the illnesses investigated in this study, understanding of asthma was the lowest.
Asthma is a non-contagious illness and there is extensive literature on children's
understanding of asthma in terms of health care and practice (Eiser, Town & Tripp,
1988; Ireland, 1997; McQuaid et ah, 2002). This study adds to this literature by
considering a general sample of children and the development of their understanding of
asthma in relation to other illnesses. In terms of biological understanding, causality of
asthma is sometimes understood in terms of inheritance. Although it is not entirely clear
what causes asthma, older children in this study considered there to be a genetic
component. Physical causes of asthma reported by children included triggers for
allergies and exercise which were noted by all age groups except the 4 years.
Understanding of the other features of asthma was low across all age groups. Recovery
strategies specified by the older age groups included using inhalers and avoiding
behaviours such as running which might trigger an attack.
Children in the 11 year old age group were capable of giving quite sophisticated and
accurate accounts of the decay processes involved in toothache and even children in the
younger age groups were able to identify physical/behavioural factors that would
contribute to toothache such as not brushing their teeth. This contradicts previous
research which found that children overextended contagion as an explanation of
toothache (Kister & Patterson, 1980) and expands on Siegal's (1988) finding which
argued children did not perceive toothache as a contagious illness but did not suggest
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how children understood the cause of toothache. Knowledge of prevention of toothache
was high which reflects the efforts of community and school health programmes to
educate children in the benefits of oral hygiene. The most frequently mentioned
recovery strategy was going to the dentist and there was some understanding displayed
as to the time course of toothache.
Children in all age groups showed comprehensive knowledge of both injuries: bruise
and broken leg. Definitions were attempted by all age groups and a mix of symptoms
and causality was mentioned. Causal explanations were all physical but more detailed
and accurate explanations were given by the older children. Interestingly, some
psychological strategies for recovery were mentioned here which were not found for the
illnesses. Prevention strategies mainly focused on "being careful" and there was some
degree of awareness of the time course of injuries. This finding that knowledge of
injuries is greater than of illness supports Williams and Binnie (2002) who suggest that
this is due to greater experience with minor injuries, the more apparent causes of
injuries and the more observable external effects of injuries.
It is a prevalent finding in this study that children understand more about illness than the
domain-general research from the 1980s would suggest. There are two possible reasons
for this. Firstly, early research did not use child-friendly methodologies. This present
study used a child-sensitive, open-ended questioning method which did not place
unnecessary task demands on any of the age groups. It is acknowledged that due to
limited verbal ability, the 4 year olds may not have been capable of displaying their full
understanding but they were still able to participate and offer answers for all of the
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interview items. Secondly, there is more awareness of health and illness in the public
domain and a greater emphasis on health education in schools. This could be leading to
increased interest and greater understanding of health-related issues in this generation of
children compared to the early 1980s which indicates the potential of successful health
education.
This discussion section has described how the first aim of this study has been fulfilled.
However, in addition to providing a study on what children understand about illness,
this study also aimed to provide a baseline measure for studies 2 and 3 and identify
areas of understanding that would benefit from intervention. As stated by previous
research, it is vital to ascertain exactly what children know about illness before teaching
them about it, making this an important aim (Au et al., 1999; Williams & Affleck,
1999). Firstly, it can be noted that understanding of injuries was almost at ceiling level
especially in the older age groups and it is therefore felt that an intervention programme
would be fruitless. However, understanding of both contagious illnesses and non¬
contagious illnesses has the scope to improve. A consideration of both the results from
this study and previous developmental literature suggests that children have separate
systems of understanding for each specific non-contagious illness (Williams & Binnie,
2002). Therefore, any intervention aimed at improving understanding of non-contagious
illnesses would have to be specifically tailored to improving knowledge of one specific
illness and it would be difficult to improve understanding in this area as a whole. In
contrast, Chapter 2 describes literature which argues that contagious illnesses are
conceptualised by children as part of a model of infection and relates this to theory-
building (Kalish, 1999). Thus, it could be argued, different contagious illnesses are
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understood in similar ways. Chapter 2 argued further that children do not hold a full
understanding of the biological processes and the results from this study support this
notion. Therefore, timely and age-appropriate intervention could be successful in
addressing children's gaps in understanding of contagion and contagious illnesses and
this will be the aim of the next two studies to be reported in this thesis. However, to
further investigate the premise that children's understanding of illness may be
fragmented into different systems of reasoning for contagious illnesses, non-contagious
illnesses and injuries (Williams & Binnie, 2002), a range of illnesses will be included in
the pre- and post-test of an intervention study to assess the generalisability of the
interventions to other illnesses.
4.6. Conclusions
This study aimed to give a comprehensive picture of children's understanding of illness
than previous research by investigating knowledge of specific contagious illnesses, non¬
contagious illnesses and injuries. This has added to the current literature by considering
cross-illness differences, which are important for designing health education
interventions and how to talk to children about different illnesses. This study had two
purposes as outlined at the start of the chapter. Firstly, gaps in previous literature meant
that research was needed to give a comprehensive picture of children's illness concepts.
As a consequence of this study, knowledge of what children understand about different
illnesses has been advanced. In sum, it has been shown that children are capable of
talking about illness as young as age 4 years and their explanations and understanding
become more complex with maturity. It is also likely that children understand
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contagious illnesses, non-contagious illnesses and injuries in different ways (see
Chapter 7 for further discussion).
The second aim of this study was to provide a baseline measure of children's
understanding of illness in order to develop an effective intervention. Discussion here
has shown that children's understanding of contagious illnesses will be targeted by the
interventions. Leading on from this study, the next chapter will therefore investigate the
effect of different intervention methods, group discussion and factual information for
improving understanding of colds and chicken pox. In order to test for generalisability,
non-contagious illnesses will be included at pre- and post-test. Therefore, all illnesses in
the next study are the same as in this study allowing comparison across the empirical
work of this thesis.
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5.1. Introduction
This chapter will report a study that examines different intervention methods for
improving children's understanding of illness. Chapter 3 discussed the findings of
research which found that intervention programmes that take an "intuitive
knowledge" perspective are useful in health education, i.e., in improving knowledge
of AIDS (Au et ah, 1999; Sigelman et ah, 1996) and drug behaviour (Sigelman et ah,
2004). However, these studies have used different teaching methods in combination,
such as group discussion, guided lessons, provision of factual information, and do
not indicate which parts of the curriculum are most effective in improving
understanding or what processes lead to changes in understanding. Previous research
has also considered the use of three main intervention types for improving biological
understanding in detail: direct experience, provision of factual information and
collaborative learning. However, there is a lack of research which investigates the
efficacy of these intervention types in detail for use with illness concepts. Therefore,
further research is needed to identify what the most appropriate intervention method
is for improving children's understanding of illness. This study will look at factual
information, in the form of explanations, and collaborative learning.
There are various points for further investigation flagged up in Chapter 3 that will be
addressed by the study to be reported in this chapter. In terms of factual information,
most of the previous developmental research assumes congruence between children's
nai've knowledge and formal knowledge (Pines & West, 1986). However, the results
of Study 1 would suggest that understanding of illness is characterised by
Chapter 5: Study 2: A Comparison ofGroup Discussion and Factual Information as 137
Interventions to Improve Knowledge ofIllness
misconceptions in places (e.g. colds are caused by cold weather). This suggests that
the provision of basic facts will not be enough to improve understanding in this area.
Instead, some effort will be needed to promote engagement with the task. There are
two possible ways of doing this. First, instead of just providing 'basic facts', full
explanations of biological processes may be more effective. Indeed, it is specific
details about illness processes that children have been shown to lack (e.g. Au &
Romo, 1999). Therefore, the explanations will be ofmore interest to the children and
will lead to a greater motivation to complete the task. It is further possible that the
explanations provided will work in conflict mode with the children's ideas.
Second, the context in which the facts are presented could be altered to attempt to
promote engagement. Previous research has presented facts to the child without any
activity to engage them (e.g. Springer, 1995; Williams & Affleck, 1999). It is the aim
of this study to engage the children in tasks that will require them to express their
own thoughts on illness which will then be challenged by the formal factual
knowledge.
For group discussion, there is a huge body of research on other areas of conceptual
understanding such as physics. Previous work has focused on such matters as the
make-up of groups and the types of conflict that is conducive to positive change. As
this has been investigated in great detail by others (see Joiner. Littleton, Faulkner &
Miell, 2000), this thesis will look at a different aspect of group work. To be specific,
the combination of group work with factual information will be investigated.
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Therefore, three intervention conditions will be examined. First, the explanations will
be combined with an individual task that aims to engage children with the facts.
Second, explanations will be combined with group discussion, which has previously
found to be effective at promoting cognitive conflict and should therefore be even
more effective than the individual task at promoting engagement. Although studies
have combined these two intervention methods before, it has been without proper
control (Myant & Howe, 2002; Williams & Binnie, 2002). Therefore, a group
discussion condition without facts or explanations will also be included to allow
detailed comparisons across all three conditions.
Considering the array of research on children's illness concepts and the results of
Study 1, contagious illnesses were identified at the end of Chapter 4 as the best target
for intervention and it was decided that non-contagious illnesses and injuries would
not be targeted by the interventions. As well as the findings of previous research on
children's illness concepts, there are also issues arising from the discussions in
Chapter 3. Firstly, health education programmes based on cognitive development
theories have shown that interventions are most effective when they build on
children's theoretical knowledge on health and illness (Au, Romo & Dewitt, 1999;
Sigelman et al., 2003) and this fits well with the notion that understanding of
contagion may be considered a naive theory (Kalish, 1999). Secondly, it was shown
that children's understanding of contagion has been found to be more amenable to
intervention than non-contagious illnesses (Myant & Howe, 2003).
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The results of Study 1 also helped identify age groups, 7 and 11 years, which would
benefit from intervention. To target interventions at these age groups also has a
strong practical rationale as research has shown children under 7 years are not likely
to benefit fully from collaborative learning techniques and age 11 years is an age
where benefits are maximised (Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993). These age
groups have also been used successfully in other intervention studies (e.g. children of
7 years were used in Williams and Binnie's (2002) study and children aged 8-12
years participated in Williams and Tolmie's (2000) research).
The findings of this study will have clear implications for health education and health
practice as it is of benefit to know what the best methods for improving children's
understanding of illness are. However, it is also likely that the results will hold
implications for theories of cognitive development (Chapter 1). According to a
domain-general account, it is argued that children cannot be taught about illness or
told details of their condition that is beyond their cognitive capabilities at a certain
stage (Burbach & Peterson, 1986). However, a domain-specific perspective on
cognitive development does not place such restrictions on children's cognition.
Therefore, children should be able to learn within a domain independently of the
stage reached in other domains of knowledge. Additionally, the results of
intervention studies can also help identify how children learn about illness e.g.
through the rote memorisation of facts or through conceptual change.
5.2. The Present Study
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The objectives of this study are to develop and compare different intervention
methods for improving seven year-olds and eleven year-olds understanding of
contagion. The interventions were a group task including explanations, a group task
and an individual task including explanations. The explanations provided detailed
accounts of biological mechanisms with a more explicit focus on explaining how
something happens (e.g. how contagious illnesses are caught). It is expected that this
would be effective, as this has been shown to be the type of understanding children
lack (Au & Romo, 1999). Given the previous research, it was hypothesised that
conditions involving peer group discussion would lead to greater pre- to post-
intervention improvement than an individual condition. It was also of interest to
examine the effects of the explanations combined with group discussion but it is
unclear, on the basis of previous research, if they would be further facilitative.
5.3. Method
5.3.1. Participants
Children from two age groups: seven years (N = 48, 29 boys, 19 girls: M = 7,9; range
= 7,3 to 8,4) and eleven years (N = 48, 26 boys, 22 girls: M = 11,9; range = 11,5 to
12,2) participated in this study. Participants were recruited through the same process
described in Chapter 4 of gaining permissions from local authorities, schools and
parents in Edinburgh and East Lothian, Scotland. All children were white Caucasian.
Social background
Using free school meal entitlement as an indicator of deprivation, one of the schools
visited in this study was high SES, two were mid SES and one was low SES.
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5.3.2. Materials
Pre-test/Post-test
The interview schedule for the pre-/post-test contained questions relating to four
common illnesses. Cold and chicken pox, the focus of the interventions, were chosen
as examples of contagious illnesses. Two non-contagious illnesses, asthma and
toothache, were included to determine whether the effects of the intervention would
generalise to non-contagious illnesses. Study 1 showed that children in this age range
have some knowledge of these illnesses and are capable of discussing them during an
interview. The materials used were the same as Study 1 with each illness introduced
via a vignette describing a child character displaying symptoms of the illness,
followed by a series of questions. The full interview schedule is included in
Appendix I.
For example:
This is Sally. Sally has lots of spots all over her face and body. She also has a sore
head and is very tired. This is because she has chicken pox.
Definition-. Can you tell me what chicken pox is like?
Causality-. How do you think Sally got chicken pox?/Why would that make Sally get
chicken pox?
Time course incubation: How long after getting chicken pox would Sally start to feel
bad?/ Why would it take that long?
Recovery: What could Sally do to make herself feel better?/ Why would that make
Sally feel better?
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Time course recovery. How long would it take for Sally to feel better?/ Why would it
take that long?
These questions were all open ended which allowed children to express their
spontaneous thoughts.
Intervention
There were three intervention conditions each with two purpose-designed work
books, one focusing on chicken pox and one on the cold. The work books were kept
consistent in terms of content and pictures across the three intervention conditions.
However, they differed systematically in order to test the effectiveness of different
elements of instruction for learning as outlined below.
Group + explanations task: This condition started with a series of questions about
cold and chicken pox and children were required to indicate their answers on fixed
choice response cards (see Appendix III). The two specially designed work books for
this condition (one for cold and one for chicken pox) provided information in
sequence about causality, incubation time course, recovery strategies and recovery
time course. Specific instructions were given which guided the children through each
of their response cards on the illness processes. For example, the first item in each
work book was causality and the children were asked to take turns to read out the
answer from their response card. This method was used in line with Howe et al.
(1990) who found that children's public assertions of particular viewpoints helped
facilitate debate. This was argued to be because once children took a public position,
they then had to defend it, rather than hide behind the potentially dominant views of
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others. The work book then required the children to arrive at a consensus about the
best answer to this question and they were asked to fill in the blue card with the
agreed answer. Additional blue cards were provided to write down the reason for
their answer. Once the blue cards were filled in, feedback was provided on their
answer. In this task, part of a story about a child's experience of the illness was
included (see below for details of the factual story). The part of the story included
after the question on causality concerned how the child character caught the illness.
Then, feedback cards were provided giving the correct answer and explanation. The
children were led through the other illness processes in the same way and the rest of
the story was incorporated after the appropriate illness process, i.e. information on
time course came after the children had discussed time course. The stories were
included to give key facts about the symptoms, causality, time course and recovery
of the illnesses. They were written in a similar age-appropriate style to the stories
used by Williams and Affleck (1999) but included explanations of biological
mechanisms to see if showing children how certain key facts are interrelated is
beneficial. The stories were illustrated with cartoon pictures. See Appendix IV for
the workbook used in this condition, including the factual information.
Group task: This task used similar materials as the group + explanations task. As
above, questions and response cards were provided at the beginning of the task and
two work books led the children through each of the illnesses. However, no story
was included in these work books so the only feedback children received was from
the feedback cards. This condition investigated the efficacy of group discussion
alone. An example of a workbook used in this condition is given in Appendix IV.
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Individual task: This condition looked at the provision of explanations without
group discussion by including the questions and response cards from the group tasks,
but without the group discussion component. The two work books for the individual
task were of a similar format to the work books used in the group plus explanations
task. However, instead of asking the children to discuss their answers in groups, they
were asked to think about them individually and then indicate whether they still
thought their answer was right. This allowed reflection on their original position and
replaced the group discussion. There was also space allocated in the booklet for them
to write a reason for their answer. After this, relevant parts of the story as in the
group + explanations task were included. Direct feedback of the correct answers and
reasons was then given. Appendix IV includes an example of this condition.
5.3.3. Procedure
Pre-test
The children were interviewed individually out of class. They were told they were
going to be asked some questions about different illnesses, that there were no right or
wrong answers and that they were free to leave the interview situation at any time.
The order of the illnesses was randomised but the questions asked about each illness
always followed the same order. The interviews were tape-recorded and lasted
around 10 minutes.
Intervention
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The children in each age group were randomly assigned to one of the three
intervention conditions. This was done using the class list. The first child in the
register and every third child after that were placed in the group + explanations
condition; the second child and every third child after that were put in the group
condition; finally, the third child and every third child after that were assigned to the
individual + facts condition. This resulted in equal numbers of children from each
age group in each condition. The interventions took place one week after the pre¬
tests.
Group + explanations condition and group condition: Children in both group
conditions were taken out of class in groups of four and seated round a table. They
were asked the initial questions about the two contagious illnesses and asked to
answer the questions individually by ticking the correct answer on their answer
cards. The children were then led through the first page of the first discussion booklet
by the researcher. After ensuring the children were comfortable with the task, the
children were left on their own to work through the rest of the booklet and the second
booklet. One child was assigned as the reader and read out all the instructions from
the intervention booklet, and in the case of the group + explanations condition, the
story as well. When the children had worked through the two workbooks and thus
had discussed both illnesses, they were asked to inform the researcher that they had
finished. This procedure is similar to that used by Williams and Tolmie (2000).
Individual task: The individual task was held out of class with four children seated
round a table. The procedure followed was the same as with the group tasks with the
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children answering the initial questions on cold and chicken pox. The children were
then required to work individually through the two workbooks which led them
through each of the questions and included the stories.
Note on in-task explanation scores: As already described, in each of the intervention
conditions, the children were asked questions at the beginning that were then used to
prompt discussion, in the case of the group conditions, or prompt further thought in
the case of the individual condition. After a final answer had been decided upon,
children were then asked to think of a reason for their answer and to write this down.
These answers were then collected and analysed and are referred to as "in-task
explanation scores". As the questions during the intervention were similar to the ones
in the pre- post-test (i.e. causality, time course incubation, recovery, time course
recovery) then the same coding scheme (see below) could be applied. However, an
important caveat is that these answers were written, rather than verbal, so they may
achieve a lower score depending on the ability of the child. Some of the younger
children, in particular, may have problems with writing down detailed explanations
of illness.
Post-test
Identical materials and procedures were used for the post-test as were used in the
pre-test. In their studies, Howe, et al., (1992) and Tolmie et al. (1993) found that
delayed post-tests of between six and eleven weeks showed greater pre- to post-test
change as an effect of the interventions than immediate post-tests. Therefore, the
post-tests took place six weeks after the intervention.
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5.3.4. Coding
Although the pre/post-test remained similar to the interview schedule used in Study
1, a new coding scheme was developed for use with the responses from this study.
This was felt appropriate as more sensitive measures would be needed to detect pre-
to post-test differences. Like Study 1, content analysis was used to code the
responses (see Weber, 1995; Krippendorff, 1980). Two coders used 15% of the
response scripts to devise appropriate categories which were then used to analyse the
remaining response scripts by the two coders. Overall agreement ranged from 83% to
89% (full details in Appendix V). The categories for each question did not have to be
as broad as Study 1 as injuries were no longer included in this study. Therefore, each
question included more categories and higher scores indicated a more sophisticated
response. Due to the high level of detail captured from this coding scheme, it was not
felt necessary to include an accuracy measure. Additionally, this coding scheme was
used to categorise the explanations generated during the intervention tasks giving an
in-task measure of group compared to individual performance. Full details of the
coding scheme for this study are given in Appendix V.
5.4. Results
The analysis for this study was based on the methods used for Study 1. The data were
judged to be suitable for parametric testing for the same reasons outlined in Chapter
4. Thus, the data were analysed using parametric statistics in the form of illness type
(cold, chicken pox, asthma, toothache) x intervention condition (group +
explanations, group, individual + explanations) x age group (7 years, 11 years) three-
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way ANOVAs. This procedure was used to analyse the pre-test scores, the pre- to
post-test change scores and the in-task explanation scores. Any main effects were
then examined by use of post hoc t-tests with corrections for the significance values
or post hoc Tukey's HSD procedure. Interaction effects were explored with the use
of one-way ANOVAs and post hoc Tukey's HSD. Further t-tests investigated the
differences between the post-test scores and pre-test scores for each of the illness
processes. Effect sizes reported are Cohen's d for t-tests and Cohen's f for ANOVAs
(Cohen, 1988).
To simplify the analysis and make it more manageable, it was decided to create a
single score for each illness instead of analysing by each illness process (which
would make cross-illness comparisons very complicated). These illness scores could
then be compared across age group and intervention condition as well as with each
other through the employment of one ANOVA. The illness scores were created by
adding together the scores for definition, causality, time course incubation, recovery
and time course recovery. To determine that this would not mask any effects and all
processes were "related", alpha coefficients were calculated for each illness.
Reassuringly, the alpha values were all of a satisfactory level and ranged from 0.58
for cold to 0.74 for asthma. (Chicken pox = 0.70 and toothache = 0.67).
For the pre-test results, a three way (illness type x intervention condition x age
group) ANOVA showed a main effect of illness type (F (3, 270) = 35.79, p < .001, f
= 0.63). Post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections showed that chicken pox had
lower mean scores than cold (t (95) = 3.78, p < .001, d = 0.41) and toothache (t (95)
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= 3.54, p < .001, d = 0.32) and the mean score for asthma was significantly lower
than all other illnesses (cold: t (95) = 3.48, p < .001, d = 0.94; chicken pox: t (95) =
4.77, p < .001, d = 0.52; toothache; t (95) = 7.94, p < .001, d = 0.83). There was also
a main effect of age group (F (1, 90) = 23.61, p < .001, f = 0.51) with the 11 year
olds having higher mean scores
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than the 7 year olds (see Figure 5.1). There was no effect of intervention condition
suggesting that there was no difference between the intervention groups at pre-test.
Chapter 5: Study 2: A Comparison ofGroup Discussion and Factual Information as 152
Interventions to Improve Knowledge ofIllness




□ group + facts
■ group
□ individual + facts
cold chicken pox asthma toothache
Pre-test scores were subtracted from the post-test scores to give a measure of pre- to
post-test change (shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3). This is a procedure that has been
employed by previous intervention studies (e.g. Williams & Tolmie, 2000).
First, it is important to determine whether these change scores are significantly
different from zero overall. Therefore one-sample t-tests were used to compare mean
change to zero and the results are shown in Table 5.2. As can be seen, change was
significantly different from zero for cold and chicken pox across all intervention
conditions.
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Table 5.2: One sample t-tests comparing mean change to zero
Illness Intervention Mean change t-value
Cold Group + explns 3.22 7.07**
Group 1.00 2.35*
Ind + explns 2.19 4 11**
Chicken pox Group + explns 2.63 5.37*
Group 1.72 3.55**
Ind + explns 2.38 4.54**
Asthma Group + explns 0.19 0.43
Group 1.53 2.72*
Ind + explns 1.16 2.21*
Toothache Group + explns 0.06 0.16
Group 0.16 0.33
Ind + explns 0.50 1.20
**p<.001; *p<.05
A three-way (illness type x intervention condition x age group) ANOVA revealed a
main effect of illness type (F (3, 270) = 13.97, p < .001, f = 0.39). This was
investigated using post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections. Cold had significantly
higher change scores than asthma (t (95) = 2.86, p < .005, d = 0.42) and toothache (t
(95) = 4.99, p < .001, d = 0.73), chicken pox had significantly higher change scores
than asthma (t (95) = 3.02, p < .005, d = 0.45) and toothache (t (95) = 5.45, p < .001,
d = 0.76).
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The illness type x age group interaction (F (3, 270) = 5.35, p < .001, f = 0.24)
indicated that there were significant differences between the age groups for cold (t
(94) = 2.91, p < .005, d = 0.60) but not for the other illnesses. For the illness type x
intervention condition interaction (F (6, 270) = 2.89, p < .01, f = 0.25), post hoc
ANOVAs showed that there were significant differences between the intervention
conditions for cold (F (2, 93) = 5.51, p < .005, f = 0.34), with the group +
explanations condition having significantly higher post-test scores than the group
condition (p < .005). There were no differences between the intervention conditions
for the other illnesses.
A series of related t-tests were computed to test for differences between the pre- and
post-test scores for each of the illness items. The use of multiple t-tests increases the
likelihood of a type I error. Therefore, Bonferroni corrections were made to increase
the accepted level of significance for these analyses p < .002.
As Table 5.3 (i) shows, the group + explanations condition improved pre- to post-test
on the causality and incubation time course of the contagious illness items. There
were no differences between pre- and post-test scores for the non-contagious illness
items in this condition.
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Table 5.3: Mean scores at pre- and post-test for each illness item by intervention
condition
(i) Group + explanations
Pre-test M Post-test M t (31) Cohen's d
Cold definition 2.66 3.03 2.10 0.44
Cold causality 1.38 2.63 7.19* 1.39
Cold incubation time 0.84 2.03 4.79* 0.92
Cold recovery 1.84 2.25 2.62 0.55
Cold recovery time 1.78 1.78 0 0
Chicken pox definition 3.00 3.06 0.42 0.09
Chicken pox causality 1.16 2.16 5.11* 0.93
Chicken pox incubation time 0.81 1.81 3.66* 0.95
Chicken pox recovery 1.97 2.16 0.84 0.19
Chicken pox recovery time 1.59 1.97 2.55 0.48
Asthma definition 2.69 2.72 .12 0.01
Asthma causality 0.81 0.97 .82 0.17
Asthma incubation time 0.22 0.09 .89 -0.24
Asthma recovery 1.44 1.66 1.27 0.23
Asthma recovery time 1.28 1.19 -.50 -0.08
Toothache definition 2.91 3.09 .77 0.17
Toothache causality 1.56 1.44 -.84 -0.16
Toothache incubation time 0.75 0.56 -1.00 -0.21
Toothache recovery 1.78 1.91 .78 0.16
Toothache recovery time 1.47 1.53 .37 0.07
*
p < .002.
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Table 5.3: (ii) Group
Pre-test M Post-test M t (31) Cohen's d
Cold definition 2.78 2.72 -.39 -0.07
Cold causality 1.56 1.78 1.32 0.22
Cold incubation time 1.22 1.47 1.19 0.23
Cold recovery 1.91 2.09 1.10 0.26
Cold recovery time 1.63 2.03 2.14 0.51
Chicken pox definition 2.59 2.69 .50 0.08
Chicken pox causality 0.81 1.38 3.14 0.64
Chicken pox incubation time 0.63 1.06 1.72 0.39
Chicken pox recovery 1.88 2.16 1.36 0.33
Chicken pox recovery time 1.47 1.81 1.88 0.40
Asthma definition 2.41 3.00 1.91 0.37
Asthma causality 0.81 0.94 .78 0.15
Asthma incubation time 0.34 0.19 -1.22 -0.22
Asthma recovery 1.22 1.66 2.95 0.44
Asthma recovery time 0.63 1.16 2.52 0.57
Toothache definition 2.97 3.16 .81 0.19
Toothache causality 1.56 1.56 0 0
Toothache incubation time 0.75 0.78 .16 0.03
Toothache recovery 2.06 2.03 -.19 -0.04
Toothache recovery time 1.72 1.69 -.22 -0.04
*p < .002.
The group alone condition (see Table 5.3 (ii)) did not reveal any significant pre- to
post-test improvement for the contagious illnesses. Again, little positive change was
observed for the non-contagious illnesses.
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Table 5.3: (iii) Individual + explanations
Pre-test M Post-test M t (31) Cohen's d
Cold definition 2.97 2.91 -.30 -0.07
Cold causality 1.31 2.09 3.73* 0.79
Cold incubation time 0.72 1.38 2.95 0.54
Cold recovery 1.81 2.25 2.95 0.64
Cold recovery time 1.50 1.88 2.04 0.45
Chicken pox definition 2.69 2.72 .15 0.02
Chicken pox causality 0.81 1.44 2.98 0.59
Chicken pox incubation time 0.41 1.00 2.46 0.54
Chicken pox recovery 1.66 2.22 3.14 0.64
Chicken pox recovery time 1.25 1.81 3.36 0.71
Asthma definition 2.41 2.88 1.77 0.28
Asthma causality 0.78 0.91 .78 0.13
Asthma incubation time 0.13 0.38 1.43 0.38
Asthma recovery 1.59 1.69 .50 0.11
Asthma recovery time 0.94 1.16 1.42 0.20
Toothache definition 2.78 2.78 0 0
Toothache causality 1.19 1.31 .70 0.16
Toothache incubation time 0.50 0.72 1.36 0.24
Toothache recovery 2.00 1.97 -.18 -0.03
Toothache recovery time 1.50 1.69 1.18 0.23
*
p < .002.
For the individual condition, shown in Table 5.3 (iii), the only contagious illness
item that improved significantly was cold causality. However, the data show that
there was improvement from pre- to post-test although not significant. There were no
significant differences for the non-contagious illness items.
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Analyses so far suggest that the effects of the intervention did not generalise to non¬
contagious illnesses, i.e. there was no pre- to post-test improvement observed for
asthma or toothache. However, it is also important to establish whether there was any
generalisation across the contagious illness. This was done by comparing correlations
between the two contagious illness at pre-test and at post-test. At pre-test, this
correlation was r = .43 , P < .001 and at post-test it was r = .50, p < .001. This
increased correlation indicates that there is likely to be some degree of
generalisability across the contagious illnesses as a result of the interventions, as
understanding of the two illnesses has become more correlated and therefore more
similar.
Table 5.4: Mean in-task explanation scores by intervention condition and age
group (standard deviation)
Group + explns Group Individual + explns
Cold: 7 y 5.25 (1.34) 3.75 (1.12) 4.62 (0.81)
ii y 8.5 (2.68) 7.25 (2.46) 9.43 (3.52)
C pox: 7 y 4.25 (1.84) 4.50 (0.89) 5.00 (0.82)
ii y 10.50 (3.76) 6.75 (1.84) 7.38 (2.06)
Scores given to explanations generated during the intervention tasks are displayed in
Table 5.4, Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5. These were investigated using a three-way
(illness type x intervention condition x age group) ANOVA. There was a main effect
of age group (F (1, 90) = 97.19, p < .001, f = 1.04), with 11 year olds giving higher
level explanations than the 7 year olds. There was also a main effect of intervention
Chapter 5: Study 2: A Comparison ofGroup Discussion and Factual Information as 159
Interventions to Improve Knowledge ofIllness
condition (F (2, 90) = 5.87, p < .005, f = 0.36), with children in the group +
explanations condition showing higher means then the group condition (p < .005).
Figure 5.4: Mean in-task explanation scores by age group
cold chicken pox
Figure 5.5: Mean in-task explanation scores by intervention condition
cold chicken pox
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The in-task explanations were correlated with pre- to post-test change as shown in
Figure 5.6. Here, the in-task explanation scores for cold and chicken pox are added
together to give a total explanation score. This collapsing of scores is justified by the
high correlation observed between cold and chicken pox scores (r = .65, p < .001).
This total in-task explanation score was significantly correlated with pre- to post- test
change for cold and chicken pox (r = .40, p < .001) indicating that higher explanation
scores were related to greater pre- to post-test change overall.
Figure 5.6: Mean in-task explanation scores correlated by pre- to post-test
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Correlations between in-task explanation scores and change scores were also
calculated within intervention conditions. For each intervention condition, the
correlation was found to be significant: group + explanations condition, r - .36, p <
.05; group condition, r = .35, p < .05; individual condition, r = .37, p < .05.
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5.5. Discussion
This study considered the effectiveness of group discussion and factual information,
in the form of explanations, as interventions to improve understanding of illness. It
was predicted, on the basis of previous research, that the group discussion and
explanations would lead to the highest levels of performance and that peer group
discussion alone would prove more successful than the provision of factual
knowledge. However, these predictions were not supported by the data and the
explanations and group discussion were found to be equally efficacious. The
following discussion will firstly consider the pre-test results and then examine the
intervention findings in depth.
The results from the pre-test show that the 11 year olds possess greater knowledge
than the 7 year olds of all illnesses. This reiterates the finding from Study 1 and
supports previous research alluding to a developmental progression in understanding
of illness (Charman & Chandiramani, 1995; Hergenrather & Rabonowitz, 1991). The
data also show clearly delineated cross-illness differences similar to those found in
Study 1, e.g. children showed a better understanding of contagious illnesses than a
non contagious illness (asthma). This supports the idea that contagious and non¬
contagious illnesses are understood in different ways as suggested by Williams and
Binnie (2002) and the findings of Study 1. However, the low mean scores, across all
illnesses, suggest that there is scope for any intervention to improve understanding.
For all intervention types, the level of pre- to post-test change for every illness was
relatively low. There were clear knowledge gains observed for cold and chicken pox
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but similar improvements were not found for asthma and toothache. This is in line
with the finding reported from Study 1 that children have different levels of
knowledge of contagious illnesses and non-contagious illnesses. It also adheres to the
suggestion that children may have a theory of contagious illness, as proposed by
Study 1, Williams and Binnie (2002) and Kalish (1999) that they can build on as a
result of the interventions. This is supported by the finding that understanding of cold
and chicken pox became more correlated as a result of the interventions, indicating
that the children did not just learn directly from the intervention in specific areas.
However, it is possible that asthma and toothache are understood in a different way
and the effects of the interventions do not generalise to non-contagious illnesses. In
addition, some elements of illness might be more difficult to learn than others.
A second trend in the intervention findings was that the 11 year olds improved more
as a function of the interventions than the 7 year olds. There are two possible
explanations for this: one relating to the intervention tasks and the second a
consequence of baseline biology knowledge. Firstly, the age trend could be explained
by the increased intersubjective awareness among older children that is suggested by
Tomasello et al. (1993) to be necessary for effective group discussion. However, the
age effect also holds for the individual condition where increased intersubjective
awareness would not play a part suggesting that intervention processes are not solely
responsible for older children's higher performance. Alternatively, it is possible that
these results indicate a greater readiness to learn about illness at 11 years compared
to 7 years. This readiness may be due to greater pre-test knowledge in the 11 year
olds that would give more congruent naive knowledge for the formal knowledge
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provided by the interventions to interact with and build upon. In support of this
suggestion, Sigelman et al. (2003) found that children with greater biological
knowledge showed more improvement as a function of an intervention in
understanding of drug action.
Unexpectedly, there was little to discriminate between the impact of the three
intervention conditions. The only significant difference was between the group +
explanations and the group condition with the group + explanations condition having
significantly greater change scores for understanding of cold. This difference is
corroborated by the global change patterns which show least significance in the
group alone condition and also the in-task measures which are significantly lower in
this condition than the group + explanations condition. Chapter 3 showed that there
is an established literature on the benefits of collaborative learning in both biology
(Hatano & Inagaki, 1997; Lumpe & Stave, 1995; Williams & Binnie, 2002; Williams
& Tolmie, 2000) and physics (Howe, et al., 1990; Howe, et al., 1992). While the
present study confirms the utility of collaborative learning approaches for illness
concepts, it differs from other research in that factual knowledge was also productive
in leading to conceptual advancement.
Previous research on the importance of factual information in the area of biology has
led to inconsistent findings. However, the present study has found that explanations
are effective in enhancing knowledge of illness, despite the previous study in this
thesis having established that children's understanding of illness is not congruent
with formal knowledge . What is it about the factual information in this study which
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makes it so effective when other studies have found that factual information has little
impact on learning?
The factual information provided in this study included not only illness outcomes but
also the biological mechanisms underlying these for a range of illness processes.
Previous studies have not provided children with this level of biological explanation.
It is unlikely that this level of information would have been lower than the children's
existing knowledge which may have been the case in the Williams and Affleck
(1999) study. Furthermore, the biological mechanisms in the stories were shown to
govern all illness processes across two contagious illnesses and this may have helped
children develop a more coherent/integrated understanding of germ mechanisms.
This is supported by the lack of impact of the interventions on understanding of non¬
contagious illness. Additionally, the tasks in the present study required children to
relate the factual knowledge regarding biological mechanisms to their own ideas,
whereas in other studies children have been passively read a story (Springer, 1995;
Williams & Affleck, 1999). Both the provision of explanations and the combination
of these explanations with different tasks have helped promote engagement with the
explanations. The idea that both factual information conditions promoted
engagement with the tasks is supported by the higher levels of in-task performance in
these two conditions when compared to the group condition showing greater effort
being put into the tasks during the intervention.
The cognitive processes underlying the learning from the explanations are not clear.
It is not likely that children are learning through rote memorisation because of the
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time delay between the intervention and post-test, although it is possible as
generalisability of knowledge to non-target illnesses was not found. It seems more
likely that the children are engaging in a process of conceptual change as a result of
being introduced to germ action. From previous literature, there are three alternative
accounts of how this may occur. One possibility is that children are replacing their
existing misconceptions about illness with the more formal concepts provided by the
factual information as described in Chapter 3. This view is upheld by science
educators such as Vosniadou and Brewer (1987). In particular children hold
misconceptions about the causality of cold (i.e. they believe it is caused by cold
weather) which is reduced at post test. Therefore, it is possible that some sort of
replacement of theories is occurring.
Alternatively, a theory building account (see Chapter 1) would suggest that the
children have been given key facts about contagion that they were able to causally
link into a coherent theory (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).
For example, in Springer's (1995) study, he argued that children were able to work
out the core principles of inheritance from inferring from the taught facts. In the
present study providing explanations may have given the children a clearer naive
theoretical framework that causally links the facts into a coherent theory of
contagion. Support is provided for this as more sophisticated explanations of
contagious processes are given at post test.
Finally, it may be the case that children are undergoing the process of
representational redescription as described by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) (see Chapter
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1). Given that the in-task measures were higher in the conditions where factual
information was provided, the discussion or individual reflection of the explanations
given may have led to appropriation of the explanations leading to progression of
knowledge. Higher levels of explanations in task were linked with greater pre- to
post-test change in the present study suggesting that the content of the factual
knowledge led to direct reorganisation of children's explanations during the tasks.
This spontaneous internal reorganisation of concepts may have given children the
ability to verbalise their thoughts, hence the higher post-test scores. As described in
Chapter 1, verbalising thoughts is indication of Explicit-3 representations, thought by
Karmiloff-Smith to be the highest level of representation. An important direction for
future research would be to identify processes that might underlie conceptual change
resulting from factual information. To this end, the next study reported in this thesis
will aim to provide further information regarding these processes by investigating
factual information as an intervention in more detail. Therefore, this important
discussion point will be returned to in Chapters 6 and 7.
On a practical level, the tasks used in this study were easy and quick to administer in
a classroom setting and seemed to be enjoyed by the children; they liked the format
of the story and enjoyed partaking in both the individual and group activities.
However, there are certain drawbacks with this study. Firstly, it is not clear what
aspects of the factual information made it successful. It may have been the timing of
presentation of facts, or the detailed content of the explanations, or the story-format
presentation, or a combination of all three. This point provides the basis for the next
study to be reported in this thesis: Study 3 will further examine the impact of the
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content of the factual information and the story format presentation. Additionally,
this investigation will be able to provide more information relating to the processes
that factual information engages to lead to improvements in knowledge. Finally, only
two contagious illnesses were included in the pre- and post-test of this study, so it is
not clear if the interventions teach about more than cold and chicken pox. Indeed, it
was found that the effects did not generalise to non-contagious illnesses. In order to
see if the effects do indeed generalise, more exemplars of contagious illnesses will be
included in the intervention study reported in the next chapter.
5.6. Conclusions
In summary, this chapter has reported the findings of a comparative study of
different intervention methods. Both, collaborative learning approaches and the
provision of age-appropriate factual information in the form of explanations had an
impact on children's knowledge of illness. Substantial research effort is already being
directed to collaborative learning approaches in science and the cognitive processes
involved are becoming relatively well understood. Research now needs to be directed
to the importance of factual knowledge where previous research has been more
inconsistent. This study has been vital in showing the potential of explanations for
improving illness concepts and the next study will build on this finding. In particular
Study 3 will focus on the context in which factual information is provided, whether
basic facts or explanations are more effective and importantly, what cognitive
processes are responsible.
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6.1. Introduction
Study 2 raised some interesting points regarding the most effective teaching methods
for improving understanding of illness. Contrary to hypothesis, group collaborative
learning was not unequivocally the best method for improving understanding of
illness. Instead, it was found that the factual information also played a strong role in
leading to enhancements in knowledge. This leads this chapter to further question the
role of factual information and the processes underlying the progression in
knowledge. The aim of the study to be reported in this chapter is to investigate the
provision of different types of factual information and measure how effective they
are in promoting illness understanding.
As well as the practical benefits of interventions that provide factual information,
there is a strong theoretical basis for factual information to be advantageous as
alluded to in Chapter 3. However, the results from previous research are contrasting.
Springer (1995) conducted a study where age-appropriate facts were provided to pre¬
schoolers. Children were only given very basic facts about inheritance and from this
they were able to draw on their own explanations to lead to increases in conceptual
knowledge. However, Williams and Affleck (1999) attempted to replicate this
finding in 4 and 7 year olds and found that the factual information did not lead to
increases in knowledge. Study 2 adds to these findings by showing the efficacy of
factual information for improving children's understanding of contagious illnesses.
This research suggests that is unclear how successful factual information
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interventions are, as some studies report advancements in understanding but other
studies do not.
By considering the results of Study 2 in combination with the findings of previous
research, possible reasons for the success of factual information in certain studies
compared to others become clear. The first point concerns baseline knowledge.
Williams and Affleck (1999) report that the children in their study had such high
knowledge at pre-test that the intervention was not likely to have taught them
anything they did not already know. This indicates the importance of determining
baseline knowledge before intervention and identifying possible gaps in knowledge
that would benefit from intervention. This can be manipulated by carefully targeting
specific age groups for intervention based on their current understanding, an
approach taken by Study 2.
Indeed, age itself is a variable that may influence the outcome of intervention studies
based on factual information. Study 2 found age differences in the amount of pre- to
post-test change observed in 7 and 11 year olds, with the 11 year olds benefiting
more than the younger children. However, Springer (1995) used a sample of
preschoolers in his study which shows that it may not be the age of the children that
is most important, but the appropriateness of the factual information for the chosen
age groups.
Another possible reason for the lack of clear findings is that these studies have all
promoted different levels of engagement with the task. First, the type of factual
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information provided may influence levels of change. Springer (1995) gave only
basic facts and allowed children to draw on their own explanations. However,
children already have a basic understanding of contagion, what they lack is
understanding of finer details and how all the illness processes are linked together
(see Study 1). In this case, the provision of detailed explanations of biological
mechanisms may help children construct a coherent theory of contagion. As well as
this, it was concluded in Chapter 5 that by providing explanations, increased
engagement with the task led to the observed increases in knowledge. However, this
could be further tested by comparing explanations with basic facts.
Second, another possible factor that could lead to increased levels of engagement is
the format of the task. In Study 2, it may not have been the explanations that were
successful in promoting engagement - it may have been the format of the stories that
helped engage the children with the facts. This is another variable that would need to
be investigated.
In the discussion of Chapter 5, various reasons for why factual information had been
a successful intervention method were raised. Of particular interest were Karmiloff-
Smith's theory of Representational Redescription, theories of theory building and
notions of conceptual change. No firm conclusion could be drawn about any of these
possibilities. Likewise, it is not the purpose of this present study to specifically test
or contrast underlying cognitive development processes. The main purpose of this
study is to compare different types of factual information but it is hoped that the
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results will be able to add to the findings of Study 2 in saying something about the
learning processes that occurs as a result of factual information.
All these factors can be taken into account to help design effective ways of
improving illness concepts through factual information. Study 2 gives a good basis
but one potential limitation with Study 2 is that it did not show generalisability of
results to non-contagious illnesses and did not investigate generalisability to other
contagious illnesses. This indicates that the children may not have learned anything
further from the information than about the target illnesses which shows that they
may just be rote learning the facts. Alternatively, it may lend support to the idea that
children's understanding of illness is fragmented and they understand different illness
types in different ways. To test these conjectures, it is necessary to investigate
whether the effects of the interventions are also observed in other contagious
illnesses. A further way to test this would be to look at a novel situation where
children would not be able to draw upon concrete facts to explain such an illness.
6.2. The Present Study
From Study 2, there is evidence that the provision of facts may be a useful
intervention method for improving understanding of illness. However, it is not clear
what level of factual information is needed and what the best format of presentation
is. For this reason, the aim of the present study was to further investigate the efficacy
of factual information as an intervention to improve knowledge of illness, using a
pre-test - intervention - post-test design. The results from the pre-test will again
provide useful information on the structure and content of children's illness concepts.
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There were three intervention conditions, differing on the type of factual information
provided. One condition included detailed facts about contagious illnesses in the
form of an illustrated story. The second condition included the same level of detail
but was presented in a more formal scientific style, thus children's engagement with
the text is likely to be lessened. Finally, there was a condition which provided basic
facts without any explanations in a story format. It is hypothesised that the conditions
which provide detailed explanations will show significantly greater improvement
than the condition with basic facts and that the story style will lead to more




Children from two age groups: seven years (N = 48, 26 boys, 22 girls: M = 7,5; range
= 7,2 to 8,0) and eleven years (N = 48, 24 boys, 24 girls: M = 11,4; range = 11,0 to
11,11) participated in this study. Children were recruited through the same processes
described in Chapter 4. The majority of the sample were white Caucasian (N=90),
the remainder were Asian.
Social background
Using free school meal entitlement as an indicator of deprivation, two of the schools
visited in this study were high SES, and two were mid SES.
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6.3.2. Materials
Pre-test/Post-test
The interview schedule for the pre-/post-test contained questions relating to four
contagious illnesses. Cold and chicken pox were included as in Study 2 and two
other contagious illnesses were chosen to determine if the effects of the intervention
would generalise. The first was tonsillitis which had been included in the pilot study
of Study 1. Children had shown an understanding of what this ailment was but did
not speak on it to the same length as cold and chicken pox. The second illness
included was a "created" illness which would be novel to the children. This would
attempt to stretch children's knowledge by assessing the degree to which they
appropriately generalise principles of contagion to this new situation. This method of
introducing a novel situation to assess conceptual understanding has been used in
research on living kinds (Carey, 1985), and illness (Keil et al., 1999).
As in previous studies, each illness was introduced by a vignette describing a child
character displaying symptoms of the illness. The questions about each illness which
followed the vignettes were the same as Study 2. The following example shows the
outline of the questions, using the created illness, mosilitis as an exemplar.
This is Amy. She has yellow skin and a rash on her face. She is also coughing and
sneezing a lot. This is because she has mosilitis.
Definition-. Can you tell me what mosilitis is like?
Causality: How do you think Amy got mosilitis?/ Why would that make her get
mosilitis?
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Incubation time course: How long after getting mosilitis would Amy start to feel
bad?/ Why would it take that long?
Recovery: Could Amy do anything to make herself feel better?/ Why would that
make Amy feel better?
Recovery time course: How long would it take for Amy to feel better?/Why would it
take that long?
Full details of the pre-test/post-test are included in Appendix I.
Intervention
As in Study 2, there were three intervention conditions. These were all individual
tasks and differed in the type of factual information that they included. See below for
descriptions of the different types of factual materials. The materials in this study
were based on those used in Study 2. Each condition started with the same series of
questions about cold and chicken pox and children were required to indicate their
answers on fixed choice response cards (see Appendix III). The tasks also used two
specially designed booklets (one for cold and one for chicken pox) which provided
information in sequence about causality, incubation time course, recovery strategies
and recovery time course. Specific instructions were given which led the children
through each of their response cards on the illness processes. For example, the first
item in each booklet was causality and the children were asked to think about their
answers and indicate whether they still thought their answer was right. They were
then asked to think of a reason and write it down in the booklet. The relevant parts
of the story were included throughout the task as in Study 2. Direct feedback of the
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correct answers was also given in the booklet, by showing the children a response
card with the correct answer ticked.
The three conditions are outlined below:
Story + explanations: The facts in this condition were given in a storybook style. It
involved a child character who contracted either cold or chicken pox and described
each stage of the illness with reference to the biological mechanism. For example,
when explaining why it would take some time between contracting an illness and
starting to feel ill, this story provided detailed descriptions of the viruses multiplying
and the effect on the human body. An example of this factual information is in
Appendix IV.
Story + no explanations: This condition also included the facts in a storybook
format. However, no details of biological mechanisms were given. Instead more
emphasis was placed on the basic facts. This condition was based upon Springer
(1995) who argued that providing basic facts would be enough to build a theory
(example in Appendix IV).
Scientific factual: The facts in this condition were presented in a more formal
scientific style with no child characters. The same level of detail was included as in
Story + explanation with detailed explanations of biological mechanisms given. The
purpose of this condition is to examine the level of engagement with the materials
(example in Appendix IV).
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6.3.3. Procedure
Pre-test
Children were taken out of class individually and asked the questions on each illness.
These interviews lasted around 10 minutes.
Intervention
The children in each age group were placed at random by picking names out of the
class lists, into one of the three intervention conditions. There were equal numbers of
children from each age group in each condition. The interventions took place one
week after the pre-tests.
The intervention was held out of class with five children seated round a table. The
children were first required to answer the initial questions on cold and chicken pox.
The children were then led through the first page of the workbook by the researcher
and when they all understood the task; they were left to complete the rest of the
workbook and the second workbook, including reading the factual information
individually.
Post-test
The post-test used the same materials and procedures as the pre-test. Like Study 2,
the post-tests took place six weeks after the intervention.
6.3.4. Coding
Responses from the pre-test, intervention task and post-test were coded using content
analysis in line with methods used throughout this thesis. The coding scheme from
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Study 2 was used. This was felt to be appropriate as there were only contagious
illnesses included in the present study and this was covered by the coding scheme in
Study 2. As there was the addition of the created illness, inter-judge reliabilities for
each question were re-calculated and ranged from 84% 92%. The coding scheme can
be found in Appendix V.
6.4. Results
The data from this study were gathered and analysed in a similar way to Study 2 (see
Chapter 5). It was judged to be suitable for parametric testing and the data were
analysed accordingly. Again, scores for each illness were collapsed to provide a
single score for each illness. The pre-test results were analysed using illness type
(cold, chicken pox, tonsillitis, mosilitis) x intervention condition (explanation,
scientific facts, no explanation) x age group (7 years, 11 years) three-way ANOVAs.
Any main effects were then examined by use of post hoc t-tests with corrections for
the significance values or post hoc Tukeys. Interaction effects were explored with the
use of one-way ANOVAs and post hoc Tukeys. The same procedures were applied
to the pre- to post-test change scores in order to measure the effects of the
interventions and also the in-task explanation scores. One-sample t-test were used to
establish whether change was significantly different from zero overall. Additional
analyses in the form of a series of t-tests investigated the illness processes in more
detail. Effect sizes reported are Cohen's d for t-tests and Cohen's f for ANOVAs
(Cohen, 1988).
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The pre-test scores are shown in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1. A three-way (illness type
x intervention condition x age group) ANOVA found a main effect of illness (F (3,
270) = 84.26, p < .001, f = 0.97). Post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections showed
that mosilitis had significantly lower pre-test score than the other three illnesses and
tonsillitis had lower scores than cold and chicken pox (all ps < .001). There was also
a main effect of age group (F (1, 90) = 24.99, p < .001, f = 0.53), with the 11 year
olds scoring higher than the 7 year olds. There were no differences detected between
the intervention conditions at pre-test.
Figure 6.1: Mean pre-test scores by age group
cold chicken pox tonsillitis mosilitis
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Using the same procedure as Study 2, pre-test scores were subtracted from the post-
test scores to give a measure of pre- to post-test change. First, it is important to
determine whether these change scores are significantly different from zero overall.
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Therefore one-sample t-tests were used to compare mean change to zero and the
results are shown in table 6.2. As can be seen, change was significantly different
from zero for all illness in the explanation and scientific facts condition. It was also
significantly different for chicken pox and mosilitis in the no explanation condition.
Table 6.2: One sample t-tests comparing mean change to zero
Illness Intervention Mean change t-value
Cold Explanation 2.94 6.18**
Scientific facts 1.87 3.82**
No explanation 0.81 1.59
Chicken pox Explanation 2.09 4.20**
Scientific facts 2.41 5.00**
No explanation 0.97 2.21*
Tonsillitis Explanation 1.75 3.47*
Scientific facts 1.37 2.69*
No explanation 0.97 1.53
Mosilitis Explanation 1.81 2.86*
Scientific facts 2.63 4.24**
No explanation 1.28 2.10*
**p<.001; *p<.05
A three-way (illness type x intervention condition x age group) ANOVA was utilised
which found no differences in change scores between the illnesses. There was a main
effect of age group (F (1, 90) = 12.46, p < .001 f = 0.37), with the 11 year olds
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showing significantly greater change scores than the 7 year olds, and a main effect of
intervention condition (F (2, 90) = 4.21, p < .05, f = 0.30). Post hoc Tukey tests
determined that the explanation condition and the scientific facts condition showed
greater change scores than the no explanation condition (all ps < .05). No interaction
effects were found.
Tables 6.3 (i), (ii) and (iii) break down each illness into the different components to
show which aspects improved as a result of intervention. It can be seen that, with few
exceptions, each illness aspect shows improvement from pre- to post-test. T-tests
compared the post-test scores with the pre-test scores. As multiple t-tests were
conducted on these data, Bonferroni corrections were used to alter the p value.
Therefore, results are reported as significant where p < .002.
Across intervention conditions, no one illness process was found to be consistently
significant, indicating that any illness process can improve significantly from pre- to
post-test. The intervention conditions being considered separately provides further
support for the finding that the no explanation condition was not as successful at
facilitating knowledge as the other conditions. This is demonstrated as there were
more instances of significant post-test improvement in the explanation and scientific
facts conditions.
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Table 6.3: Mean scores at pre- and post-test for each illness item by intervention
condition
(i) Explanation condition
Pre-test M Post-test M t (31) Cohen's d
Cold definition 2.69 2.94 1.68 .33
Cold causality 1.47 2.31 3.37 .81
Cold incubation time 0.47 1.19 3.47 .70
Cold recovery 1.44 2.13 4.53* 1.04
Cold recovery time 1.56 2.00 3.26 .68
Chicken pox definition 2.75 3.00 1.35 .37
Chicken pox causality 1.25 1.69 2.82 .42
Chicken pox incubation time 0.31 1.03 3.01 .69
Chicken pox recovery 1.44 1.88 2.82 .66
Chicken pox recovery time 1.75 2.00 1.76 .44
Tonsillitis definition 2.06 2.19 0.57 .09
Tonsillitis causality 0.59 1.09 3.71* .67
Tonsillitis incubation time 0.13 0.34 1.56 .14
Tonsillitis recovery 1.25 1.63 2.55 .42
Tonsillitis recovery time 0.91 1.44 2.79 .56
Mosilitis definition 0.75 1.53 3.57* .57
Mosilitis causality 1.03 1.13 0.50 .12
Mosilitis incubation time 0.06 0.41 2.61 .57
Mosilitis recovery 1.13 1.44 1.67 .32
Mosilitis recovery time 0.88 1.16 1.25 .27
*
p < .002.
Table 6.3 (i) shows that there is some significant improvement from pre- to post-test
in the explanation condition for all illnesses.
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Table 6.3 (ii) Scientific facts condition
Pre-test M Post-test M t (31) Cohen's d
Cold definition 2.63 2.47 -0.93 -.18
Cold causality 1.22 2.03 4.94* .88
Cold incubation time 0.38 1.09 3.13 .74
Cold recovery 1.81 1.78 0.19 .05
Cold recovery time 1.41 1.94 3.57* .70
Chicken pox definition 2.69 2.91 1.02 .23
Chicken pox causality 1.19 1.72 2.72 .42
Chicken pox incubation time 0.44 1.00 2.29 .45
Chicken pox recovery 1.69 2.00 2.26 .47
Chicken pox recovery time 1.13 1.91 4.02* .97
Tonsillitis definition 1.72 2.03 1.57 .21
Tonsillitis causality 0.72 1.03 1.38 .32
Tonsillitis incubation time 0.25 0.16 -0.90 -.18
Tonsillitis recovery 1.28 1.53 1.11 .24
Tonsillitis recovery time 0.69 1.28 2.89* .60
Mosilitis definition 0.53 1.50 3.52* .72
Mosilitis causality 0.69 1.34 4.29 .60
Mosilitis incubation time 0.16 0.34 1.18 .28
Mosilitis recovery 1.06 1.44 1.61 .39
Mosilitis recovery time 0.56 1.00 2.03 .46
*
p < .002.
Likewise, Table 6.3 (ii) shows that there are some significant improvements in the
scientific facts condition.
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Table 6.3 (iii) No explanation condition
Pre-test M Post-test M t (31) Cohen's d
Cold definition 2.91 2.91 0 0
Cold causality 1.59 1.63 0.19 .04
Cold incubation time 0.59 0.69 0.36 .09
Cold recovery 1.50 1.97 2.79 .77
Cold recovery time 1.59 1.81 1.87 .29
Chicken pox definition 3.00 2.84 -1.09 -.25
Chicken pox causality 1.19 1.53 1.48 .29
Chicken pox incubation time 0.31 1.03 3.01 .69
Chicken pox recovery 1.59 2.00 2.43 .66
Chicken pox recovery time 1.84 1.97 1.00 .26
Tonsillitis definition 1.94 2.03 0.36 .06
Tonsillitis causality 0.59 0.84 1.48 .32
Tonsillitis incubation time 0.06 0.06 0 0
Tonsillitis recovery 1.38 1.47 0.50 .10
Tonsillitis recovery time 0.91 1.44 2.42 .55
Mosilitis definition 0.78 1.03 0.86 .18
Mosilitis causality 0.88 1.22 2.47 .44
Mosilitis incubation time 0.02 0.13 1.14 .31
Mosilitis recovery 1.00 1.16 0.79 .17
Mosilitis recovery time 0.84 1.28 1.75 .46
*
p < .002.
The above table shows that there is no significant pre- to post-test improvement
within the no explanation condition.
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From these analyses, it appears as though there is some degree of generalisability of
the interventions. The ANOVA analysis indicated that there were no significant
differences between the change scores for the four illnesses, suggesting that
improvements in understanding occurred at a similar level for all the illnesses. To
further investigate this, a series of correlations were carried out, the idea being that if
the correlation between two illnesses was higher at post-test than pre-test, then the
understanding of the illnesses was further related. Table 6.4 below shows the
correlations between the four illnesses at pre- and post-test. Most of these
correlations are higher at post-test with the exception of cold - tonsillitis and chicken
pox - tonsillitis which are lower.
Table 6.4: Correlations between the illnesses at pre- and post-test
Pre-test r Post-test r
Cold - chicken pox 0.40** 0.32**
Cold - tonsillitis 0.30** 0.44**
Cold - mosilitis 0.39** 0.46**
Chicken pox - tonsillitis 0.33** 0.30**
Chicken pox - mosilitis 0.27* 0.47**
Tonsillitis - mosilitis 0.32** 0.59**
**
p < .001; * p < .01
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Table 6.5: Mean in-task explanation scores for each illness type by intervention
condition and age group (standard deviations)
Explanation Scientific No Explanation
Cold: 7y 4.00 (1.67) 3.63 (1.36) 3.31 (1.78)
ii y 8.94 (2.95) 9.38 (2.15) 7.68 (2.82)
C pox: 7y 2.25 (2.17) 1.19(1.55) 0.75 (2.08)
ii y 9.06 (3.41) 9.13 (3.70) 6.44 (3.03)
The in-task explanation scores (Table 6.5) were investigated by a three-way (illness
type x intervention condition x age group) ANOVA. This found a main effect of
illness (F (1, 90) = 29.30, p < .001, f = 0.57), as cold scores were higher than chicken
pox scores. The 11 year olds had higher scores than the 7 year olds and this was
found to be significant (F (1, 90) = 176.25, p < .001, f = 1.40). There was a main
effect of intervention (F (2, 90) = 4.47, p < .05, f = 0.31) and post hoc Tukey tests
showed that the explanation condition displayed higher scores than the no
explanation condition (p < .05). Finally, there was an interaction effect of illness type
x age group (F (1, 90) = 12.83, p < .001, f = 0.37). This was investigated through t-
tests which found that there was a difference between cold and chicken pox scores in
the 7 year olds (t (47) = 8.37, p < .001, d = 1.24) but there was no difference in the
11 year olds.
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Figure 6.4: Mean in-task explanation scores by age group
cold chicken pox
Figure 6.5: Mean in-task explanation scores by intervention condition
cold chicken pox
The in-task explanation scores were also correlated with the pre- to post-test change
scores. This correlation was found to be significant, r = .28, p < .01. Figure 6.6
shows that higher in task explanation scores indicate higher pre- to post-test change
scores.
Chapter 6: Study 3:What do Children Learn About Biologyfrom Factual Information? 190
Figure 6.6: Mean in-task explanation scores correlated by pre- to post-test





Pre- to post-test change score
Correlations between in-task explanation scores and change scores were also
calculated within intervention conditions. For the explanation and scientific facts
intervention conditions, the correlations were found to be significant: explanation
condition, r = .51, p < .005; scientific facts, r = .49, p < .005. The correlation between
in-task scores and change scores was not significant within the no explanation
condition.
6.5. Discussion
This study has investigated the effect of factual information as an intervention to
improve knowledge of illness and provides additional baseline data on children's
intuitive illness concepts. Several important findings emerge from the study. The
results from the pre-test correspond with the findings described in Chapters 4 and 5
as they show that the 11 year olds have more advanced knowledge of illness than the
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7 year olds. In line with the hypotheses, factual information which includes detailed
descriptions of mechanisms was significantly more successful than factual
information which does not include mechanisms. Surprisingly, there was no
difference between an intervention providing information about these mechanisms in
a story format and an intervention that presented them in a standard scientific format.
Further, the effects of these interventions did appear to generalise to other contagious
illnesses. As described in Chapter 5, The 11 year olds in this study also showed
greater change than the 7 year olds and higher in-task explanation scores. The
following discussion will consider each finding in turn.
The pre- and post-test included two contagious illnesses not included in the
intervention tasks: tonsillitis and mosilitis. Despite mosilitis being a novel illness that
was created for the purposes of this study, children were able to provide explanations
of what it was, how it was caused, time course and recovery factors. However, as
expected, understanding of this illness was lower than for other illness. Further
discussion of children's understanding of this novel illness will be addressed in
Chapter 7 as this adds to debate on how children understand illness. Understanding
of tonsillitis was also lower than cold or chicken pox. This was probably due to
tonsillitis being a less common illness that the children are not likely to have much
experience of.
This study has found strong age differences in understanding of illness. For example,
children aged 7 years were able to use biological explanations such as contagion for
the illness but the 11 year olds gave much more detailed explanations which included
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a description of the functions and role of germs. A comparison of these findings with
Study 2 shows that the mean scores achieved for each illness are similar. These
findings are consistent with the findings from the rest of this thesis and a wide body
of previous research that has found development of children's illness concepts (e.g.
Charman and Chandiramani, 1995; Hergenrather & Raboniwits, 1991; Koopman et
al., 2004).
There was improvement in post-test scores compared to pre-test scores indicating
that interventions based on factual information can be successful if teamed with an
activity designed to engage children's interest. The no explanation condition was
found to show significantly lower mean change scores than the explanation condition
and the scientific facts condition. This is backed up by the global change patterns
which indicate that there is more pre- to post-test difference in the explanation
conditions for most features of the four illnesses. These results support the
hypothesis that providing the basic facts about illness outcomes is not enough and
children also need to be provided with factual information about the mechanisms to
lead to significant changes in knowledge. This result refutes Springer's (1995) claim
that facts are important in order to construct a theory of biology (see Chapters 1 and
3) by illustrating which facts are most influential. There were no differences between
the scientific facts condition and the explanation condition. This suggests that the
level of engagement with the text was similar in the two conditions. This is
somewhat surprising, especially amongst the 7 year-olds, and suggests that the
content of the factual information rather than the format in which it is delivered is the
crucial factor promoting engagement in the task. As in Study 2, in-task performance
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scores are higher in the explanation and scientific facts conditions further supporting
this idea.
It was of interest to identify whether the effects of the interventions would generalise
to other illnesses. Study 2 found that there was no generalising effect of an
intervention designed to improve knowledge of cold and chicken pox to non¬
contagious illnesses. It was of interest here to investigate whether understanding of
other contagious illnesses would be improved, thus ruling out the possibility that the
interventions would only improve knowledge of the target illnesses. The findings of
this study are promising as understanding of mosilitis and tonsillitis did improve at a
similar rate to cold and chicken pox. This is demonstrated by the lack of significant
differences between the change scores for the illnesses and also the global change
patterns which also show significantly greater post test scores for many processes of
tonsillitis and mosilitis. Furthermore, there is some degree of increased correlation
between most of the illnesses between pre- and post-test indicating that knowledge of
the contagious illness was becoming more similar.
A further interesting finding of this study was that the 11 year olds showed
significantly greater pre- to post-test change scores than the 7 year olds. This was
also found by Study 2. No interactions were found although it may have been
expected that the different age groups may have benefited more from the different
types of facts. Possible reasons for this age difference were discussed in Chapter 5
where it was concluded that the most likely candidate was that the greater biological
knowledge in the 11 year olds gives them more to build upon, therefore leading to
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greater levels of change (Sigelman et al., 2003). This explanation would also be
applicable to the present study.
Having determined that factual information which provides detailed explanations is a
successful intervention method for improving knowledge of illness, the cognitive
processes underlying the learning from the factual information can be considered.
Evidence for a shift in knowledge is provided from careful analysis of the post-test
responses. For example, more 7 year olds at post-test could explain illness
transmission in terms of germ action and detailed contagious processes than at pre¬
test and this is more marked at 11 years. It was not possible from the results of Study
2 to discount rote learning as no generalisability of the interventions was found.
However, in this study illnesses not included in the intervention were found to
improve at a similar rate to the target illnesses. This makes it increasingly unlikely
that providing children with factual information leads to improvement through rote
learning. Further evidence against this is that the post-test was conducted at a delay
of six weeks making it unlikely that children would "remember" things at this time
lag. Finally, the pre- and post-test were designed to measure the sophistication of
children's knowledge rather than how many facts they could report.
It is possible that conceptual change is occurring where children's misconceptions are
replaced with more scientific knowledge. The children were made aware if they held
misconceptions in this study by asking initial viewpoints that were then clarified.
This would lead to the opportunity for their misconceptions to be replaced. However,
there are other alternatives from within developmental psychology as discussed in
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Chapter 5. One suggestion was that rather than the children's ideas being replaced,
they were able to causally link the key facts about contagion that they were given
into a coherent theory (Carey, 1985). The results of the present study add support to
this proposal by showing that providing children with detailed factual information is
more successful than providing only the basic facts. However, the results from this
study would also support another possibility; that children are undergoing the process
of representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) (see Chapter 5). Higher
levels of explanations in task were observed in the explanation conditions than in the
no explanation condition. This implies that the content of the factual knowledge was
important and providing explanations may have led to appropriation of the
explanations leading to progression of knowledge. As described in Chapter 1, this
process of representational redescription leads to implicit knowledge becoming more
explicit and open to verbal explanation.
6.6. Conclusions
This study has expanded on the findings of Study 2 by further exploring the role of
factual information in learning about illness. The main finding to emerge from this
study is that providing detailed explanations about illness leads to more dramatic
increases in understanding than providing basic facts, regardless of whether the
explanations are presented in a story-book style or factual style. Thus the content of
factual information is more important than the format. This is an important finding
for health and science education as it indicates that children's knowledge of illness
can be improved through the provision of age-appropriate facts about the
mechanisms of illness. The validity of the results of Study 1 and Study 2 have also
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been strengthened as some of the key findings from these studies have been
replicated here.
Furthermore, the findings of these studies hold implications for theories of
development, biological understanding and learning. The following chapter will draw
together the findings of this study and of the two preceding studies to discuss the
conclusions and theoretical and practical implications.
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7.1. Introduction
In order to address the aims of this thesis, the empirical work has first, determined
what children of various ages during the primary school years understand about
different illnesses and second, examined intervention methods that can improve
understanding of illness. It is the purpose of this chapter to draw together the findings
of these studies and provide discussion on what this research has contributed to
knowledge in the area of nai've theories and biology concepts.
It is expected that the results of this thesis can contribute to three areas of
developmental psychology. First, as stated in Chapter 1, there is debate about the
nature of children's cognitive development and whether it proceeds in a domain-
specific or domain-general manner. Specifically, this thesis has investigated whether
children have a specific conceptual system for understanding illness within a broader
framework of nai've biology, which is considered a core domain of thought by some
theorists (e.g. Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Secondly, the findings of this thesis can
contribute to knowledge on children's understanding of illness, the development of
this understanding and the structure of children's illness concepts. Finally, this thesis
has investigated the impact of factual information and collaborative learning as
interventions and can therefore add to knowledge on the best ways to teach about
illness.
The current chapter discusses the theoretical implications for each of the research
areas outlined above. Various methodological shortcomings and issues that have
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been identified will then be covered and possible directions for future research are
mentioned. Special attention to the implications for practice is to be given as this
thesis can inform education in schools as well as in health care settings.
7.2. Children's Biological Knowledge and Concepts of Illness
The first two chapters of this thesis set the research in context by discussing
children's naive thinking about the biological world and their understanding of
illness. As discussed, children's understanding of illness is an area of research that
has informed theory on cognitive development and Chapter 2 demonstrated the
impact of illness concepts on domain-general and domain-specific theories of
development. Importantly, it was shown that as understanding of illness is a
significant part of children's naive biology (Siegal & Peterson, 1999), it can inform
debate on the nature of children's biological thought. Chapter 1 raised the key
debates that surround children's biological understanding: when and how does it
emerge, and is it theoretical? Chapter 2 expanded on these issues by focusing in on
understanding of illness. This section will discuss what the results of this thesis can
add to this literature. Study 1 of this thesis directly investigated the development of
children's understanding of illness which has the potential to contribute to this
literature but the results of Studies 2 and 3 are also relevant.
To begin, the contribution of the research of this thesis to the domain-general
approach to children's illness concepts will be discussed. This approach was heavily
criticised in Chapter 2 and has been largely discredited by more recent research
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(Eiser, 1989; Siegal, 1988). In the view of this early research, children did not have
an understanding of illness processes that conformed to formal knowledge. Instead it
was argued that children were likely to use immanent justice and magic as
explanations of the causality of illness (Bibace & Walsh, 1981; Kister & Patterson,
1980). The results of this thesis clearly show that children do not base their
explanations of illness on immanent justice or magic, although the open ended
method used gave them every opportunity to. This finding is also in contrast to the
position of Carey (1985) who claimed that children understand biology according to
a psychological model, this point will be returned to later in this section. The early
research was also dominated by Piaget's stage model of development (e.g. Bibace &
Walsh, 1981). The results of Study 1 suggest a developmental progression of illness
but this does not correspond with the model proposed by Bibace and Walsh (1981).
Instead, in line with recent research, it makes more sense to appeal to theories of
domain-specific development. Specifically, older children often explained illness
making reference to biological processes. Therefore, the findings of this thesis
support the proposal that older children are capable of understanding illness
according to biological modes of explanation.
In Chapter 1, it was outlined that within the domain-specific approach to cognitive
development, there is little agreement concerning the nature of development. Some
theorists, e.g. Atran (1990), Sperber (1994) and Keil (1992), have argued that nai've
biology is innate. Most evidence in support of this is focused on preschooler's ability
to distinguish between the living and nonliving world. However, Chapter 2 showed
that research on illness concepts can also inform this debate (e.g. Kalish, 1999;
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Springer & Ruckel, 1992). In the present research, children were asked questions on
different types of illnesses, the most relevant to this argument are the contagious
illnesses (cold and chicken pox). Children in the youngest age group, 4 years old,
were most likely to answer "don't know" to these questions. On first glance, this
would appear to indicate that the demands of the task may have been too high. The
questions asked were sensitive to young children's abilities, but open ended methods
do not allow young children to show their full understanding of a topic as they
require a certain amount of verbal ability that is not present in 4 year olds (Siegal et
al., 1988). However, some 4 year olds were able to give explanations of illness but
few of these explanations referred to biology. Instead, they focused on physical
influences of illness such as chicken pox being caught from eating bad chickens or
not wearing a scarf. It is the finding of this thesis, therefore, that 4 year olds lack a
biological understanding of contagion, thus contradicting the positions of Sperber,
Atran and Keil.
To look at the next age group, it is clear that 7 year olds do sometimes refer to
contagion in their responses to chicken pox, but their explanations are not accurate.
For example, they may say that chicken pox is caught from someone else by standing
next to them. This is not the case for children's understanding of the cold as most
children adopt a physical mode of explanation. This indicates that even at 7 years,
children's knowledge of illness does not necessarily involve biological mechanisms.
From this we can conclude that children of age 7 years have some way to go before
possessing a fully detailed biological understanding of specific contagious illnesses
although they have the beginnings of an understanding of the process of contagion.
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Furthermore, it would appear that their knowledge of illness as a whole is
fragmented and illness specific. Children had different levels of understanding for
the different illnesses in Study 1 and Study 2 and the effects of an intervention to
teach about contagious illness did not impact on children's understanding of non¬
contagious illnesses.
The next theory of the development of children's biological understanding is that of
Carey (1985; 1995). She believes that an understanding of biology arises from an
understanding of psychology at around 7 years. If children held a psychological
model of illness, explanations such as "they got ill because they were sad" would be
expected. However, during the course of this thesis, no psychological explanations of
illness were spontaneously (or otherwise) given, which contradicts Carey's position.
It was also explained in Chapter 2 that there is lack of studies which have found
psychological explanations of illness. In fact the only examples given in the chapter
were from the earlier domain-general research (e.g. Kister & Patterson, 1980). It has
already been discussed in this chapter that the research of this thesis is in contrast to
the research from the domain-general perspective. This has implications for Carey's
theory of conceptual change as she argues that children's knowledge of biology
arises from their understanding of psychology through a process of conceptual
change. However, the developmental progression of illness concepts reported in
Study 1 would suggest that this is not the case. Furthermore, the intervention studies
led to improvements in knowledge but they did not replace psychological
explanations with biological ones but enhanced children's knowledge, either by
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filling gaps in biological knowledge or replacing physical explanations of illness
with biological ones.
The final possibility raised in Chapter 1 is that naive biology emerges from an
understanding of naive physics, as suggested by Au and Romo (1999). Indeed, the
results of this thesis suggest that children frequently do use physical explanations of
illness before biological ones. To expand on this point, children in younger age
groups focus on the physical aspects of biological explanations such as proximity to
other people, without giving full biological explanations. This is in full support of Au
and Romo and also relates to Kalish's (1999) models of infection, discussed later in
this chapter.
Chapter 2 also offered different perspectives on the structure and development of
children's illness concepts. There are three main views in the existing literature that
were discussed. First of all, Keil (1999) argued that children reason about illness
according to a domain of biology, but that this understanding is abstract to begin
with. He believes that it becomes more specific throughout development. Secondly,
Kalish (1999) proposed that there are a series of models of infection that children
hold and pass through, in a way analogous to Piagetian stages. Finally, Williams and
Binnie (2002) hold a view that children conceptualise different types of illnesses in
different ways.
The accuracy measure included in Study 1, allows some discussion of Keil's ideas of
abstract to specific shifts in knowledge. Keil (1994) suggested that young children
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appeal to general domains of knowledge to explain biological phenomena, without
having clear understanding of the specific facts. Therefore, the results which show
that children use explanations such as "he caught it off someone else" at age 4 years,
becoming more and more frequent at ages 7 and 9, would be taken as suggesting that
the children are operating within a domain of biology. Furthermore, these
explanations become more accurate and include more specific details in the older age
groups lending support to the proposal that knowledge becomes more specific with
age. However, whether this proposal is accepted depends mainly on the definition of
biological knowledge that is used. Au and Romo (1999) would consider such a
response as "he caught it off someone else" as an explanation based on physical
proximity and not biological. In the studies of this thesis, responses such as this were
coded as indicating a certain degree of basic biological understanding. The results of
this thesis support Keil's proposal in part. The provision of detailed facts was found
to increase children's knowledge in Study 3, indicating that it is knowledge of
specifics that is lacking in younger children. However, when considering children's
starting state of biological knowledge, this thesis does not correspond with Keil. It
has already been argued in this chapter that children start out with a physical
understanding of illness. In contrast, Keil (1992, 1994) claims biological
understanding is innate.
Kalish (1999) outlined a series of infection models that are primarily concerned with
children's understanding of contagious illnesses. This is a more detailed proposal of
the development of illness concepts than Keil's theory but adheres to the same idea
that children's knowledge becomes more sophisticated and detailed with age.
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However, instead of development being as a result of an abstract to concrete shift in
knowledge, Kalish places more importance on conceptual change and educational
intervention. The most basic model of infection is the associational model which is
analogous to the domain-general approach to illness. Study 1 included 4 year olds in
the sample but an open ended questioning method was used that did not allow this
age group to respond to their highest capabilities. Therefore, a lack of codeable
responses makes it difficult to determine whether children in this age group hold an
associational model of infection or a physical model. It is apparent that they did not
use biological explanations of illness, although a small proportion did say that
contagious illnesses could be caught from other people. A lack of detail in these
explanations could either be due to lack of verbal ability or lack of biological
knowledge. The 7 year old age group give more detailed explanations. However,
they still do not give full biological explanations and this cannot be accounted for by
a lack of verbal competence. The breakdown of results from Study 1 shows that the
majority of 7 year olds prefer to use physical explanations of colds compared to
biological, thus corresponding with Kalish's second model of infection: a physical
model. However, as seen in all three studies, by age 11 years, children are able to
give biological explanations for the causality of contagious illnesses. This would
correspond with Kalish's third and fourth models of biological infection. Again, the
findings outlined in this thesis do appear to fit in with these models of infection.
However, one key difference is that the work of this thesis has considered a lot more
than just causality of contagious illnesses. Kalish's models only account for
contagion and therefore do not provide a complete picture of the development of
other illness processes.
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Given that this thesis has considered a range of illness types and illness processes,
these two accounts are not suitable for explaining the development of non-contagious
illnesses and injuries. This becomes apparent as one of the most consistent findings
from the three studies is that children seem to understand different illness types and
even different illnesses according to separate systems of knowledge. In particular,
they have a more biological understanding of contagious illnesses than non¬
contagious illnesses. These findings are important in relation to debates within
cognitive development concerning the development of biological thought. They
suggest that children's understanding of illness is not coherently organised around a
single theory. It is perhaps not even likely to be organised in a way such as that
suggested by Williams and Binnie (2002), around three micro-theories relating to
contagious illnesses, specific non-contagious illnesses and injuries (see Chapter 2 for
a further description) as findings suggest that understanding of illnesses may be even
more fragmented than this. Although it is likely that children may develop a single
theory of contagion to understand contagious illness, children in this study appeared
to understand cold in a different way from chicken pox. This indicates that
understanding of contagious illnesses may develop in an illness by illness basis,
before coming together into a coherent theory. Also fragmented is children's
understanding of non-contagious illnesses where response profiles for the illnesses
were very different. This study has also shown that although children may learn
about contagion from interventions, the effect of the interventions do not generalise
to non-contagious illnesses. More research is required on the range of illnesses
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children have knowledge of at different ages and how they fit within broader
framework theories of biology (Wellman & Gelman, 1992).
Finally, it will be considered whether children's understanding of illness is
theoretical or not. As stated in Chapter 1, a theory is a coherent well organised
system of beliefs empowered in a causal explanatory framework that allows
reasoning about phenomena in a particular domain to take place (Wellman &
Gelman, 1992). Therefore, if children have a theory of biology they should be able to
offer causal explanations that are relevant and appropriate to biological phenomena.
In keeping with this definition, the results of the three empirical studies reported in
this thesis demonstrate that children offer explanations based on relevant biological
processes for the causality of contagious illnesses. However, it was an important
finding in this study that children in the younger age groups explain colds as caused
by cold weather and not contagion but show an understanding of contagion in
relation to chicken pox. This implies that children may have separate theories for
different illnesses and their understanding is fragmented. Coherence is a key element
of theory-like understanding and by looking at a range of processes in each study, it
is clear that children's understanding becomes linked together in the older age
groups. There is also a consistency in older children's explanations that is not always
observed in the younger children. For example, they provide details of the causality,
time course and recovery of contagious illnesses that is consistent with a theory of
germ action. However, this coherence and consistency is sometimes observed in the
7 year olds after intervention, confirming the potential of educational intervention.
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As well as contributing to developmental psychology literature on children's
understanding of illness, the findings are also relevant within health psychology. One
of the main criticisms highlighted with this approach by Chapter 2 was that research
did not usually refer to any theoretical background when investigating children's
understanding of illness. As a result of this thesis, knowledge of what children
understand about different illnesses and the ways in which this is related to theories
of development has been advanced. See Chapter 4 for a thorough account of what
has been discovered about children's understanding of the different illnesses.
7.3. Intervention Methods to Improve Illness Concepts
Identifying intervention methods that can improve children's understanding of illness
has obvious practical implications and also strong theoretical implications. Chapter 3
outlined theoretical reasons why collaborative learning and factual information might
be expected to be successful at improving illness concepts and this section considers
the results of this thesis in light of this theoretical background.
Previous research has found collaborative learning to improve knowledge of physics
concepts and biology concepts (Howe et al., 1992; Williams & Tolmie, 2000). The
findings of Study 2 add to this by showing that collaborative learning teamed with
factual information improved children's understanding of contagious illnesses.
Group discussion alone was not enough to lead to significant increases in knowledge.
The direction that this thesis took from this finding was to further investigate the role
of factual information. However, a more detailed discussion of collaborative learning
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is provided here to help identify why it was not as successful as previous research
predicts.
Chapter 3 introduced the two main theoretical approaches generally taken towards
designing collaborative learning interventions. Piagetian theory states that conflict
arising in discussion among group members is important in driving changes in
understanding (Piaget, 1932). Alternatively, a Vygotskian perspective is more
focused on joint problem solving and shared constructions of knowledge (Vygotsky,
1978). Typically, previous research on improving children's science concepts has
been based upon the Piagetian idea of cognitive conflict (e.g. Howe et al., 1992).
However, Williams and Tolmie's (2000) study on improving children's inheritance
concepts suggested that a different process from socially induced cognitive conflict
may be important in groups discussing biology. This is supported by the findings of
Study 2 (Chapter 5) where group discussion was found to be no more successful than
factual information in improving understanding of illness. One possibility is that
there is not as much for children to discuss and disagree over with illness concepts in
the way that there is with physics concepts. Therefore, the cognitive conflict was not
as effective in improving understanding of illness as it has been in improving other
areas of conceptual understanding.
The key question relating to the role of collaborative learning in this thesis is: why
did collaborative learning work substantially better with the addition of factual
information? The first possibility is that a lack of knowledge could have affected the
group's ability to interact productively with each other. By this account, the factual
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information provided throughout the intervention task would have provided things
for the children to talk about. However, the children in Study 2 displayed a
reasonable amount of knowledge about illnesses at pre-test and indicated an ability to
verbalise their ideas making this unlikely. Another possibility is that children
progressed via appropriation of the detailed explanations provided in the factual
information. Explanations of such detail would not have been received in the group
discussion condition as the children in the group would be unlikely to provide such
specific and accurate information during the discussions. By looking at the in task
explanations generated for each condition in Study 2, it is clear that children were
absorbing some degree of the factual information during the interventions as scores
were higher in the condition providing facts. Furthermore, a positive correlation was
found between high in-task explanation scores and higher pre- to post-test change
scores. This indicates that is possible that children progressed through a process of
Representational Redescription as a result of appropriating the explanations. This is
reconcilable with results found by Tolmie et al. (2005) investigating different
interventions to improve children's road crossing abilities. They report a similar
finding where children in a condition involving explanations given by adults
improved in their road crossing skills significantly more than children partaking in
peer discussion. It is encouraging that other studies have similar findings, making the
above possibility of progressing through representational redescription more
credible.
Turning now from collaborative learning to factual information, the resounding
finding that factual information can be presented as a successful intervention will be
Chapter 7: General Discussion and Conclusions 211
discussed. Chapter 3 outlined the theoretical reasons why factual information might
be expected to improve knowledge of illness. Firstly, Pines and West (1986)
suggested that children's naive biological knowledge is congruent with formal
knowledge indicating that teaching involving cognitive conflict was not needed and
that factual information would be enough to improve understanding. However, Study
1 identified that children do not necessarily have congruent knowledge of biology
and hold misconceptions about many different aspects of illness. Nevertheless,
factual information was still investigated as a possible intervention method.
Secondly, Springer (1995; 1999) argued that providing basic facts would allow
children to draw inferences about inheritance processes and help in constructing a
biological theory of birth and kinship. However the results of Study 3 showed that
the provision of basic facts did not improve understanding thus refuting Springer's
position. Therefore, we must consider alternative reasons to explain the positive
impact of factual information.
It appears as though the use of explanations in place of just basic facts was a key
driving force behind the improvements in knowledge in both studies. This was
confirmed in Study 3 where the explanation conditions were significantly better than
a condition using basic facts. Explanations are likely to have led to improvements as
they are precisely the information that children lack. As a result they would have
promoted engagement with the intervention. This was demonstrated by the higher in-
task performance in the conditions where explanations were provided.
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Chapter 5 alluded to various learning processes that may result in the knowledge
changes observed as a result of factual information. One of these was theory building
(e.g. Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). The factual information provided in Studies 2 and 3
may have filled in gaps in children's concepts of illness and helped to make
children's understanding of illness more coherent. In support of this, Study 3 found
that when children were provided with the factual knowledge that they lack (i.e.
detailed explanations of processes involved in contagious illness) they progressed at
a greater rate and their post-test understanding was more sophisticated and detailed
than at pre-test.
So far, both the processes of representational redescription and theory building
appear to be possibilities for the driving force behind the knowledge improvements
observed in the intervention studies. This leaves one final possibility: conceptual
change. As discussed this concept has roots both in cognitive development literature
(Carey, 1985) and science education (Vosniadou et al., 2001). In terms of cognitive
development, Carey (1985) suggested that children's knowledge progressed from
psychological to biological through a process of conceptual change. This has already
been discounted as children do not appear to ever understand illness in terms of
psychology.
From a science education perspective, the factual information serves to make
children aware that they hold misconceptions and replace these with formal
conceptions. Harking back to research on the structure of illness concepts may help
unravel these possibilities. Although it is certainly true that children hold
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misconceptions of illness; whether the successful interventions in this study served to
make them aware of these and give them the correct alternative is not entirely clear.
What can be said is that where clear alternatives were given in the form of
explanations, more change in knowledge was observed than interventions which
either gave no facts or only basic facts.
7.4. Methodological Discussion
There are various methodological issues regarding the empirical approach of this
thesis which require discussion. This thesis has adopted a quantitative paradigm to
explore children's understanding of illness and this is in line with most of the
developmental psychology research in this area (Siegal & Peterson, 1999). However,
within health psychology as whole, qualitative approaches are increasingly
recognised as valuable for providing more insight into people's health attitudes and
beliefs (Marks et al., 2005). There is a lack of qualitative research on children's
understanding of illness and this may be because children are perceived as less
competent and social than adults, and therefore such rich qualitative data would not
be obtained from them. However, Woodgate (2001) has suggested that a qualitative
approach may be successful in the study of children's illness experiences as long as it
is recognised that conducting qualitative research with children involves different
challenges and research techniques than qualitative research with adults. If children's
competence, their communication styles and the interviewer-child relationship are
properly understood, then there is no reason why qualitative methodology cannot be
a useful tool for use with children (Curtin, 2001). Future research could look to
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utilise this methodology in order to find out more about children's experiences and
understanding of illness and health. Despite these positive aspects of qualitative
research, a quantitative paradigm was more appropriate in this research as it enabled
cross-group comparisons and level of change after interventions could be quantified.
On top of this overarching issue, there are more specific points that should be
addressed. First of all, within the quantitative research paradigm there is a choice of
two experimental questioning methods for use with children: open ended or fixed
choice. This thesis employed open ended questioning methods in all three studies.
The main criticism is that young children who are inexperienced in conversation may
not be able to respond fully and appropriately to adults' questions (Grice, 1975) and
therefore may not disclose the depth of their understanding (Siegal & Petersen,
1999). However, an open-ended method was needed to allow a full examination of
the structure and content of children's knowledge. Using forced choice methods
would not have provided such valuable data as such methods do not truly capture
whether children can adequately understand biology - it is not clear why children
chose their answer and indeed even whether they would have arrived at their
response at all, had it not been suggested.
A second point for discussion is the range of illnesses used in the three studies. In
particular, Study 2 would have benefited from a greater number of illnesses at pre-
and post-test to measure the generalisability of the interventions. In addition to
including a wider range of illnesses, it may have been useful to collect information
on contagion itself e.g. children's understanding of viruses/germs and their function.
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There are also issues with the samples used in these studies as they were essentially
quite a narrow range of participants. The majority of children who participated in this
research came from white families making the sample homogeneous in terms of
ethnicity. It may have been more relevant and interesting to conduct these studies
with a more ethnically diverse sample. This is especially important considering the
cross-cultural differences in illness concepts that have been found by recent research
(Raman & Gelman, 2004). It is possible that the use of such a homogeneous sample
limits the generalisability of the results. It is argued that results from North American
and European research cannot be used to inform health education and practice in
different parts of the world such as Asia. Instead, care must be taken to ensure
education is based upon an understanding of the health belief systems and cultural
values of the target population (Landrine & Klonoff, 1992).
In all studies it would have been useful to investigate other factors than just age that
may influence children's understanding of illness. Most importantly, there was no
measure of illness experience. Due to time constraints, it was difficult to obtain a
reliable measure of illness experience as relying on the children self reporting may
not have been accurate. This is exemplified by a small number of children (N = 4) in
Study 3 who reported experience of mosilitis (e.g. "I've had that"), the made-up
illness. A possible alternative would have been to ask the parents. Having a reliable
measure of experience would not only have been interesting in terms of the level of
children's understanding, but also how this would interact with the interventions.
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In studies 2 and 3, age differences in the effects of the interventions were found, with
the 11 year olds showing greater pre- to post-test change than the 7 year olds.
Possible reasons for this were suggested but it is also possible that this difference
was observed due to the different reading abilities of the 7 and 11 year olds. Study 3,
in particular, involved a great amount of reading which some of the 7 year olds may
have found difficult, thereby not absorbing as much information from the text.
Therefore, this finding must be treated with caution.
7.5. Practical Implications of this Thesis
From a practical perspective, the results outlined in this thesis give a very optimistic
message for teaching about illness concepts. The interventions were easy to
administer in a classroom and the materials used in this study could be developed by
teachers for use in health or science education. This section will first cover the
educational implications of the findings of the studies. Subsequently, there are
implications for health practice that will be given consideration.
7.5.1. Implications for Education
There are several points that arise from this thesis that hold implications for
education. The first point concerns when children are ready to learn about health and
illness. Readiness to learn is an important concept in education and is argued to be
specific to the topic taught and the method of teaching (Watson, 1996). By providing
a detailed account of children's understanding of illness, this thesis can make
suggestions of the best point in children's cognitive development to begin teaching
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about illness. The fact that children as young as 4 years old can talk about illness in
an open ended interview situation suggests that biology education could be
introduced early in the curriculum. This is distinct from Carey (1985) who assumes
that children of this age have no form of biology thus implying that the teaching of
biology should be postponed until later in schooling. The results of this thesis have
shown that children aged 7 years can benefit from age-appropriate education about
illness. As long as care is taken to tailor interventions to the appropriate
developmental level, primary school children are in a strong position to benefit from
education about biology and health.
The second point that arises from determining that children have intuitive knowledge
about illness (even if it is not truly "biological") is that this intuitive knowledge may
impact upon any efforts to teach about illness. Indeed, it was found that children
have some misconceptions about such things as the causality of cold and the
incubation time period of germs and these had to be accounted for in the designing of
the interventions. Study 3, in particular, compared a condition where factual
information was provided that directly challenged these misconceptions (the
explanation condition) with factual information that did not (the no explanation
condition). The condition with the challenging factual information was found to lead
to greater increases in knowledge. Thus, it is shown how vital it is to consider initial
knowledge when designing teaching programmes.
Therefore, the combined findings of the three studies indicate that children are ready
and eager to learn about biological phenomena and this opportunity should be
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realised in the primary school curriculum. The results of Study 2 and Study 3 can
help to suggest possible teaching approaches. From Chapter 1, it is clear that there
are various different influences on the development of children's biological thought
(Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). This suggests that there are different approaches that
teaching about biology can take. Firstly, an important part of many theories of the
acquisition of a theory of biology is the learning of key facts (Carey, 1985; Inagaki &
Flatano, 2002; Springer, 1999) and secondly, allowing children to discuss biology
has been shown to be important (Hatano & Inagaki, 1997; Williams & Tolmie,
2000). The findings of this thesis support these ideas fully as both collaborative
learning and factual information lead to increases in knowledge. However, factual
information seems to have had more of an effect. In particular, Study 3 found that
providing detailed explanations in line with the understanding that children lack is
particularly effective.
7.5.2. Implications for Health Practice
The implications of this thesis also reach into health care settings. The results are
particularly relevant in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom where
legislation states that "a person under the age of 16 years shall have legal capacity to
consent on his own behalf to any surgical, medical, or dental procedure or treatment
where, in the opinion of a qualified medical practitioner attending him, he is capable
of understanding the nature and possible consequences of the procedure or
treatment" (Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991). Rushforth (1999) identified
that the growing research literature on children's understanding of illness was linked
to this perspective on children's rights and their competence to consent. She argued
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that in order for children to make informed medical decisions they must display
accurate knowledge of illness and it is research such as that of this thesis that is
needed to inform this position. Traditionally, children were not seen as capable of
understanding explanations of illness as they were cognitively immature (Bibace &
Walsh, 1981). Without clear accounts of what children understand about illness,
there is a danger that medical practitioners could frequently underestimate older
children's capability and overestimate younger children's ability. However, the
findings of the three studies in this thesis show firstly, that children are capable of
giving reasonably sophisticated explanations of illness and secondly, that children
are capable of understanding detailed explanations of specific illnesses as
demonstrated in the intervention studies. From this, and in line with the perspective
of others (e.g. Au et al., 1999; Kalish, 1996b; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002), it is safe to
assume that we can regard children who are taken ill as capable of understanding
their illness and necessary treatments.
In terms of how illness should be explained to children, the results of the intervention
studies are useful. Firstly, children learnt more from detailed explanations of illness
making this a more effective way of explaining illnesses than providing only basic
facts that practitioners may believe are commensurate with children's level of
understanding. Secondly, group discussions with other children were found to be
beneficial in combination with accurate facts. Therefore, letting children discuss their
illness with other children can be advantageous, if they have the necessary factual
information to hand. In this thesis, discussion with others was used as a tool to
enhance conceptual understanding of illness and there were no differences found
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between children in an individual condition compared to a group condition.
However, there may be other benefits observed in letting children talk to other
children about their illness, such as alleviating fears and talking to others in similar
situations. The benefits of discussions about illness have also been recognised by
Peterson and Siegal (1999) who argue that children are better placed to make
decisions regarding their care after conversations with parents or health
professionals.
Finally, it has been shown that children have an understanding of what health is and
they see it as more than just an absence of illness (Study 1). In fact, they prefer to
define health in behavioural terms suggesting that they have a degree of
understanding that their health is partly within their control. From the perspective of
health education and practice, this knowledge could be emphasised and built upon.
Furthermore, it is clear that children have knowledge of a variety of ways to avoid
illness. Study 1 included questions on how to avoid getting the different
illnesses/injuries and children gave responses including a variety of strategies.
Importantly, they mentioned staying away from people who are ill. Thoughts such as
this must be dealt with care as this may lead to prejudice against the sick and/or
unnecessary anxiety. This is especially relevant in cases such as HIV transmission as
children hold misconceptions about how this disease can be caught (Sigelman et al.,
1993). However, sensitive and appropriate intervention can combat such dangerous
misconceptions.
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7.6. Directions for Future Research
This thesis has revealed some important findings relating to what methods are
important in helping children understand about illness. However, it has also left some
questions unanswered and opened up directions for future research. Some
methodological changes that could be utilised in future research have already been
discussed. This section will now cover directions for future research which will help
advance our understanding of the issues surrounding the development of illness
concepts. Specific points from the three studies will be discussed.
To expand on Study 1 and provide more information on children's baseline
knowledge, it would be most relevant to extend the age ranges further and look at
adolescent's understanding of illness. There is little work on this group's
understanding of biology despite it being clear that children do not have a complete
understanding in primary school. Specific to this thesis, the intervention studies have
shown that 11 year olds still have room for their understanding to improve and that it
can improve given the correct input. Furthermore, an important issue concerns the
experiences which influence the development of children's understanding of illness.
Children already have some form of knowledge of illness before formal schooling
and identifying where this knowledge comes from is vital for knowing the best ways
to approach teaching about illness. It has been suggested that information from
sources such as parents and doctors have a profound effect on children's knowledge
of illness and further work could look to utilise this in determining the best way to
inform children about illness.
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One area for expansion around Study 2 is further investigation into collaborative
learning. The finding that factual information was more influential as an intervention
than collaborative learning was not as expected and a priority area for future research
would be to identify why this is so. Possible factors that could be investigated would
be the composition of groups and the size of the groups. For example, children could
be placed into groups where the different members hold differing conceptions of
illness in the hope this induces socio-cognitive conflict (Piaget, 1926). Alternatively,
whole class discussion as utilised by Hatano and Inagaki (1997) may be useful in that
a greater variety of perspectives are consulted.
However of more interest is the impact of factual information, as shown by the
results of both Study 2 and 3. Providing explanations was found to be a successful
method of teaching children about illness and future research could look to
investigate this further. In particular, it was a surprising finding that it was the
content of the explanations, rather than the format in which it was presented that was
the driving factor behind the improvements. More research is needed to identify the
optimal level of explanations that children require at various ages and adapting the
content of the factual information to teach about other biology concepts.
A crucial unanswered question from both intervention studies regards the underlying
process of development that drives the observed changes in knowledge. It would be
important to investigate this further as it has implication for how domain-specific
theories of development can be used to inform educational practice. If the processes
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were identified, this could lead to the development of more effective intervention
methods in the future as well as adding to theory on development.
7.7. Final Summary
Before this research, the literature on children's illness concepts was disparate and
not very well integrated. It was usually the case that the different research
history/background of the experimenter(s) led the research rather than the research
question itself. Therefore, research of this nature was frequently qualified by the
theoretical perspective, i.e. researchers investigating children's understanding of
illness were influenced by their preconceived, sometimes prejudicial, ideas of where
children's understanding of illness fitted into their priorities. This thesis has
attempted to synthesise and integrate the different approaches towards understanding
of illness in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of illness concepts. As a
result, Study 1 has provided a clearer picture of children's understanding of a wider
range of illnesses and illness processes than previous research. Valuable information
on what these concepts are, when they emerge and the further development of these
illness concepts has been gained. The results of this work were then translated into
intervention studies, giving what had been discovered about children's knowledge of
illness a practical application. A thorough investigation of intervention types was
undertaken. This had not previously been researched with illness concepts, despite
their practical importance. From the findings, we can see that children's
understanding of illness can be enhanced through timely and age-appropriate
intervention involving peer discussion and factual information. The results of the
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intervention studies have not only been useful in their practical implications but have
also contributed to naive biology and educational literature.
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Appendix I:
Interview schedule for Study 1/2/3
Today we are going to talk about some illnesses. I am going to ask you some
questions about illness. Don't worry if you don't know the answer to something or if
you are not sure about an answer. There are no right or wrong answers, I only want
to know what you think.
Can you tell me what it means to be ill?
Can you tell me what it means to be healthy?
Cold
This is Johnny. Johnny has a runny nose
throat. He is also coughing and sneezing a
because Johnny has a cold
Can you tell me what a cold is like?
How do you think Johnny got a cold?/Why would that make him get a cold?
What could Johnny have done to stop himself getting a cold?/Why would that have
stopped him from getting a cold? (only asked in Study 1)
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How long after getting a cold would Johnny start to feel bad?/ Why would it take that
long?
Could Johnny do anything to make himself feel better?/ Why would that make him
feel better?
How long do you think it would take for Johnny to feel better?/ Why would it take
that long?
Chicken pox
This is Sally. Sally has lots of spots all over her face and
body. She also has a sore head and is very tired. This is
because Sally has chicken pox.
Can you tell me what chicken pox is like?
How do you think Sally got chicken pox?/ Why would that make her get chicken
pox?
What could Sally have done to stop herself getting chicken pox?/ Why would that
stop her getting chicken pox? (only asked in Study 1)
How long after getting chicken pox would Sally start to feel bad?/ Why would it take
that long?
Could Sally do anything to make herself feel better?/ Why would that make her feel
better?
How long would it take for Sally to feel better?/ Why would it take that long?
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Asthma
This is Harry. Harry sometimes finds it difficult to breath.
He also coughs a lot. This is because Harry has asthma.
Can you tell me what asthma is like?
How do you think Harry got asthma?/ Why would that make him get asthma?
What could Harry have done to stop himself getting asthma?/ Why would that stop
him from getting asthma? (only asked in Study 1)
How long after getting asthma would Harry start to feel bad?/ Why would it take that
long?
Could Harry do anything to make himself feel better?/ Why would that make him
feel better?
How long would it take for Harry to feel better?/ Why would it take that long?
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Toothache
This is Amy. Amy has a very sore tooth. She also has
a hole in her tooth. This is because Amy has
toothache.
Can you tell me what toothache is like?
How do you think Amy got toothache?/ Why would that make her get toothache?
What could Amy have done to stop herself getting toothache?/ Why would that stop
Amy from getting toothache? (only asked in Study 1)
How long after getting toothache would Amy start to feel bad?/ Why would it take
that long?
Could Amy do anything to make herself feel better?/ Why would that make her feel
better?
How long would it take for Amy to feel better?/ Why would it take that long?
Broken leg (only asked in Study 1)
This is Ben. Ben has a very sore leg. He also has to have a
plaster on it. This is because he has a broken leg.
Can you tell me what a broken leg is like?
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How do you think Ben got a broken leg?/ Why would that make him get a broken
leg?
What could Ben have done to stop himself getting a broken leg?/ Why would that
stop him from getting a broken leg?
How long after getting a broken leg would Ben start to feel bad?/ Why would it take
that long?
Could Ben do anything to make himself feel better?/ Why would that make him feel
better?
How long would it take for Ben to feel better?/ Why would it take that long?
Bruise
This is Jenny. Jenny has a purplish patch on her knee.
It is also a bit swollen. This is because Jenny has a
bruise.
Can you tell me what a bruise is like?
How do you think Jenny got a bruise?/ Why would that make Jenny get a bruise?
What could Jenny have done to stop herself getting a bruise?/ Why would that stop
Jenny from getting a bruise?
How long after getting a bruise would Jenny start to feel bad?/ Why would it take
that long?
Could Jenny do anything to make herself feel better?/ Why would that make her feel
better?
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How long would it take for Jenny to feel better?/ Why would it take that long?
Tonsillitis (only asked in Study 3)
This is Harry. He has a very sore throat and a cough. He
also has funny sounding voice and a high temperature.
This is because he has tonsillitis.
Can you tell me what tonsillitis is like?
How do you think Harry got tonsillitis?/ Why would that make him get tonsillitis?
How long after getting tonsillitis would Harry start to feel bad?/ Why would it take
that long?
Could Harry do anything to make himself feel better?/ Why would that make him
feel better?
How long would it take for Harry to feel better?/ Why would it take that long?
Mosilitis (only asked in Study 3)
This is Amy. She has yellow skin and a rash on her
face. She is also coughing and sneezing a lot. This
is because she has mosilitis.
Can you tell me what mosilitis is like?
256
How do you think Amy got mosilitis?/ Why would that make her get mosilitis?
How long after getting mosilitis would Amy start to feel bad?/ Why would it take
that long?
Could Amy do anything to make herself feel better?/ Why would that make her feel
better?
How long would it take for Amy to feel better?/ Why would it take that long?
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Appendix II:
Coding scheme for Study 1
1. Definition of illness (inter-judge reliability = 0.93)
Code Category Label Example
3 Symptoms / physical Be sick
2 Behavioural You have to stay off school
1 Psychological Be sad
0 Don't know
2. Definition of health (inter-judge reliability = 0.91)
Code Category Label Example
3 Absence of symptoms You're fit and you're able to run and stuff
2 Behavioural Means you eat a lot of healthy stuff like
fruit and vegetables




3. Definitions (inter-judge reliability = 0.97)
Code Category Label Example
2 Causality Cold: If it was cold and you had been
outside a lot
1 Symptoms Chicken pox: Red spots and itchy
0 Don't know
4. Causality (inter-judge reliability = 0.93)
Code Category Label Example
2 Biological Cold: Someone else might have had it and
they might have coughed germs onto him
1 Physical Asthma: Swallowed lots ofwater from a
bubble bath
0 Don't know
5. Accuracy measure (inter-judge reliability = 0.86)
Code Category Label Example
4 Complete understanding
ofmechanism
Cold: he caught it off from someone else
because he sneezed and the germs went
inside him and made him ill
3 Partial understanding of
mechanism
Chicken pox: caught them from somebody
else cos she was playing too close them
and the chicken pox might go onto them
2 Basic understanding Toothache: eating sweets and sweets have
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sugar in them





Cold: from the cold weather
6. Prevention (inter-judge reliability = 0.90)
Code Category Label Example
2 Biological Cold: Not gone near the person who had
the cold so that their germs couldn't get
inside you
1 Physical Toothache: Don't eat sweets
0 Don't know
7. Time course incubation (inter-judge reliability = 0.85)
Code Category Label Example
2 Complete understanding
of time course
Broken leg: he would feel sore right away
Cold: it would take a few days for him to
be ill because the germs have to do their
work
1 Some understanding of
time course
Chicken pox: it would take a few days
0 No understanding of time
course / Don't know
Cold: as soon as he came in from the cold
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8. Recovery strategies (inter-judge reliability = 0.89)
Code Category Label Example
4 Seek medical help Go to the doctors/hospital/dentist
3 Behavioural control Broken leg: get crutches
2 Symptom relief Asthma: Inhaler, then he would be able to
run around as normal
1 Psychological Bruise: Think like she didn't have a bruise
0 Don't know
9. Time course recovery (inter-judge reliability = 0.90)
Code Category Label Example
2 Complete understanding
of time course
Chicken pox: after a week she would feel
better because that is how long it takes for
the germs to go away
1 Some understanding of
time course
Toothache: as soon as she went to the
dentist
0 No understanding of time
course / Don't know




Fixed choice questions and responses for Study 2/3
How do you think that Jamie got a cold?
Because he went outside and played in the cold
Because he caught it off his friend Graham
Because he ate something that was bad for him




What is the best thing that could Jamie do to make
himself better?
Rest in bed
Go to the doctor
Take some medicine





How do you think that Jenny got chicken pox
Because she went outside and played in the chicken
pox
Because she caught it off her friend Amy
Because she didn't wash her face





What is the best thing that Jenny could do to make
herself better?
Rest in bed
Go to the doctor
Take some medicine






Intervention workbooks for Study 2 and 3
1. Full example of group + explanations workbook used in Study 2
2. Outline of individual tasks used in Study 2 and 3
3. Example of Scientific Facts information for colds used in Study 3
4. Example ofNo Explanation information for chicken pox used in Study 3
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1. Full example of group+explanations workbook used in Study 2
Colds...
Please turn the page
to begin.
This is a story about Jamie and how he got the cold. This is
Jamie here.
One day Jamie went to see his friend Graham who was off
school because he was ill. Graham had a cold.
Find your card called Answer Card 1 - Cold
How do you think Jamie got a cold?
Take it in turns to tell each other what your answers are.
Do you all have the same answer?
IfYES. then fill in the blue card.
Now discuss the reason why you think Jamie got a cold in that
way and write it down in the space on the blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
If NO. then discuss your answers until you can agree on an
answer.
When you have agreed fill in the blue card.
Now discuss the reason why you think Jamie got a cold in that
way and write it down in the space on the blue card.
Now turn to the next page
Colds are caused by viruses which get inside your body and
make you sick.
Viruses are a type of germ. They are tiny living things. In fact,
viruses are so tiny that we need a microscope to see them.
Viruses can get inside your body without you knowing and
make you sick.
Jamie and Graham were playing in Graham's bedroom.
Graham really didn't feel well though. He kept coughing and
sneezing. What Graham and Jamie didn't know was that cold
viruses were passing from Graham into Jamie.
.C
When Graham was coughing and sneezing, droplets were
flying through the air. These droplets had cold viruses in them.
Jamie was breathing in these droplets without knowing it. The
viruses were getting inside him and sticking to the inside of his
nose.
Check your answer with the answer card in the envelope.
Did you have the right answer?
If YES. Did you have the right reasons for your answer? If you
had the wrong reason for the answer then write the correct
reason on the back of the blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
If NO; Discuss why you got the question wrong. Write the
correct answer and reason for the answer on the back of the
blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
Find your card called Answer Card 2 - Cold
How long would it take for Jamie to start to feel ill?
Take it in turns to tell each other what your answers are.
Do you all have the same answer?
IfYES. then fill in the blue card.
Now discuss the reason why you think it would take Jamie
that long to start to feel ill and write it down in the space on
the blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
If NO; then discuss your answers until you can agree on an
answer.
When you have agreed fill in the blue card.
Now discuss reason why you think it would take Jamie that
long to start to feel ill and write it down in the space on the
blue card.
Now turn to the next page
Jamie didn't know he had cold viruses inside him because he
felt fine. In fact, it wasn't until two days later that he began to
feel ill. This is because it takes time for the viruses to multiply
and attack the body.
When the viruses get inside the nose, your body sends white
blood cells to the rescue. That is why Jamie had a runny nose
- it was trying to get the viruses out of his body. He also had a
sore throat, a sore head and a cough.
Check your answer with the answer card in the envelope.
Did you have the right answer?
IfYES. Did you have the right reasons for your answer? If you
had the wrong reason then write the correct reason on the
back of the blue card
Now turn to the next page.
If NO. Discuss why you got the question wrong. Write the
correct answer and reason for the answer on the back of the
blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
Find your card called Answer Card 3 - Cold.
What is the best thing that Jamie could do to make himself
feel better?
Take turns to tell each other what your answers are.
Do you all have the same answer?
IfYES. then fill in the blue card.
Now discuss the reason why you think that is the best thing
that Jamie can do to make himself feel better and write it
down in the space on the blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
If NO: then discuss your answers until you can agree on an
answer.
When you have agreed fill in the blue card.
Now discuss the reason why you think that is the best thing
that Jamie can do to make himself feel better and write it
down in the space on the blue card.
Now turn to the next page
Jamie was quite miserable. He kept sneezing and felt verytired. His dad said that there was no medicine that can cure
the cold. The best thing to do is let your body fight it.
<>/
Jamie had to rest and go to bed early, this made his body
stronger to fight the viruses. To make himself feel better he
took some cold medicines. This made him feel better but it
didn't make the viruses go away
Check your answer with the answer card in the envelope.
Do you have the right answer?
IfYES: Did you have the right reasons for your answer? If you
had the wrong reason then write the correct reason for the
answer on the back of the blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
If NO. Discuss why you got the question wrong. Write the
correct answer and reason for the answer on the back of the
blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
4 ♦
Find your card called Answer Card 4 - Cold.
How long would it take for Jamie to feel better?
Take it in turns to tell each other what your answers are.
Do you all have the same answer?
IfYES. then fill in the blue card.
Now discuss the reason why you think it would take Jamie
that long to feel better and write it down in the space on the
blue card.
Now turn to the next page.
If NO; then discuss your answers until you can agree on an
answer.
When you have agreed fill in the blue card.
Now discuss the reason why you think it would take Jamie
that long to feel better and write it down in the space on the
blue card.
Now turn to the next page
After about a week, Jamie began to feel much better. He was
glad that it had only taken a week for his body to fight the
viruses because he didn't like having a cold. He hoped he
would never have a cold again.
0
He wanted to go out and play with his friends. His dad said be
careful though: if he went near anyone who had the cold he
might get it again!!
Check your answer with the answer card in the envelope.
Do you have the right answer?
IfYES. Did you have the right reason for your answer? If you
had the wrong reason then write the correct reason on the
back of the blue card.
If NO. Discuss why you got the question wrong. Write the
correct answer and reason on the back of the blue card.
You have now finished answering all the questions about
Jamie's cold. Please tell the person who is helping you that
you have finished.
2. Outline of individual tasks used in Study 2 and 3
• Find your card called Answer Card 1 - Cold.
• How do you think Jamie got a cold?
• Do you still think that?
• Think carefully of the reason why you think Jamie got a cold in that way and
write it down in the space below.
• Now turn to the next page.
• Here is the right answer
• Did you have the right answer?
• If YES: Did you have the right reasons for your answer? If you had the wrong
reason for the answer then write the correct reason on the back of your answer
card.
• Now turn to the next page.
• If NO: Think carefully about why you got the question wrong and write the
correct answer and reason for the answer on the back of your answer card.
• Now turn to the next page.
3. Example of Scientific Facts information for colds used in Study 3
This book will give you some information about colds.
The cold is an illness that lots of children have had.
Colds are caused by viruses which can get inside a person's body and make them sick
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Viruses are a type of germ. They are tiny living things. In fact, viruses are so tiny
that we need a microscope to see them. Viruses can get inside someone's body
without them knowing and make them sick.
A person who has a cold can pass it to someone else by coughing or sneezing. This
will make the cold viruses pass from one person to the other. When they cough,
sneeze or talk, tiny drops come out of their mouth.
These drops are full of the cold virus. If someone breathes in the drops, the viruses
will get in their body. They won't know that they have the cold viruses inside them.
It takes a few days after getting the viruses inside someone's body before they start
feeling ill. This is because it takes time for the viruses to multiply and attack the
body.
When the viruses get inside the nose, the body tries to defend itself by sending white
blood cells to the rescue. That is why people get a runny nose - it is trying to get the
viruses out of their body. They may also have a sore throat, a sore head and a cough.
The cold can make people feel very miserable. They keep sneezing and feel very
tired. There is no medicine that can cure the cold. The best thing to do is to stay in
bed. This lets the body get strong and fight the cold viruses.
To help make someone with the cold feel better, they can take some cold medicines.
This will make them feel better, but it won't make the viruses go away.
After about a week the person will feel much better. They should feel well enough to
do normal things and because they aren't coughing and sneezing anymore, they won't
give the cold to any of the other children.
Be careful though: if you go near anyone who has the cold, you might get it again!!
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4. Example ofNo Explanation information for chicken pox used in Study 3
This is a story about Jenny and how she got chicken pox. This is Jenny here.
One day Jenny went to see her friend Amy who was off school because she was ill.
Amy had the chicken pox.
Chicken pox is caused by viruses which get inside your body and make you sick.
Viruses are a type of germ. They are tiny living things. In fact, viruses are so tiny
that we need a microscope to see them. Viruses can get inside your body without you
knowing and make you sick.
Jenny and Amy were talking in Amy's bedroom. Amy really didn't feel well though.
She had a lot of spots and was coughing and sneezing.
Amy's face was covered in spots. Jenny thought this was very funny. What the girls
didn't know was that Jenny was getting the chicken pox too.
Jenny didn't know she had chicken pox because she felt fine. She was still going to
school and going out to play. In fact, it wasn't until TEN days later that she began to
feel ill.
First she got spots all over her face. These spots were very itchy and Jenny wanted to
scratch her face. As well as having spots, Jenny also had a sore head and felt sick.
Jenny was quite miserable. Her spots were very itchy and she was also very tired.
Jenny wanted to get better quickly so she asked her mum what she could do. Her
mum said that it was very important that she stayed in bed.
Jenny wasn't allowed to scratch her spots because that would make them burst and
Jenny could be left with a scar. To stop her spots itching so much, Jenny's mum put
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some cream on them. This made the spots stop itching but it didn't make the chicken
pox go away.
After six days the spots began to go away and Jenny felt much better. Jenny was very
happy that she felt better because she didn't like the chicken pox. She hoped that she
would never get chicken pox again.




Coding scheme for Study 2 and 3
1. Definitions (inter-judge reliability = 0.83)
Code Category Label Example
5 Cause + symptoms +
treatment
Asthma: If you do a lot of running and you can't breath
properly so you need to get an inhaler
4 Symptoms +
treatment or cause
Chicken pox: Wherever there is a chicken pox it's really
itchy and you have to buy creams that stop the itching
Toothache: It's just when your teeth is all sore cos you
eat too many sweets
3 Accurate symptoms
or cause or treatment
Cold: When you sneeze a lot and you've got a choked up
throat and you just want to sneeze
Tonsillitis: You have a very sore throat, hurts when you
cough
2 Inaccurate or vague
symptoms
Tonsillitis: When your tonsils go wrong
Asthma: it's really itchy spots
1 Vague statement Not nice/ annoying
Chicken pox: Me and my friend Helen were watching tv
and we got chicken pox on our bums
Toothache: I've never really had toothache but this one
really annoys me cos it's wobbly and that one there








Cold: Maybe someone else in his class had a cold and
passed it onto him [how] cos a cold is like a wee germs
thing that goes from person to person
Cold: Could have caught it off somebody [how] if you
are talking to someone who has a cold, they are






Chicken pox: From friends [how] when they breath it
out, you can breath it in and catch it
Asthma: When he was a baby and maybe his mum or
dad had it and they passed it on to him
2 Basic understanding
it comes from




Cold: Maybe someone else had them and she could have
went near them too much and she could have catched
them off her
Mosilitis: She catched it from a friend
Asthma: He was born with it
1 Physical/ external Cold: He was out in the cold
Chicken pox: Itching and stuff like that [how] just




3. Time course incubation 0.85





Cold: Week [why] so that the germs could get into his
body





Chicken pox: Week [why] cos its hard to get all the
chicken pox on your face and it would take a wee while
to catch it
Chicken pox: 2 days, the first day you get them
appearing, and the next day they are itchy and the next
day you feel ill
2 Some understanding
of incubation + no
explanation
Mosilitis: It would take a few days
Asthma: When he was born
1 No understanding of
incubation
Cold: Straight after he'd got it, it might go into his body








Tonsillitis: stay in bed to make the body strong so's the
white blood cells can fight the germs
3 More than one
accurate treatment
Cold: Keep blowing his nose and keep his clothes on
Tonsillitis: Take some cough medicine, stay in bed and








Cold: Stay at home
Asthma: He would have to cough it out and drink lots of
water to make it come out
0 Don't know
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5. Time course recovery 0.84





Cold: Five or six days [why] cos the germs will
eventually die down if you do the right things but they
don't die down straight away, it takes a while for his
body to beat the germs






Chicken pox: Days [why] if she got medicine she would
have to wait until medicine started to work in her body
2 Some understanding
of recovery + no
explanation
Chicken pox: Few weeks
1 No understanding of
recovery
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This study was designed to
provide a more comprehensive
picture of children's
understanding of illness and
injury than previous studies by
interviewing 83 children from 4
age groups (4/5 years, 7/8 years,
9/10 years and 11/12 years).
They were asked questions
about how they defined illness
and health as well as questions
regarding different features of
specific illnesses. First, it was
found that definitions of health
and illness became more
polarized with age. Further,
significant effects of age were
detected for understanding of
the specific illnesses with
explanations becoming more
sophisticated and accurate with
development. This result held
for almost every illness and
illness feature. Lastly,
cross-illness analyses showed
that children hold differing
levels of understanding for each
ailment, e.g. understanding of
injuries was higher than
illnesses. These results





children, concepts of illness,
development
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knowing how much children understand
about illness has both practical and theoretical
implications. From a practical perspective,
research on children's understanding of illness
can be used to generate age-appropriate expla¬
nations for children affected by illness. This is
especially pertinent in health care settings as
children have frequently been shown to display
unnecessary fear, guilt and anxiety before
receiving treatment for illness (Whitt, Dykstra,
& Taylor, 1979). Health education programmes
used in schools could also benefit from being
aware of children's baseline knowledge of
health and illness. Furthermore, at a more
general level, research on children's under¬
standing of illness can inform theories regarding
cognitive structures and cognitive development
(Kalish, 1996a).
The question of how children define the
concepts of health and illness is the starting
point for this present study. Previous studies
have focused on general definitions of health
(Natapoff, 1978) or illness (Millstein, Adler, &
Irwin, 1981) and only a few attempts have been
made to compare definitions of the two
(Millstein & Irwin, 1987; Schmidt & Frohling,
2000). Millstein and Irwin (1987) argue that
concepts of health and illness become more
polarized with age. While Schmidt and Frohling
(2000) concluded that adequate definitions of
health encompassed more than just an absence
of illness. They found that describing negative
aspects (e.g. absence of illness) decreased with
age and describing positive aspects (e.g. positive
mood) increased. In Schmidt and Frohling's
study, illness was frequently described in terms
relating to symptoms and a general feeling of
being unwell; developmental changes were
reflected in the number of aspects that were
mentioned.
There has, however, been a substantial
research effort exploring children's understand¬
ing of illness processes in detail. Historically,
there have been two broad approaches to this.
Early research attempted to plot the develop¬
ment of children's concepts of illness in line with
the stages outlined in Piaget's theory of
development (e.g. Bibace & Walsh, 1981; Perrin
& Gerrity, 1981). Hence, it was argued that
children's understanding of illness was limited.
Bibace and Walsh (1981) conducted a series of
clinical-style interviews based on children's
understanding of the common cold and
provided a detailed description of the develop¬
ment of children's illness concepts in terms of
Piagetian stages. Causal explanations of illness
given by children in the pre-operational stage
(2 to 7 years) are described as based upon super¬
stition or magic. There was a general conclusion
in this early research that pre-operational
children did not understand contagion or
contamination as causes of illness. Kister and
Patterson (1980) further report that 7-year-olds
gave explanations of illness based on immanent
justice and that younger children frequently
over-extended contagion to non-contagious
illnesses (toothache) and accidents. Bibace and
Walsh argue that concrete-logical explanations
are apparent in children aged 7 to 10 years when
the children are thought to be able to distinguish
between internal and external influences on the
self. Explanations frequently cite contamination
and internalization processes in the contraction
of illness. The highest level of explanation is at
the formal logical stage. By age 11 years children
are described as able to give physiological
explanations of illness that correspond to formal
theories of infection, health maintenance and
treatment.
Relatively recently it has been suggested that
the neo-Piagetian approach underestimates chil¬
dren's understanding of illness. This corresponds
with other criticisms of Piagetian research,
which argue that his stage theory underestimates
children's abilities such as reasoning about
physical phenomenon (Baillargeon, 1993) and
conservation of number (Donaldson, 1978).
Furthermore, Hergenrather and Rabinowitz
(1991) propose that it is incorrect to use Piaget's
stages to plot the development of illness
concepts as Piaget's stages refer to children's
logic and capability for certain types of thought,
not to their understanding. Carey (1985) also
argues that illness cannot be conceptualized as
part of a domain-general Piagetian framework
as children's reasoning skills are very different
across domains. By this account, domain-
general theories may not be appropriate for
explaining theoretical development within a
specific domain. Despite these criticisms, Bibace
and Walsh's stages have been used as the back¬
ground for a lot of further studies on illness
understanding (e.g. Banks, 1990; Crisp, Ungerer,
& Goodnow, 1996; McQuaid, Howard, Kopel,
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Rosenblum, & Bibace, 2002) and have also
sparked debate about the nature of the develop¬
ment of illness concepts.
The second approach to investigating chil¬
dren's understanding of illness corresponds with
the recent growth of research concerning
whether children have an intuitive understand¬
ing of biology (see Wellman & Gelman, 1992).
Kalish (1996a) provides evidence for an early
understanding of the biological processes of
illness. In his study, pre-schoolers were asked to
judge whether children who had contracted an
illness in different ways would be ill and be
contagious. The findings suggest that children
see illness as more than just symptoms and
whether or not someone was judged to be con¬
tagious depended on the cause. This indicates
that contagion and infection may be linked by a
theory of biology. In another set of studies
Kalish (1996b) showed that pre-school children
can understand that germs cause illness and that
they are living things and therefore intrinsically
biological agents. Further support for a biologi¬
cal conception of illness comes from Springer
and Ruckel (1992) who showed that children
preferred biological explanations of illness to
social explanations.
However, Solomon and Cassimatis (1999)
argue against a biological germ theory of illness.
By asking pre-schoolers to judge whether
someone would be contagious to others due to
contact with a biological agent, e.g. germs, or a
non-biological agent, e.g. pepper, they found
that pre-schoolers did not distinguish between
the types of agent in determining whether
someone was contagious to others. Further
studies indicated that pre-schoolers did not
consider germs as living things. Solomon and
Cassimatis stress that they are not against the
idea that children have a grasp of some causal
relations. They believe that children's under¬
standing of illness undergoes a conceptual re¬
organization in order to become a biological
theory although they do not suggest an age at
which this may occur. Au and Romo (1999)
argue further against a biological understanding
of illness. Children aged 5-10 years were asked
open-ended questions about how someone got
sick and answers were coded according to how
'biological' they were. This led to a very small
proportion of children (6%) being credited with
a biological understanding of illness. Therefore,
Au and Romo conclude that children do not
possess the ability to reason biologically about
phenomena and cannot talk about biological
causal mechanisms. However, it can be noted
that the coding scheme they use classifies many
things as mechanical that other studies would
say are biological and even the authors admit
they may be being 'too harsh' (Au & Romo,
1999, p. 396).
However, this research is limited in that it
focuses on pre-schoolers' understanding of
contagion. As most of the work in this area has
only considered pre-schoolers' understanding
no real conclusions can be drawn about the
development of illness concepts throughout the
rest of childhood. This is especially relevant as
the debate converges on whether pre-schoolers
do have a biological understanding. If, as
Solomon and Cassimatis argue, they do not then
an area of further investigation would be to
investigate when a biological understanding
comes to the fore. Furthermore, the emphasis on
understanding of germs and contagion has led to
other illness processes and knowledge of
specific illnesses being neglected (see also
Williams & Binnie, 2002).
Research on adults' illness cognitions are
potentially useful in providing a framework to
extend research on children's understanding. In
particular, the work of Leventhal and his
colleagues (e.g. Leventhal, Meyer & Nerenz,
1980; Leventhal & Nerenz, 1985) highlights the
functions and dimensions of adult illness repre¬
sentations. Illness representations function to
help adults cope with their illness, understand
their illness and help them to identify illness
onset (Ogden, 1996). Leventhal and his
colleagues distinguish between five elements of
adult illness beliefs: identity (definition and
symptoms) of illness; the causes of illness; the
timeline; the consequences; and whether it is
controllable and curable. This framework of
illness dimensions broadens out the research
possibilities for those working with children
from a focus purely on causes and contagion to
a consideration of a range of possible illness
concepts.
The present study aimed to consider general
definitions of the concepts of health and illness
as well as understanding of specific illnesses. The
age range in this study was extended to include
children from 4 years up to 12 years allowing an
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examination of the development of illness
concepts throughout primary school. It was
predicted that concepts become more sophisti¬
cated and accurate with age. The specific
illnesses are common childhood ailments that
the children have some knowledge of as shown
by previous research. In addition, more than just
understanding of causality was investigated with
questions on definitions, prevention, time course
and recovery also being asked. It is likely that
the children will have different levels of under¬
standing of the different illnesses. An open-
ended questioning method was used throughout
to allow children to express their spontaneous
thoughts. Although it was noted that the full
extent of understanding among the youngest
children may not be tapped by this type of
method (Smith & Williams, 2004), it was hoped
a more compete picture of understanding of
illness will be obtained than by using forced
choice methods. The study will be able to add to
debate concerning intuitive biology as well as
adding to health psychology literature on under¬
standing of specific illnesses.
Method
Participants
A total of 83 children participated in this study
from state-run primary schools and both state-
run and private nurseries in Glasgow. The
sample comprised four age groups: 4/5-year-olds
(n = 20, Mean age = 4;7, range = 4;0-5;3);
7/8-year-olds (n = 20, M = 7;9, range = 7;4-8;2);
9/10-year-olds (n = 21,M = 9;9, range = 9;4—10;3)
and 11/12-year-olds (n = 22, M = 11;9, range =
11 ;4—12;4). In total, there were 44 males and 39
females. The sample size was determined using
power analysis. Assuming a large effect size and
based on ANOVA comparisons of 4 groups, a
minimum group size of 18 was recommended
(Cohen, 1992).
The sample was selected through a process of
Education Authority approval and school
willingness to participate. Parents in the rele¬
vant age groups were then invited to give their
permission for their children to participate in
the study and were informed of the purpose of
the study and the importance of the findings for
health education and cognitive development
research. They were also advised that all data
would remain confidential and anonymous.
Therefore, written parental permission was
received for all participants. Due to a high level
of asylum seekers in Glasgow, some participants
(n = 5) did not have English as their first
language and although they were interviewed in
line with inclusive practice they were not
included in this final analysis.
Pilot study
Initial items were extensively piloted on a
sample of forty-five children. Nine common
illnesses were asked about but this was reduced
to six as the interview was felt to be too long. In
addition, prompting was introduced as a result
of the pilot study's findings as this yielded more
insights into the children's knowledge. The final
materials and procedure used are described
below.
Materials
Introductory questions Two questions asking
for general definitions of health and illness were
drawn up (Can you tell me what it means to be
ill/healthy?) as well as a question asking what
illnesses the participant had personally experi¬
enced (Have you ever been ill? What illnesses
have you had?). These questions served a dual
function: first, it eased the participants into the
interview situation and second, it allowed an
examination of understanding of the concepts of
health and illness in general.
Vignettes Six short vignettes were written
describing child characters with different
illnesses. The ailments described were: con¬
tagious illnesses (cold and chicken pox); non¬
contagious illnesses (asthma and toothache);
and injuries (bruise and broken leg). Each
vignette described the symptoms experienced
by the character and gave the name of the
illness. For example: 'This is Johnny. Johnny has
a runny nose and a sore throat. He also coughs
and sneezes a lot. This is because Johnny has a
cold.' The vignettes were of the same form and
complexity for each illness and described the
same number of symptoms. In addition, to main¬
tain the participant's interest, a cartoon drawing
of each of the characters accompanied the
vignettes. This method of employing vignettes,
which facilitates children's ability to answer
questions concerning their representations, has
been used widely in research on illness (e.g.
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Kalish, 1996, 1997; Siegal, 1988; Solomon &
Cassimatis, 1999; Williams & Binnie, 2002) and
children's understanding of biology more
generally (e.g. Smith & Williams, 2004; Williams
& Tolmie, 2000).
The questions about each illness, which
followed the vignettes were:
Definition: What is [illness] like?
Causality: How do you think [name] got
[illness]?/Why would that make [name] get
[illness]?
Multiple causality: Can you think of any other
ways that [name] could get [illness]?
Prevention: What could [name] do to stop
himself/herself from getting [illness]?
Time course (1): How long would it take for
[name] to feel bad?
Recovery: What could [name] do to make
himself/herself feel better?
Time course (2): How long would it take for
[name] to feel better?
Procedure
The participants were individually interviewed
in a quiet room separate from their classroom.
They were told they were going to be asked
some questions about different illnesses, that
there were no right or wrong answers and that
they were free to leave the interview situation at
any point. The introductory questions were
asked first followed by the vignettes and ques¬
tions for the specific illnesses. First the vignette
was read out to the participant and they were
shown the cartoon drawing. The questions about
each illness were then asked. These always
followed the same order. However, the order in
which each of the illnesses was presented was
randomized for each participant. The interviews
were tape recorded and transcribed before
analysis.
Content analysis
The data were coded using content analysis (see
Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1995), a method
frequently employed for analysing children's
explanations of illness (Perrin, Sayer, & Willett,
1991; Raman & Winer, 2002; Sigelman,
Maddock, Epstein, & Carpenter; 1993). Two
coders used 15 per cent of the response scripts
to devise appropriate categories. After discussion
the final categories were decided and used to
analyse the remaining response scripts by the
two coders. The final categories were fairly
broad in order to encompass responses to each
of the illnesses/injuries. Although this may lead
to missing some detail of the data that would
remain with narrow categories it does have the
advantage of allowing analysis of cross-illness
comparisons. Since one of the purposes of this
study was to look at cross-illness variations in
representations it was crucial to devise a coding
scheme that would allow statistical comparisons
across the illnesses. Full details of the coding
system are given in the Appendix. For the defi¬
nitions of illness and health and the strategies
for recovery, it can be seen that the data were
coded into separate categories independent of
each other. For definitions, causality and preven¬
tion a higher score indicated a higher level of
response. An attempt was made to maintain a
high level of detail with the coding of the causal¬
ity questions by including an accuracy measure.
This enabled responses to be coded in two ways:
first, whether they were biological or physical
and second, how accurately they described the
mechanism. The time course items were also
coded according to how accurate they were.
Results
The data for each question were analysed using
either chi-square or two-way ANOVAs with
follow-up tests. Where data were judged to be
categorical and therefore non-parametric as in
the case of definition of illness/health and
strategies for recovery from illness, chi-square
analyses were employed to explore age trends
(in line with Charman & Chandiramani, 1995).
However, some of the data were judged to be
suitable for parametric testing as each response
type superseded the other in level of sophistica¬
tion and therefore a higher score indicated a
greater level of understanding (Springer & Keil,
1991; Williams & Binnie, 2002; Williams &
Tolmie, 2000). Thus, for questions on definition,
causality, prevention and time course the data
were analysed parametrically using Age Group
(4/5 years, 7/8 years, 9/10 years, 11/12 years) X
Illness Type (cold, chicken pox, asthma,
toothache, bruise, broken leg) two-way
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ANOVAs. Any main effects were then exam¬
ined by use of post-hoc /-tests with corrections
for the significance values and interaction
effects were explored with the use of one-way
ANOVAs and post-hoc Sheffes.
Definitions of illness
In relation to definitions of illness, Fig. 1 shows
the percentage of children giving each response
type. 'Don't know' answers decrease across the
age groups and 'symptom' answers increase with
age. Behavioural and psychological definitions
are generally unpopular with all age groups. A
chi-square test (%2 - 21.65,p < .01) indicated the
response pattern is associated with age.
Definitions of health
Figure 2 shows the percentages of participants
invoking each response type for definitions of
health. A different pattern to definitions of
illness is seen. The most favoured category here
is behavioural for the 7/8-year-olds and the
11/12-year-olds. The 4/5-year-olds prefer 'don't
know' and the 9/10-year-olds mainly use defi¬
nitions based on absence of symptoms. Chi-
square test showed responses to be significantly
associated with age (%2 = 45.37, p < .001).
90
Definitions of the specific
illnesses
A two-way ANOVA on the definition scores
(Table 1) found a main effect of Age Group
(F(3,79) = 7.70,p < .001), a main effect of Illness
Type (F(5, 395) = 13.47, p < .001) but no inter¬
action effect. To explore the main effects of Age
Group and Illness Type in detail, post-hoc /-tests
were performed.
For Age Group it was found that the 4/5 years
have a lower mean than 9/10 (/(39) = -1.38, p <
.001) and 11/12 years (/(40) = -4.27, p < .001).
Repeated measures /-tests comparing the differ¬
ent Illness Types across all ages showed that
scores for asthma were lower than scores for
cold (/(82) = 4.88, p < .001), chicken pox (z(82)
= 3.31, p < .001), toothache (/(82) = 4.17, p <
.001) and bruise (/(82) = 6.71,p < .001). Further,
chicken pox scores were significantly lower than
the injuries' scores: bruise (/(82) = 5.05,p < .001)
and broken leg (/(82) = 3.68, p < .001).
Causality of specific illnesses
For understanding of the causality of illness
(Table 2), a two-way ANOVA revealed a main
effect of Age Group (F(3,79) = 14.26, p < .001),
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Figure 2. Percentage of children giving each type of definition for health.
p < .001) and an interaction effect (F(15,395) =
3.11, p < .001).
Subsequent post-hoc /-tests showed 4/5 years
have a lower mean than 9/10 years (/(39) =
-4.31, p < .001), and 11/12 years (/(40) = -6.31,
p < .001) and 7/8 years have a lower mean than
11/12 years (/(40) = -4.00, p < .001). Although a
main effect of illness was found, the post-hoc
/-tests did not show any significant differences
between pairs of illnesses.
The interaction effect was initially explored
using one-way ANOVAs with Scheffe post-hoc
analysis (only significant differences are
reported). There were significant developmental
improvements between age groups for cold
(F(3,79) = 4.59,/? < .005; 4/5 years have a lower
Table 1. Mean scores for definitions of illnesses by Age Group
Cold Chicken pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Broken leg
4/5 years 1.00 0.95 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95
7/8 years 1.10 0.90 0.70 1.05 1.25 1.25
9/10 years 1.33 1.00 0.95 1.33 1.62 1.19
11/12 years 1.09 1.05 1.00 1.23 1.41 1.45
Table 2. Mean scores for causality of illnesses by Age Group
Cold Chicken pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Broken leg
4/5 years 0.65 0.40 0.55 0.90 0.95 0.85
7/8 years 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.95 1.00 1.00
9/10 years 1.19 1.33 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00
11/12 years 1.00 1.55 1.18 1.50 1.00 0.95
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mean than 9/10 years, p < .01), chicken pox (F(3,
79) = 7.87,p < .001; 4/5 years have a lower mean
than 9/10 years and 11/12 years, p < .01 and
7/8 years have a lower mean than 11/12 years,
p < .05 and toothache (F(3, 79) = 8.07, p < .001;
11/12 years have a higher mean than all other
age groups, p < .01). There were no age differ¬
ences for bruise, broken leg and asthma.
Accuracy measure for
explanations of causality
Table 3 shows the accuracy of explanations for
causality of illness. A two-way ANOVA indi¬
cated a significant main effect of Age Group
(F(3, 79) = 16.91, p < .001), a significant main
effect of Illness Type (F(5,395) = 82.28,p < .001)
and a significant interaction effect between Age
Group and Illness Type (F(15, 395) = 3.174,
p < .001).
Further analyses detected differences in accu¬
racy between 4/5 years and all other age groups:
7/8 years (t(38) = 4.32,p < .001), 9/10 years (t(39)
= 6.85, p < .001) and 11/12 years (t(40) = 7.24,
p < .001).
For the cross-illness post-hoc comparisons
toothache, bruise and broken leg all have signifi¬
cantly higher means than cold, chicken pox and
asthma (cold-toothache: r(82) = -10.92,p < .001;
cold-bruise /(82) = -16.27,p < .001; cold-broken
leg: t(82) = -15.23, p < .001; chicken pox-
toothache: r(82) = -5.53, p < .001; chicken
pox-bruise: i(82) = -7.89, p < .001; chicken pox-
broken leg: t(82) = -7.60, p < .001; asthma-
toothache: t(82) = -10.07, p < .001; asthma-
bruise: r(82) = -13.00, p < .001; asthma-broken
leg: i(82) = -12.62,p < .001) and chicken pox had
greater score than cold (/(82) = -4.87, p < .001).
The interaction effect was examined by
using one-way ANOVAs and post-hoc Sheffes
comparing means for different age groups for
each illness type separately. There were signifi¬
cant age differences in accuracy for chicken pox
(F(3, 79) = 7.87, p < .001; 4/5 have lower mean
than 9/10 and 11/12 years, p < .005) asthma (F(3,
79) = 6.70, p < .001; 4/5 have lower mean than
9/10 and 11/12 years, p < .05), toothache F(3,79)
= 7.17, p < .001; 11/12 have a higher mean than
4/5 and 7/8 years,p < .01), bruise (F(3,79) = 2.85,
p < .05; no pairwise differences detected) and
broken leg (F(3, 79) = 4.04, p < .01; 4/5 have
lower mean than 7/8 years, p < .05). No age
differences were detected for cold.
Prevention of the specific
illnesses
Table 4 shows clear developmental trends with
prevention strategy scores increasing across the
age groups for each illness. A two-way ANOVA
found a main effect of Age Group (F(3, 79) =
24.32, p < .001), main effect of Illness Type (F(5,
935) = 7.84, p < .001) and a significant inter¬
action effect (F(15, 395) = 2.21, p < .01).
Post-hoc t-tests looking for differences
between the age groups found significant results
between 4/5 years and all other age groups
(7/8-year-olds: i(38) = -4.103, p < .001;
Table 3. Mean scores for accuracy measure by Age Group
Cold Chicken pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Broken leg
4/5 years 0 0.10 0 1.50 1.90 1.80
7/8 years 0.45 0.95 0.40 1.65 2.35 2.60
9/10 years 0.47 1.52 0.91 1.95 2.09 2.24
11/12 years 0.09 1.68 1.18 2.64 2.27 2.27
Table 4. Mean scores for prevention of illnesses by Age Group
Cold Chicken pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Broken leg
4/5 years 0.50 0.30 0.25 0.35 0.55 0.40
7/8 years 1.00 0.85 0.40 0.90 0.80 0.90
9/10 years 0.90 1.43 0.57 1.10 1.00 1.00
11/12 years 1.00 1.27 0.91 1.32 1.00 0.91
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9/10-year-olds: r(39) = -6.59, p < .001;
11/12-year-olds: r(40) = -7.13, p < .001) and
7/8-year-olds and 11/12-year-olds (7(40) = -3.19,
p < .003).
F-tests comparing the different Illness Types
showed that asthma scores were significantly
lower than for all other illnesses (cold: t(82) =
3.99,p < .001; chicken pox: /(82) = 4.39, p < .001;
toothache: /(82) = 4.71, p < .001; bruise: r(82) =
4.29,p < .001; broken leg: t(82) = 3.85,p < .001).
The interaction effect was examined by
comparing age differences within each illness
using one-way ANOVAs with post-hoc Sheffe
tests. There were significant age effects for all
illness types: Cold (F(3, 79) = 4.84, p < .005; 4/5
have a lower mean than 7/8 and 11/12 years,
p < .05); chicken pox (F(3, 79) = 8.94, p < .001;
4/5 have a lower mean than 9/10 and 11/12 years,
p < .001); asthma (F(3,79) = 5.26,p < .005; 11/12
have a higher mean than 4/5 and 7/8 years,
p < .05); toothache (F(3, 79) = 11.23, p < .001;
4/5 years have a lower mean than all other age
groups,/? < .05); bruise (F(3,79) = 9.09,p < .001;
4/5 have a lower mean than 9/10 and 11/12 years,
p < .001) and broken leg (F(3, 79) = 14.07,
p < .001; 4/5 years have a lower mean than all
other age groups,/? < .001).
Time course: accuracy in judging
the incubation time of illness
Table 5 shows how accurate the participants in
each age group were in their estimations of
incubation time, i.e. the time between contract¬
ing the illness and 'feeling ill'. There was a main
effect of Age Group (F(3,79) = 17.86,/? < .001),
a main effect of Illness Type (F(5, 395) = 8.35,
p < .001) and an interaction effect (F(15,395) =
2.29, p < .005).
Post-hoc Mests comparing age groups detect
improvements in accuracy scores between the
4/5 years and all other age groups: 7/8 years:
(f(38) = -4.05,/? < .001); 9/10 years (t(39) = -6.68,
p < .001) and 11/12 years (f(40) = -7.56, p < .001)
and between 7/8 years and 9/10 years (/(39) =
-2.42, p < .05) and 11/12 years (/(40) = -2.70,
p < .05).
For the cross-illness main effect, post-hoc t-
tests indicated asthma has a lower mean than
bruise (r(82) = -4.74, p < .001) and broken leg
(r(82) = -4.92, p < .001); and cold has a lower
mean than bruise (t(82) = -4.38,/? < .001) and
broken leg (t(82) = -0.38, p < .001).
One-way ANOVAS with post-hoc Sheffes
examining age trends within illness types were
employed to investigate the interaction. Age
differences were found for cold (F(3,79) = 3.80,
p < .05; 4/5 have a lower mean than 9/10 and
11/12 years,/? < .05); chicken pox (F(3,79) = 5.40,
p < .005; 4/5 have a lower mean than 9/10 years,
p < .01 and 7/8 have a lower mean than 9/10,/? <
.05); toothache (F(3,79) = 6.98,p < .001; 4/5 have
a lower mean than all other age groups, p < .05);
bruise (F (3,79) = 8.60,/? < .001; 4/5 have a lower
mean than all other age groups, p < .01) and
broken leg (F (3, 79) = 11.11,/? < .001; 4/5 have
a lower mean than 9/10 and 11/12 years,/? < .005
and 7/8 have a lower mean than 11/12 years, p <
.01). There were no age trends for asthma.
Recovery
Figure 3 shows the percentage of children giving
each recovery strategy for the six illnesses. In
general the most favoured strategy is symptom
relief. For toothache, most children referred to
seeking medical help. As for all other illness
features, asthma shows the highest number of
don't know responses.
To explore this overall trend in more detail,
associations between recovery strategies and
age were examined for each illness type using
chi-square. The results were significant in rela¬
tion to cold (x2 = 29.85, p < .005), bruise (x2 =
24.64, p < .05) and broken leg (%2 = 27.83,
p < .01).
Table 5. Mean accuracy scores for predicting incubation time of illnesses by Age Group
Cold Chicken pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Broken leg
4/5 years 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.20
7/8 years 0.45 0.30 0.10 0.75 1.30 0.70
9/10 years 0.76 1.15 0.48 0.86 1.33 1.24
11/12 years 0.77 0.73 0.64 1.00 1.09 1.64






■ seek medical help
bruise broken leg
Figure 3. Percentage of children giving each recovery strategy for each illness.
Time course 2: accuracy of
judgements of time to recovery
Table 6 shows the accuracy of answers regard¬
ing time to recovery. A two-way ANOVA found
a main effect of Age Group (F(3, 79) = 26.66,
p < .001), main effect of Illness Type (F(5, 395)
= 13.76,p < .001) and an interaction effect (F(15,
395) = 1.91,p<.05).
Exploring the main effect ofAge Group, post-
hoc Mests showed significant increases in accu¬
racy between 4/5 years and all other age groups:
7/8 years (r(38) = -3.55, p < .001); 9/10 years
(r(39) = -8.74, p < .001); 11/12 years (f(40) =
-8.23, p < .001). Seven/eight years also have a
lower mean than 9/10 (t(39) = -3.61, p < .001)
and 11/12 years (t(40) = -3.33, p < .005).
For Illness Type, toothache has a lower mean
than cold (/(82) = 3.79, p < .001), chicken pox
(f(82) = 5.95, p < .001), bruise (f(82) = -3.34, p <
.001) and broken leg (f(82) = -6.45, p < .001).
Asthma has a lower mean than chicken pox
(t(82) = 4.88, p < .001) and broken leg (f(82) =
-5.30, p < .001).
In relation to the interaction there were
significant age differences for all illness apart
from asthma: cold (F(3,79) = 14.91, p < .001; 4/5
have a lower mean than 9/10 and 11/12 years,
p < .001 and 7/8 have a lower mean than 9/10
and 11/12 years, p < .005) chicken pox (F(3, 79)
= 12.73, p < .001; 4/5 have a lower mean than
9/10 and 11/12 years,/? < .001 and 7/8 has a lower
mean than 9/10 years, p < .05) toothache (F(3,
Table 6. Mean accuracy scores for predicting time to recovery of illnesses by Age Group
Cold Chicken pox Asthma Toothache Bruise Broken leg
4/5 years 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.55
7/8 years 0.55 0.95 0.40 0.45 0.95 1.00
9/10 years 1.38 1.62 0.48 0.71 1.05 1.62
11/12 years 1.27 1.41 0.73 0.77 1.09 1.41
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79) = 6.95, p < .001; 4/5 have a lower mean than
9/10 and 11/12 years,/? < .01) bruise (F(3, 79) =
8.57, p < .001; 4/5 have a lower mean than all
other age groups, p < .01) and broken leg (F(3,
79) = 7.66, p < .001; 4/5 have a lower mean than
9/10 and 11/12 years,/? < .01).
Discussion
This study has shown the development of chil¬
dren's understanding of health and illness
between the ages of 4 years to 12 years. As
predicted, children's knowledge of illness
becomes more sophisticated and accurate with
age. This was found both for general definitions
of health and illness and also for knowledge of
specific illnesses. Furthermore, it was expected
that children would hold differing levels of
knowledge for the specific illnesses investigated
and this was supported with knowledge of
injuries being much greater than the illnesses
with a particularly low understanding of asthma.
In this study, the most frequent definition of
illness was based upon the presence of symp¬
toms and feeling poorly. Even some of the 4/5-
year-olds were able to define illness in this way,
although the majority answered 'don't know'. In
contrast, definitions of health were more
commonly based on behavioural factors there¬
fore indicating health is not necessarily defined
as the opposite of illness. Millstein and Irwin
(1987) suggest that health and illness are differ¬
ent but overlapping constructs. They looked at
these concepts among adolescents and found
that the degree of overlap varied with age with
older adolescents seeing health as more than
just absence of illness. The results of the present
study extend this by looking earlier into child¬
hood. The results show polarization of the
concepts as the 9/10-year-olds gave definitions
that appear to associate health with absence of
illness but 11/12-year-olds move away from
illness-related definition and gave more defi¬
nitions based on health-related behaviours.
It is well documented that children's under¬
standing of illness becomes more sophisticated
with age (e.g. Bibace & Walsh, 1981; Charman
& Chandiramani, 1995) and this study supports
this further by including a wider range of
illnesses and processes than previous studies.
The most commonly found effect of age in this
study was that 4/5 years had lower means than
the older age groups (9/10 years and 11/12
years). In addition, 7/8 years also frequently
showed differences from the 4/5 years, for
example accuracy of judgements of time
course. This indicates equivalent developmental
progression across illnesses and across
processes. Comparing across illnesses for each
process has shown that children can have under¬
standing of one ailment without understanding
another to the same degree. For example,
although accuracy of explanations of causality
of toothache was quite high across all age
groups, accuracy of explanations for asthma,
another non-contagious illness, was significantly
lower. This indicates the importance of
considering the variation in understanding of
specific illnesses when researching children's
concepts.
In order to provide a complete overview of
the findings and interpret them in respect to
previous literatures in both developmental and
health psychology, each illness will now be
considered separately. The following paragraphs
mainly discuss understanding of causality as this
has been the focal point of previous literature
and it is therefore easy to draw comparisons but
the findings of the other processes are also
considered.
Despite the cold being a common contagious
ailment that children are likely to have exten¬
sive direct experience of, there was a large
proportion of misconceptions made apparent in
this study. Specifically, children at all ages were
more likely to refer to cold weather than con¬
tagion to explain the causality of colds. Sigelman
and Alfeld-Liro (1995) suggest this misconcep¬
tion may be prevalent due to the nature of colds.
The symptoms of a cold can be described as
cold-like e.g. runny noses and chills and children
tend to get more colds in the winter than in the
summer. More importantly, however, children
are frequently told by their parents that they
will catch a cold if they go out in the cold
weather without proper protection. This indi¬
cates how powerful parental influence is in
giving children advice related to health. Despite
a naive conception of causality of colds, the chil¬
dren in this study did show fairly sophisticated
reasoning of the other aspects of colds such as
definitions, prevention and recovery.
Knowledge of the causality of chicken pox
was greater than for cold, which further suggests
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it is not a lack of understanding of contagion
that underlies misconceptions of cold. This study
shows that children are capable of conceptual¬
izing the causality of chicken pox in biological
terms even at age 4/5 years. However, expla¬
nations of the biological mechanisms involved
in contagion do not become accurate until age
9/10 years. Knowledge relating to chicken pox
specifically has only been investigated by a
handful of studies (e.g. Charman & Chandira-
mani, 1995; Peltzer & Promtussananon, 2003)
but knowledge of contagion has been exten¬
sively studied (e.g. Kalish, 1996a, 1996b;
Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999). The finding of this
study that children are capable of referring to a
biological framework of understanding at age
4/5 years without having knowledge of the
specific mechanisms at work would appear to
bridge the gap between contradictory findings
by these studies. It is possible that children have
an idea that some illnesses are caught off other
people (Kalish, 1996a, 1996b) without knowing
the details (Au & Romo, 1999; Solomon &
Cassimatis, 1999). In addition, the older age
groups of children have the beginnings of an
understanding of the incubation period involved
in this contagious illness and the time to recov¬
ery. However, the younger children frequently
answer that someone would get chicken pox
immediately showing little understanding of the
biological processes involved in the reproduc¬
tion of viruses and this effect on the body.
Of all the illnesses investigated in this study,
understanding of asthma was the lowest.
Asthma is a non-contagious illness and there is
extensive literature on children's understanding
of asthma in terms of health care and practice
(Eiser, Town & Tripp, 1988; Ireland, 1997;
McQuaid et ah, 2002). This study adds to this
literature by considering a general sample of
children and the development of their under¬
standing of asthma in relation to other illnesses.
In terms of biological understanding, causality
of asthma is sometimes understood in terms of
inheritance. Although it is not entirely clear
what causes asthma, older children in this study
considered there to be a genetic component.
Physical causes of asthma reported by children
included triggers for allergies and exercise,
which were noted by all age groups except the
4/5 years. Understanding of the other features of
asthma was low across all age groups. Recovery
strategies specified by the older age groups
included using inhalers and avoiding behaviours
such as running which might trigger an attack.
Children in the 11/12-year-old age group were
capable of giving quite sophisticated and accu¬
rate accounts of the decay processes involved in
toothache and even children in the younger age
groups were able to identify physical/behav¬
ioural factors that would contribute to
toothache such as not brushing their teeth. This
contradicts previous research that found that
children overextended contagion as an expla¬
nation of toothache (Kister & Patterson, 1980)
and expands on Siegal's (1988) finding, which
argued children did not perceive toothache as a
contagious illness but did not suggest how chil¬
dren understood the cause of toothache. Knowl¬
edge of prevention of toothache was high which
reflects the efforts of community and school
health programmes to educate children in the
benefits of oral hygiene. The most frequently
mentioned recovery strategy was going to the
dentist and there was some understanding
displayed as to the time course of toothache.
Children in all age groups showed compre¬
hensive knowledge of both injuries: bruise and
broken leg. Definitions were attempted by all
age groups and a mix of symptoms and causal¬
ity was mentioned. Causal explanations were all
physical but more detailed and accurate expla¬
nations were given by the older children. Inter¬
estingly, some psychological strategies for
recovery were mentioned here which were not
found for the illnesses. Prevention strategies
mainly focused on 'being careful' and there was
some degree of awareness of the time course of
injuries. This finding that knowledge of injuries
is greater than of illness supports Williams and
Binnie (2002) who suggest that this is due to
greater experience with minor injuries as well as
the more observable external effects of injuries.
Previously, research such as this has been used
to inform practice in health care settings. For
example, Rushforth (1999) describes how
research into children's understanding of health
and illness can inform care in hospital situations
such as preparing children for medical
procedures. However, there has been little
attempt to relate this research to more general
health education in schools. Accurate health
education is important as illustrated by how
predominant the misconception that colds are
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caused by cold weather is in children of all ages.
In addition, the children in this study were
capable of citing many variables that would
keep them healthy but this did not indicate a
deep understanding of processes involved in
staying healthy. Further, it is not clear whether
this knowledge of what makes you healthy leads
to appropriate health-maintaining behaviours,
which could be an area of future research
(Bennett & Murphy, 1997; Conner & Norman,
1995; Pitts, 1996).
It is a prevalent finding in this study, that chil¬
dren understand more about illness than
research from the 1980s would suggest. There
are two possible reasons for this. First, early
research did not use child-friendly method¬
ologies. This present study used a child-sensitive
open-ended questioning method that did not
place unnecessary task demands on any of the
age groups. It is acknowledged that due to
limited verbal ability, the 4/5-year-olds may not
have been capable of displaying their full under¬
standing but they were still able to participate
and offer answers for all of the interview items.
Second, there is more awareness of health and
illness in the public domain and a greater
emphasis on health education in schools. This
could be leading to increased interest and
greater understanding of health-related issues in
this generation of children compared to the
early 1980s, which indicates the potential of
successful health education.
In terms of future research, it would be useful
to take a variety of approaches in exploring chil¬
dren's understanding of illness. These should
include both quantitative research to replicate
and extend the findings presented here and also
qualitative work to provide an in-depth account
of the variety of children's understandings
around different illnesses. This study has
successfully extended research on children's
understanding of illness by including dimen¬
sions other than causation. However, an import¬
ant remaining issue concerns the experiences
that influence the development of children's
understanding of illness. It has been suggested
that both health education in schools and infor¬
mation from other sources such as parents and
doctors have a profound effect on children's
knowledge of illness and further work should
look to utilize this in determining the best way
to inform children about illness.
This study aimed to provide a more compre¬
hensive picture of children's understanding of
illness than previous research by investigating
knowledge of specific contagious illnesses, non¬
contagious illnesses and injuries. It has been
shown that children are capable of talking about
illness as young as age 4/5 years and their expla¬
nations and understanding become more
complex with maturity. This research has
important implications for the timing and
content of health education and for theories of
cognitive development.
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MYANT & WILLIAMS: CHILDREN'S CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS
Appendix. Coding system
Question
(inter-judger reliability) Score Category label Example
Definition of illness (0.93) 3 Symptoms/physical 'Be sick'
2 Behavioural 'You have to stay off school'
1 Psychological 'Be sad'
0 Don't know
Definition of health (0.91) 3 Absence of symptoms 'You're fit and you're able to run and stuff
2 Behavioural 'Means you eat a lot of healthy stuff like
fruit and vegetables'
1 Psychological 'To be happy and to run around without
having to worry'
0 Don't know
Definition (0.97) 2 Causality 'If it was cold and you had been outside a lot'
1 Symptoms 'Red spots and itchy'
0 Don't know
Causality (0.93) 2 Biological 'Someone else might have had it and they
might have coughed germs onto Johnny'
1 Physical 'Swallowed lots of water from a bubble bath'
0 Don't know
Accuracy measure (0.86) 4 Complete understanding of mechanism
3 Partial understanding of mechanism
2 Basic understanding
1 Partial misunderstanding
0 Complete misunderstanding/don't know
Prevention (0.90) 2 Biological 'Not gone near the person who had the cold
so that their germs couldn't get inside you'
1 Physical 'Don't eat sweets'
0 Don't know
Time course [1 ](0.85) 2 Complete understanding of time course
and [2] (0.90) 1 Some understanding of time course
0 No understanding of time course/don't know
Recovery (0.89) 4 Seek medical help 'Go to the doctors/hospital/dentist'
3 Behavioural control 'Get crutches'
2 Symptom relief 'Inhaler, then he would be able to run around
as normal'
1 Psychological 'Think like she didn't have a bruise'
0 Don't know
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